NEW REPORT: Fukushima five years later

25 March 2016

Fukushima five years later: back to normal?

by David BOILLEY, Chair of the Association for the Control of Radioactivity in the West (ACRO) and NTW member, commissionned by GreenPeace Belgium

SUMMARY
-The nuclear disaster at the Fukushima daiichi nuclear power plant (FDNPP) ranked at Level 7 (the highest level) of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) is widely recognized as man-made. It contaminated a vast territory in Japan and was responsible of the displacement of about 160 000 persons according to official statistics and contaminated territories that were not evacuated are also strongly affected by the disaster. The crippled reactors are still discharging radioelements into the environment and tainted water piles up in tanks without any solution in sight. TepCO has yet to fully stabilize the power station and its priority is still to reduce the threat. The possibility of the consequences of another natural disaster can’t be ignored, as the crippled reactors are more fragile than usual reactors and their containment vessels are leaking. They might not be able to sustain an earthquake or a tsunami, which would lead to a new massive release of radioelements.

-Evacuees: The total number of evacuees is not well known, nevertheless about 160000 people fled from contaminated territories according to official statistics (who either forced to evacuate during emergency phase or evacuated on their own). Five years later the number of nuclear displaced persons is still about 100 000 as evacuation orders have been only lifted in three places. Behind these figures there are individuals whose life was disrupted. Major nuclear disasters are firstly human disasters leading to the displacement of many people who lose everything from dwellings, family life, social relationship and future.

-Radiation protection: This report shows that both evacuation and return policies are based on a lax interpretation of the international recommendations that are not very binding. 20 mSv per year corresponds to the highest value of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) reference interval in case of existing situation that includes post-accident. ICRP recommends lowering with time the reference level to 1 mSv per year. Consequently, Japanese authorities have adopted this value as a long-term target, without a precise agenda for compliance.
30 years after the Chernobyl disaster, international radiological protection rules and practices are not adapted for populations living in contaminated territories. They are extremely confusing and impossible to enforce, allowing authorities to adapt rules to their own advantage rather than the affected populations. Rule should be binding in terms of limits, temporal evolution and operational quantities.

-Food contamination: Regarding the food issue, Japanese authorities initially failed to foresee the scale of problems with contaminated food and crops and were repeatedly caught by surprise in the following months. As a consequence, many people’s trust in the government was eroded and the population concerned about food safety reconsidered their relationship to the state and food. Government’s policy was focused on food safety but it did not address how to generate a climate of trustworthiness about food. Enforcing technical standards alone is not sufficient to overcome consumer mistrust. The challenge is to bring together food safety and the peace of mind that comes with it.

-What future for evacuated territories? Decontamination is not very effective and generated huge amount of waste for which all proposed solutions failed because of the opposition of the populations. Handling radioactive waste is a difficult issue in all countries that have accumulated significant amounts, but after a severe nuclear accident, it is even more difficult as volumes are enourmous. 20 millions cubic meters are expected in Fukushima prefecture and the projected storage centre will cover 16km2. Decontamination proved to be deceiving as dose rates have not significantly fallen compared to what can be observed in the forest. Nevetheless authorities keep encouraging inhabitants to come back.

-Residents are reluctant to come back: So far, evacuation orders were lifted in parts of Tamura and Kawauchi, and in Naraha in 2015; all these areas lying within the less contaminated parts of the 20km evacuation zone and evacuation recommendations around scattered hotspots are also completely lifted. But residents are reluctant to come back and contaminated areas are facing aging and depopulation problems.Facts prove that return to normalcy is impossible after a large-scale nuclear disaster such as the ones that occurred at Chernobyl and Fukushima. United Nation’s guidelines on internally displaced persons urge authorities to ensure the full participation of internally displaced persons in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration. But in Japan their participation is reduced to “explanation meetings” usually organized behind closed doors without any presence of media, NGOs, legal or independent experts and thus leaving evacuees with little recourse. Affected communities see no end to the severe hardship they are facing and are suffering. To stay or to flee, to come back or to relocate are difficult choices in a no-win situation. Number of people suffering from psychological disorders such as depression and post-traumatic stress disorder is larger thant usual among both evacuated and non-evacuated people.

Conclusions
The impact of the accident still continues and responses that can be accepted by the affected populations are urgently required. Residents in the affected areas are still struggling to recover from the effects of the accident. They continue to face grave concerns, including the health effects of radiation exposure, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and the environmental contamination of vast areas of land.
After a nuclear disaster, many residents distrust authorities and official experts that failed to protect them. But recovery paths require a good coordination between authorities and the populations, which means new ways for deliberation and decision. Beyond the pain of the affected persons, a nuclear disaster also shakes the ground of democracy. Japanese citizens have proved to be resourceful about the measurement of radioactivity. Citizen mapping was done all over and food monitoring prompted authorities, producers and retailers to strengthen their controls and finally led to a decrease of intake of radioelements. Why such an open process that proved to be effective is not possible when deciding about the fate of contaminated territories and affected populations?

Link to the full report: http://fukushima.eu.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Fukushima_back_to_normal_ACRO_2016.pdf

EVENT NTW in the European Parliament 22/03/16: Fukushima 5 years after, what are the lessons for Europe?

18 March 2016

Video of Michèle Rivasi

16 March 2016

Voici la dernière vidéo de Michèle Rivasi sur la sûreté nucléaire et le risque terroriste

NEWSLETTER – AUTUMN 2015

17 December 2015

Newsletter – Autumn 2015

Position – Emergency Preparedness and Response	Position – Transparency
11.12 \| Applying Fukushima’s lessons in EP&R	10.12 \| Is Belgium able to extend its Doel 1 & 2 reactors?
A NTW position on the implementation process of the BSS Directive	NTW watchs the respect of Aarhus and Espoo Conventions

During the Post-Fukushima European Nuclear Safety Stress Tests, civil society has drawn the attention of EU and national authorities to the urgent necessity to update and rescale the existing EP&R provisions in the EU. With the new BSS directive, NTW calls on the Commission to ensure an effective and qualitative transposition and a civil society involvement at the earliest stages of this process.	On 30 November 2015, an agreement between Electrabel and the Belgian Federal Government was reached to extend by 10 years the lifetime of nuclear reactors Doel 1 & 2. But it breaks international rules for transparency and safety, as ensuring an environmental impact assessment process. Lifetime extension of power plants must take into account a high level of safety measures to protect the population, but also the environment.


Support – RICOMET’s appeal	Support – E-Track advisory group’s statement
29.10 \| Broadening social and ethical dimensions	29.11\| Need to reinforce E-Track project
NTW supports the RICOMET’s appeal	NTW supports the statement of the E-Track Advisory group

NTW supports the RICOMET’s call “Appeal to implement Responsible Research and Innovation in Euratom nuclear research, development and activities”. During core scientific and nuclear research and development, NTW highly recommends the incorporation of activities to broaden the social, participatory and ethical dimensions. We need social sciences to understand the nuclear world.	The Commission has started an effort called E-Track for the promotion and enhancement of public participation in the implementation of energy policies. The first project is about radioactive waste management. One and a half years after E-track setting up, NTW shares the Advisory group concern about the current state and future of the project: inadequate resources, limited use of information collection, the lack of political support, etc.


Workshop – Emergency Preparedness and Response	Workshop – Radioactive Waste Management
03.12 \| Importance to engage civil society	07.09 \| Public participation in the area of RWM
NTW’s participation in a workshop organised by the European Commission	NTW at European Economic and Social Committee’s workshop

On 3 December 2015, a workshop “More effective EP&R arrangements at the EU level under the BSS Directive” was organised by the European Commission. NTW was invited to give a presentation on public information and stakeholder involvement in EP&R, made by Nadja Zeleznik. It was an opportunity to stress the importance to engage civil society in each step of EP&R and to take into account CS recommendations.	On 7 September, the EESC organised a workshop on public participation in the area of Radioactive Waste Management. This workshop was an opportunity for reviewing initiatives and practices with regard to public participation in RWM across the EU. Discover two presentations made by Philip Kearney and Paul Dorfman, setting the scene and highlighting the importance of transparency and public participation in RWM.


INFO – Paks II, Hungary	NTW Membership
07.12 \| Outlook on the IEA procedure for Paks II project	2015 \|New members at NTW
Compilation made by NTW of Paks II transboundary hearing feedbacks	Welcome!

A new project with two reactor units from Rosatom is planned as an addition to the existing four-block nuclear power plant, Paks-1 that currently generates some 40% of the Hungarian energy production. An environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure for this project is currently being conducted. An EIA Report has been submitted and public hearings organised. NTW has compiled the available feedbacks.	Nuclear Transparency Watch is pleased to announce the arrival of new NTW members: Piotr Stankiewicz, NTW qualified member (Poland), Josep Puig, NTW representative of Grup de Científics i Tècnics per un Futur No Nuclear (Spain) and Gabriele Mraz, NTW representative of Austrian Institute of Ecology (Austria). Welcome!


Info – Climate change	Info – COP 21
07.12 \| How might climate change affect nuclear safety?	30.11 \| Limited access for the CS in the COP process
Climate change and Safety	COP21 and Transparency

Nuclear power plants already face issues that may be related to climate change: floods, heat waves, storms, invasion of jellyfish and seaweed, rising sea levels, etc. With global warming, some of these natural events may be more severe. Events like floods or heat waves can have a serious impact on their cooling system. Is the European nuclear fleet ready to face those threats?	Two years ago, a significant portion of civil society delegates to COP19 simply walked out. They had agreed to leave the COP19 together to denounce the perceived closeness of governments to industrial lobbies, and to express their rejection of the false solutions. The COP 21 seems to offer to multinationals advertising opportunities and privileged access of economic agents to policy makers and the negotiations space.

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Nuclear Transparency Watch promotes the conditions for democratic transparency, effective public participation and safety in the nuclear sector.

NTW POSITION PAPER: Applying the lessons of Fukushima in EP&R

17 December 2015

Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R):
Applying the lessons of Fukushima in the context of the implementation of the Basic Safety Standards (BSS) Directive

Download: NTW position paper on the current implementation process of the EP&R provisions of 2013/59/EURATOM (BSS) Directive

11th December 2015

Summary
During the Post-Fukushima European Nuclear Safety Stress Tests, Civil Society (CS) has drawn the attention of EU and national authorities to the urgent necessity to update and rescale the existing provisions of EP&R in the EU as a component of an in-depth nuclear safety review, a key challenge here being achieving the practical implementation of EP&R provisions at European and National levels.

In December 2013, the European Commission completed a first appraisal of the current state of Nuclear EP&R provisions in Europe (the ENCO study – “Review of current off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and response arrangements in EU member states and neighbouring countries“).

NTW has carried out (2013-2014) a review of existing EP&R provisions at EU and national levels and published a report[1]synthesising the CS concerns and expectations and a position paper[2] summarising the findings and recommendations for the scaling up of the European capacity to cope with a large scale accident such as Fukushima.

The revised Basic Safety Standards (BSS) Directive (2013/59/Euratom) involves the updating of the EP&R provisions by 6th February 2018 and offers a real opportunity for improving the current situation.

On December 3rd 2015, NTW was invited by DG ENER to participate in the Workshop “More Effective EP&R at the EU level under the BSS Directive” involving the representatives of the Member States’ Authorities that are in charge of the transposition of this Directive. It was for NTW an opportunity to present the views and expectations of Civil Society on this very sensitive issue. See: the presentation of Dr Nadja Železnik, Chair of the NTW EP&R Working Group, “Public information and stakeholder involvement in EP&R “.

The presentation of NTW illustrated the potential contribution of CS to an effective and qualitative transposition of the BSS Directive.
NTW calls on the European Commission to support CS in:
1) further refining the picture of the current challenges for EP&R country by country in Europe,
2) establishing the criteria for an effective and qualitative transposition in a participatory way, and
3) defining, testing and implementing stakeholder engagement methods and processes.
This should be incorporated in the DG energy work program and give rise to action starting in the course of 2016.

Download: NTW position paper on the current implementation process of the EP&R provisions of 2013/59/EURATOM (BSS) Directive

[1] https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/NTW-Report.pdf
[2] https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/NTW-Postition-paper.pdf

Is Belgium able to extend its Doel 1 & 2 reactors?

10 December 2015

On 30 November 2015, an agreement between Electrabel and the Federal Government was reached to extend by 10 years the nuclear reactors Doel 1 & 2 lifetime. But this decision breaks international rules for transparency and safety. Lifetime extension of power plants must take into account a high level of safety measures to protect the population, but also the environment. The right of the public to participate in an environmental impact assessment should be respected.

A denial of international obligations for transparency
To extend the lifetime of Doel 1 & 2 reactors, Belgium must carry out an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and a national and transboundary public participation, as prescribed by Aarhus and Espoo conventions that apply notably to all member countries of the European Union. In May 2015[1], NTW had contacted the Belgian energy minister Christine Marghem to emphasize the importance of respecting international obligations to organize large-scale EIA and a process of cross-border public participation before any final decision. But it seems that the minister, who has still not responded, has no knowledge of international standards of transparency.
These international obligations are essential for safety. Doel 1 & 2 have been designed on the knowledge and technology of the 1970s. The last past years, the understanding of accident scenarios and nuclear technology have evolved, but also the environment of the nuclear reactors and the society as a whole have changed drastically. Therefore, a decision to extend the lifetime of nuclear reactors should automatically involves a comprehensive and transparent environmental impact assessment and public participation process for Belgian citizens, but also Dutch citizens.
NTW strongly supports the complaint filed by Greenpeace Belgium on 30 November with the Council of State to challenge the decisions of the government and the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) for approving the 10-year extension of Doel 1 and 2. NTW also welcomes the complaint filled by Benegora[2], a Dutch environmental organisation, with the Belgian State Court, because Dutch border municipalities and their citizens are not able to participate in a cross-border public participation and environmental impact assessment process. Meanwhile, the Dutch Province of Zeeland has also passed a motion in which they call upon the Belgian authorities to allow the citizens of Zeeland to participate in a consultation process concerning the lifetime extension of Doel1&2.

A flawed decision from a safety perspective
Questions in terms of safety arise in case of lifetime extension of nuclear plants designed initially for a period of 30 years. The FANC speaks of “the safest reactors in Belgium”, but are the highest-level safety criteria applied? Are preparedness and response measures to emergency situations suitable for this extension?
This issue is very important for the Doel nuclear power plant, which is the plant installed in most populous region in Europe. Considering a radius of 30 km, the population around the Doel plant (1,510,000) turns out to be 9 times greater than the population who lived around Fukushima, at the time of the accident (172,000 residents). In addition, a serious nuclear accident in Belgium will certainly have repercussions beyond its borders. The Netherlands is situated a less than 3 km from the Doel plant.
An example of EP&R failure is the issue of receptions places in case of a large-scale evacuation, which is not sufficiently studied by the Belgian authorities. Of the four planned reception centers in the preceding Antwerp emergency plan for the Doel plant (the Sports Palace, the civil protection in Brasschaat, the slaughterhouse of Antwerp and Haasdonk’s Fort), the last two are completely dilapidated buildings[3]. For the new response and emergency plan of the province of Antwerp, there is only one reception center that is mentioned: Campus Vesta in Ranst, whose capacity is not indicated. Providing a single reception center, for a nuclear plant in a densely populated area, is not consistent.
Lifetime extension of power plants must take into account a high level of safety measures to protect the population, but also the environment. It is high time that EP&R measures take into account the lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster. The environment around Doel has fundamentally changed over the last 30 years and the risk of reactors failure increases exponentially over time. Ten years of extra life adds 25% additional time in which these reactors are exposed to various risks.

The challenges of decommissioning
Extending the lifetime of Doel 1 &2 has halted preparations for decommissioning. An amount of € 24.7 million has already been spent for the preparation of Doel 1 & 2 decommissioning[4]. Indeed, as the nuclear phase-out law passed in 2003 provided the closure of Doel 1 and 2 plants for 2015, Synatom, branch of Electrabel specializing in the management of radioactive materials, had already begun preparing decommissioning for an amount of 24.7 million, when the parliament was finally given the green light last June to the extension. Will the results of this study be still valid in 10 years?

[1]https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/activities/nuclear-power-plants-ageing/nuclear-transparency-watch-warns-belgian-minister-to-respect-transparency-laws-in-lifetime-extension-of-doel-1-2-nuclear-power-reactors.html
[2]http://www.benegora.nl/28-levensduurverlening-doel-1-2
[3]Study commissioned by Greenpeace Belgium, “Insuffisances des plans d’urgence nucléaire belges :les leçons de la catastrophe de Fukushima n’ont pas été tirées”, David Boilley et Mylène Josset, Janvier 2015. http://www.greenpeace.org/belgium/Global/belgium/report/2015/RapportDavidBoilleyFR.pdf
[4] Response of the Energy Minister Marie-Christine Marghem to a written parliamentary question posed by the Member Jean-Marc Nollet

Overview of the EIA procedure for the Paks II nuclear project in Hungary

10 December 2015

The Paks Nuclear Power Plant is located on the right bank on the Danube, approximately 100 km south of Budapest. A new project with two reactor units from Rosatom (VVER1200) is planned as an addition to the existing four-block nuclear power plant, Paks-1 that currently generates some 40% of the Hungarian energy production.
The environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure for this project is currently being conducted. It’s made under Hungarian law, implementing the Espoo Convention (the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context), the EU EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment) and the Aarhus Convention (the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters).

THE EIA REPORT
In April 2015, Hungary submitted the EIA Report for the transboundary EIA procedure. This EIA Report was prepared in order to identify and evaluate the impact of the planned nuclear power plant technology on the environment. The study was prepared by the project company MVM Paks II Ltd[1], which has submitted its application for the development consent together with the EIA documentation to the competent Hungarian authority, South Transdanubian Regional Inspectorate for Environment and Nature. Today, The Paks EIA process belongs to the Baranya County Government Office.
A few months after the official documents for the EIA procedure have been published, Benedek Jávor, Member of the European Parliament and of NTW, obtained secret documents. On our website[2], he declared that the MVM documents contain fundamental mistakes. The grid integration was not modelled as would have been necessary. The construction was not budgeted and planned, as would be needed at this stage of implementation. The analysis completely ignored external factors like the application of the EU competition law. The thermal pollution of the Danube caused by the cooling water was miscalculated.

To better analyse the EIA report, several expert assessments have been published:

Download: Expert statement on the Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of the PAKS II NPP
by Oda Becker, commissioned by Greenpeace Germany, October 2015.
The independent nuclear expert Oda Becker was commissioned by Greenpeace Germany to prepare an Expert Statement on the EIA report. The objective of the assessment was to investigate whether the information presented in this study is reliable and sufficient to determine the potential risks for other countries, in particular Germany. This expert evaluation comes to the following conclusion: “The content of the EIS was found to not to be in line with the EIA Directive general requirements and IAEA specific recommendations. Much additional information is necessary to assess the possible consequences of the Paks II for Germany. However, the information at hand indicates that a severe accident with a major release and consequences for Germany cannot excluded.”

Download: summary of Expert analysis on the environmental impact assessment documentation (EIAD)
by experts commissioned by Benedek Javor, Member of the European Parliament and NTW, November 2015.
The conclusions of the expert analysis reveal that the EIAD is extremely low-quality; it is based on false data and false assumptions and has very little to do with reality.
Zsuzsanna Koritár, expert of Energiaklub and member of NTW, also pointed out the main deficiencies of the EIS, such as the unresolved problem of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, the inadequate analyses regarding nuclear safety, the heating problems, as well as the lack of alternative energy scenarios.

PUBLIC HEARINGS
On 7 May 2015, public hearings were held in Hungary, Paks and in Autumn 2015 all over Europe (Germany, Ukraine and Austria).

Find feedbacks from NGO representatives:

Public hearing in Paks, Hungary
According to Jan Haverkamp, the Paks hearing did not fulfill EIA and Aarhus specification, some of the reasons being the restrictions for participation of citizens and NGOs and the fact that only short questions were allowed during the hearings.
Download: Comments on the environmental impact assessment implementation of new nuclear power plant units at the paks site made by MVM Paks II
By Ir. Jan Haverkamp, expert consultant on nuclear energy and energy policy for Greenpeace in central and eastern Europe, qualified member of NTW
+ Addendum

Public hearing in Vienna, Austria
On 23rd September 2015, a public hearing for the planned new reactors in Paks was held in Vienna, with 65 attended people opposing a podium of 20 hungarians delegates. The deadline for public participation for Austria has to be prolonged, as 7 additional official documents were published on the MVM website, without have been officially submitted to Austria. Therefore the public was not aware of their existence while participating in the hearing.
Download: Summary of the public hearing in Vienna, transboundary environmental impact assessment NPP Paks II
By Gabriele Mraz, Austrian institute of ecology, member of NTW, September 2015.

Public hearing in Munich, Germany
The public hearing for Germany was held in Munich on 20 and 21 October 2015.
According to Brigitte Artmann, member of NTW, “this public hearing didn’t answer to every raised question, questions still remain open. Further serious questions about the lack of rescue staff in the emergency case were raised. Moreover, 30.000 submissions from Germany demand that German public concerns must be included into the EIA procedure without discrimination. Hungarians will get technical information of the chosen reactor and another hearing with documents in Hungarian language. German NGOs demand the same for Germany.”
Download: Summary of the public hearing in Munich, transboundary environmental impact assessment NPP Paks
By Brigitte Artmann, Greens Fichtelgebirge, member of NTW, October 2015.

Oda Becker commented also that: “On the basis of the known factors and the formally issued, more than 2,000-page environmental impact study, the biggest problem with Paks-2 is that serious accidents involving large quantities of radioactive material emissions cannot be ruled out. From the received reactions of the Hungarian delegation, the picture emerges that they believe that if something is highly unlikely, then it doesn’t have to be, because it “cannot happen”. This is not a modern, not a responsible way of thinking.”

THREE PROCEDURES LAUNCHED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
End of November 2015, the European Commission announced the launch of three procedures about the new nuclear power plant in Paks. First, an infringement procedure was launched by the Internal Market Commissioner on the violation of EU public procurement rules. Secondly, the DG Environment decided to further examine the classification of information contained in the Paks documents, as they might violate rules concerning the publicity of environmental information. And lastly, Margrethe Vestager, the Commissioner in charge of competition, drew the conclusion following her preliminary investigation that state aids by the Hungarian government cannot be excluded despite the contrary claims of the government. Therefore, she wishes to have a more thorough investigation on the question.

[1]http://www.mvmpaks2.hu/hu/Dokumentumtarolo/International%20chapter.pdf
[2]https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/a-la-une/recent-developments-on-paks2.html

How might climate change affect nuclear safety?

7 December 2015

CLIMATE CHANGE – NUCLEAR SAFETY

Nuclear power plants already faces issues that may be related to climate change: floods, heat waves, storms, invasion of jellyfish and seaweed, rising sea levels, etc. With global warming, some of these natural events may be more severe. Is the nuclear fleet ready to face those threats?

Nuclear power plants must be prepared to resist particular climatic hazards. Events like floods or heat waves can have a serious impact on their cooling system. Flooding is one of the major risks to which nuclear power plants must be prepared. To cool their reactors, these facilities use large amounts of water, 40 cubic meters per second and per reactor, which necessarily places them close to a river or the sea. This water dependence puts them at other risks: lack of available river water, blockage of access to cooling water by plant debris, jellyfish or sea weed bloom in the filter grids.

STORM SURGES
Safety checks following the Fukushima disaster in Japan in March 2011, when a 10 meter-high sea wall was overtopped by a tsunami, have shown that nuclear plants are at greater risk of catastrophic flooding as a result of climate change. Nuclear plants can be flooded and it happened several times.
In Bordeaux, on 27 December 1999, the Martin storm has made reached the seawater beyond the dikes oh the Blayais nuclear plant and the water has crept in utility tunnels. The reactors were immediately shut down by EDF, but the damage was done: electrical systems had to be shut down, including two of the four cooling circuits of reactor 1. As the plant still had electricity, pumping operations were started quickly, preventing a major accident. These operations lasted for weeks. The incident was rated level 2 on the INES scale[1].
In Britain, after discovering in May 2013 that one of their reactors at Dungeness would be at risk of inundation by seawater during a storm, the owners, EDF Energy, quietly shut it down. Dungeness is built on a shingle beach beside the English Channel. The company informed the Office for Nuclear Regulation that it was being shut down as a precaution. The reactor remained off-line five months in 2013 while a new sea wall was constructed.

HEAVY RAIN – SEA LEVEL RISE
Changes in rainfall regime may impact the behavior of cooling water supplies (rivers, streams, groundwater) and transmission lines. A change in the rain regime can in the long term change the bearing capacity of the underground. Even if the principal facilities (e.g. reactors) might not be concerned, related structures, piping and cabling can be.
Moreover, predicted increases in sea level may cause inundation of some sites. Many existing nuclear power stations are located on coastal sites because of the need for an isolated location with a plentiful supply of cooling water. Many are built at very low elevations, and are consequently highly vulnerable to the rising sea levels which global warming is expected to bring.This will be particularly true in the southeast of England[2].

HEAT WAVES
Nuclear power may face difficulties in working because of the heat. A rise in temperature may affect the performance of the cooling systems. During the brutal heat wave in 2003, a quarter of French reactors had to be shut down. Normally, the cooling system pumps water, uses it to cool the reactors and then rejects the heated water into the environment. But in case of a heat wave, cooling waters are collected in smaller quantities, they come out of the plant warmer than usual, with the possibility of damage to the flora and fauna. Each nuclear plant has standards for the tolerated heating of the water, which is of the order of one to several degrees. During the heat wave of 2003, EDF had obtained derogations to reject abnormally warm water in rivers. The proposed new nuclear power station in Paks is supposed to reduce capacity when cooling water emission temperature limits are reached. When this happens more frequently, this will influence the economic performance of the reactor.
In the face of climate change, heat peaks will still force to reduce nuclear power performance or to dump too hot water in natural environments. In France, over the last thirty years, the frequency and intensity of heat waves has increased. And that’s not all, since there are three in four chance that the number of days of heat waves will increase to 5 to 10 days in the southeast of France in the twenty-first century[3].

JELLYFISH AND SEAWEED BLOOM
Power plants in Europe do get closed down due to cooling water intake problems. Large amounts of jellyfish and seaweed more frequently block the cooling water inflows of nuclear reactors. In recent decades[4], dozens of cases were observed where jellyfish and seaweed caused the partial or complete shut down of coastal nuclear plants. In 2011, for example, in Scotland, two of the Torness reactors had to be shut down in the space of one week, when the seawater, used as a coolant, has been invaded by jellyfish. In France, the small ‘rose-de-mer’ jellyfish closed the Paluel nuclear plant, and in Sweden in the USA, plants have been closed down with massive influxes of larger umbrella- type jellyfish. Jellyfish are abundant in Europe coastal waters through the summer months and warmer conditions (often attributed to ‘global warming’) and exacerbate this risk.
To explain this phenomenon, there is a climate-related mechanism: it could be a combination of elevated temperatures in the oceans and some environmental changes, such as overfishing and ocean acidification. It could be that the rising acidity of the oceans – related to the increased level of carbon dioxide in the water- reduces the number of sea- shell animals (that need lots of calcium) but do not touch the jellyfish. In this new non-competition environment, jellyfish could take the opportunity to multiply.

Conclusion
All nuclear plants need large quantities of water for cooling so all must be built close to the sea, large rivers or lakes. This makes them vulnerable to sea level rise, storm surges and to the possible collapse of large dams upstream from poor construction, floodwater or seismic activity.
The vulnerability of power plants to risks of flooding and overwhelming heat raises the question of cooling systems of the nuclear reactors. Besides the issue of seismic risk and probability of flooding, it is important to ask how long time of autonomy have nuclear power plants to ensure cooling a reactor if it ever stops completely?
Since nuclear plants are designed to operate for as long as 60 years and need around a further century to decommission, accelerating sea level rise and more intense rainfall may present serious problems. The risk of a serious nuclear accident remains always above zero as a result of unexpected phenomena from climate change.

[1]Rapport sur l’inondation du site du Blayais survenue le 27 décembre 1999, Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety (IRSN), 2000. http://www.irsn.fr/FR/expertise/rapports_expertise/Documents/surete/rapport_sur_l_inondation_du_site_du_blayais.pdf

[2]Greenpeace Study, “The impacts of climate change on nuclear power stations sites”, 2007. http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/files/pdfs/nuclear/8176.pdf

[3] Report lead by Jean Jouzel, “Le climat de la France au 21è siècle”, volume 4, 2014. http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Le-climat-de-la-France-au-21e.html

[4] British Environment Agency, “Cooling Water Options for the New Generation of Nuclear Power Stations in the UK”, 2010. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/291077/scho0610bsot-e-e.pdf

Limited access for the Civil Society in the COP process

6 December 2015

COP 21 AND TRANSPARENCY

Two years ago, a significant portion of civil society delegates to COP19 simply walked out. They had agreed to leave the COP19 together to denounce the perceived closeness of governments to industrial lobbies, and to express their rejection of the false solutions. Today, the COP 21 seems to offer to multinationals advertising opportunities and privileged access of economic agents to policy makers and the negotiations space.

The sponsors of the COP21 – an advertisement for big corporations
Among the official sponsors of the COP 21[1], we find a large number of multinationals (including Engie, Renault-Nissan, EDF, BNP Paribas, etc.). We find notably key actors of the nuclear sector: EDF, which operates the 58 reactors at 19 nuclear plants across France, Areva, which manages the chain from fuel to plant – extraction and enrichment of uranium, transportation, recycling some of the waste … – and builds reactors, Engie (ex GDF-Suez), which has investments in Chooz and Tricastin plants and operates seven reactors in Belgium by Electrabel, Bouygues, specialized in plants structures – from the construction of the Flamanville EPR to the “sarcophagus” covering the Chernobyl plant- and Alstom, which designs turbines for nuclear power plants. BNP Paribas is also one of the sponsors, which is the largest bank in the euro area but also one of the most involved banks in the financing of nuclear power (13.5 billion euros between 2000 and 2009). Bolloré and Renault-Nissan are also key actors by defending the nuclear-powered electric cars.
To be one of the COP21 sponsors is a major opportunity for advertising. The brochure “Become a partner”[2], developed by the Secretariat responsible for the organization of the COP in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides the business case to attract sponsors: “The partners of COP21 will have the opportunity to Showcase their actions to the most important climate stakeholders. “Brand your organisation as a climate leader before and during COP21”. “Network with more than 500 leaders.” “Speak on panels with high-level leaders from the public and private sector”.Moreover, they are ensured of having a 60% tax-exempt for their contribution.

The exhibition “COP21 Solutions” – solutions by and for multinationals
The exhibition “COP21 solutions”, which takes place from 4 to 10 December at the Grand Palais in Paris, is expected to attract nearly 50,000 visitors. Event partners, such as Engie and Renault-Nissan[3], have paid large sums to obtain high visibility within the exhibition and privileged access to policymakers. Among the “solutions” presented on the climate solutions hub, there is a near monopoly of the multinationals. On the 284 “solutions”, more than two-thirds come from companies, to which should be added solutions from professional associations and research institutions with very similar economic backgrounds. SMEs can be counted on the fingers of both hands. In this way, the solutions advocated by large companies are present in force. For example, Engie has presented 27 solutions, nearly 10% of solutions presented on the website. A little more than forty solutions come from local authorities, and only 17 come from associations.
The French government has never hidden that his choice to focus on “solutions” was intended to advertise the products and technologies of French companies. The sponsors of the COP21 and the COP21 Solutions partners are recruited among the leading names of the French CAC 40. There are the two “historic” operators of the French market for electricity and gas, EDF (Electricité de France) and Engie (formerly GDF-Suez), for which the French state still holds respectively 84 and 33% of these companies. They have made a point of advertising themselves as the “Official partner of a low carbon world” for EDF or Engie, as the “European leader in energy transition”.

The events around the COP 21- a privileged access for multinationals
Beyond advertising offered to multinationals, there is the issue of privileged access of economic agents to policy makers and the negotiations space. “COP21 solutions” is not the only major event scheduled in December to promote “solutions” from multinationals. Many others events promoting business will also take place around the COP21, such as:
–       World Climate Summit, on 6 December at the Hotel Potocki, which describes itself as an ” original business, finance and government forum”. The entrance ticket is 1100 dollars for this summit and for the Sustainia charity gala that will bring together “senior business leaders and government officials”[4].
–       The “caring for climate business” Forum on 7 and 8 December in Le Bourget, is only accessible by invitation. It’s organized by the Global Compact of the UN, which continues to give privileged access to multinationals.
–       – The “Energy for Tomorrow” conference is organized by the New York Times on 8 and 9 December at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Paris. The entrance ticket costs 1200 euros for this event sponsored by Total, Renauld-Nissan and the American Chamber of Commerce in France.
–       The “Sustainable Innovation” Forum organized on 7 and 8 December by the United Nations Environment Programme and sponsored by BMW and nuclear giant Vattenfal. It is the largest official event parallel to COP21 and is presented as “the most important event focused on the business world during the COP”. It also has a web site whose address is confusing: http://www.cop21paris.org/.

The civil society organisations seem to have disappeared from the landscape of these events planned around the Grand Palais in December. Nevertheless, solutions are not possible without civil society participation. During the 15 days of negotiations, NTW supports civil society organizations presence in Paris to weigh into the debate.

[1]http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/partners/business-and-sponsors/
[2]http://cop21.org/become-a-partner/
[3]http://www.solutionscop21.org/en/
[4]http://cop21.org

NTW supports the RICOMET’s appeal

29 October 2015

NTW supports the RICOMET’s appeal to address social, ethical and participatory dimensions in the nuclear field

NTW supports the RICOMET’s appeal “Appeal to implement Responsible Research and Innovation in Euratom nuclear research, development and activities”.During core scientific and nuclear research and development, NTW highly recommends the incorporation of activities to broaden the social, participatory and ethical dimensions.

The relationships between technology and society should evolve
Nuclear power is far from being solely a technical subject. In the debates and discussions around nuclear power development, there is considerable attention to technical questions such as design and cost, but attention is also needed to social issues such as safety, justice, public perception, risk assessment, ethics, political acceptability, and public accountability.

Addressing social, ethical and participatory aspects is a lesson learned from Fukushima
The Fukushima catastrophe has profoundly altered the nuclear debate, as did the accidents at Three Miles Island and Chernobyl. In the 30 years between Three Miles Island and Fukushima, nuclear technology itself has not fundamentally evolved, but the way societies approach it has changed. Today, faced with risks of nuclear energy and waste management uncertainties, nuclear operations have to be reframed along the lines of transparency, governance and public participatory.

We need social sciences to understand the nuclear world
We feel that the ethical and societal dimensions of nuclear technologies and applications are of high importance and need to be strengthened. Nuclear risk, for example, has been a specific focus point, studied from the standpoint of accidents and their consequences on popular perceptions of risk. We need associations, unions and collectives in framing national and local debates on nuclear policy and sites.

The inconstancy of legislators and governments
Social science research is needed and even often requested by legislators and governments. But a difficulty is the scarcity of funding for social sciences in nuclear research. For example, social sciences and humanities deserve a more prominent place in Horizon 2020 Euratom projects. They should have an equal place to technical and industrial research, which are highly supported by EU funds and by different national funds especially established for their purpose (like radioactive waste management funds, decommissioning funds, special resources devoted to finance public institutes, etc.). In order to fulfill the full range of targets identified, it is important that the upcoming Euratom Horizon 2020 calls ensure the continuity of a forum for different stakeholders and include social, governance and transparency topics to the extend necessary.

NTW supports RICOMET’s position and calls the European Commission to take actions now rather than wait for the next nuclear crisis.