Options for EU Treaty Change in the Energy Field.
The conference underscored the need to give renewables a favourable treatment in the EU Treaties, similar to the one granted to nuclear power in the Euratom Treaty.
Prevent and anticipate through transparency and participation
NTW’s position on the Lifetime Extension of the reactors of Doel 1&2.
Some reasons why the lifetime of the reactors should not be extended according to NTW.
In 2009, the Belgian TSO FANC (Federal Agency for Nuclear Control) requested in its advice on the Strategy Note for life extension of the Belgian nuclear power plants that the operator must prove that a plant has the highest possible safety level, and the reassessment should be done with respect to the most recent PWR nuclear power plants, i.e., third generation nuclear reactors, such as the EPRs under construction since 2002 in Olkiluoto (Finland) and Flamanville (France). The safety requirements for these reactors are stricter than for the second- generation nuclear reactors.
The four main problems in the design of Doel 1 and 2 that show the reactors do not meet current safety requirements and should not be extended are the following:
The reactors of Doel 1&2 are not equipped with a “core catcher”, a system that helps to prevent the very hot and extremely radioactive corium from penetrating into the soil and groundwater in the event of a core melt. Even if FANC considered a core catcher as a necessary condition for the lifetime extension, this is no longer included in the final long term operation action plan that they approved.
The reactor buildings of Doel 1 and 2 have a single-walled concrete shell with a metal lining a few millimeters thick on the inside. The possibility of an accident involving a passenger aircraft was only taken into account when designing the most recent European reactors such as the EPR (under construction since 2002). Thus, no Belgian reactor has taken into account the risk of a 9/11-type terrorist attack. The plant operator’s long term operation action plan did not provide for any strengthening of the walls of the Doel 1 and 2 reactor buildings, to the extent that this would be practically possible at all.
The long-term operation action plan didn’t call for improvements to the cooling basin where the spent fuel rods from Doel 1 and 2 are stored after they have been discharged from the nuclear reactor. The building is not bunkered and is therefore vulnerable to external attacks.
The design of Doel 1 and 2 did not take earthquakes into account. The FANC states that they are not “considered as a factor influencing the design requirements, due to the weak seismic activity of the region”.
When the FANC approved the lifetime extension of Doel 1 and 2, the original standards were lowered in function of the “economic” feasibility for Electrabel, the plant operator. For example, the reactor vessel covers replacement removal was a condition for extending the operation. However, the need to replace the existing reactor vessel covers was identified during the stress tests in 2012 and confirmed by FANC in its analysis of Electrabel’s long-term operation file. It is important because the reactor vessel cover is subject to ageing and its integrity must be guaranteed at all times.
In April 2018, a leak developed in the primary cooling circuit in the Upper Plenum Injection line (UPI) of Doel 1, which cannot be separated from the reactor. Similar degradation was observed in Doel 2. This serious incident demonstrates that the degradation of critical components increases seriously with life extension, leading to irresponsible risks.
In the event the containment would fail, very large quantities of radioactivity may be released. Such an accident is categorized as INES-7 in the IAEA’s International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). However, this scenario is not taken into account in SCK’s EIA report.
The English version of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) by SCK does refer to the research work of the University of Vienna (BOKU, Flexrisk project) commissioned by the Austrian government for accidents in which the containment is breached and radioactivity is therefore discharged unfiltered into the atmosphere. It is strange that SCK does not elaborate on this and that it is not included in the Dutch version.
A simulation of a nuclear disaster at Doel 1 demonstrated that both the Netherlands and Germany would be seriously affected, and a large part of the countries would become uninhabitable for a long period of time.
Doel 1 and 2 are situated in a very densely populated area, at ten kilometers from the center of the city of Antwerp. In the event of a nuclear disaster, millions of people risk having to live for decades in a heavily contaminated area, lacking the financial means to start a new life elsewhere.
The Belgian nuclear emergency plans were drawn up to protect the population against the impact of a limited nuclear accident, in which only a small quantity of radioactive substances escapes from the affected nuclear reactor and in which the radioactive contamination outside the site of the nuclear power plant is minimal. The measures, provided for in the nuclear emergency plans, are totally inadequate to protect the population in the event of a major nuclear disaster.
The emergency plan zones are too minimalistic. The evacuation of a city located near a nuclear power plant – such as Antwerp, Liège or Namur – has never been evaluated nor prepared or simulated.
In a report, Bart Martens estimated the economic damage cost of a serious nuclear accident in Doel at more than €1400 billion. The port of Antwerp alone would lose €300 billion.
The nuclear operator Electrabel is only liable for €1.2 billion, i.e. less than one thousandth of what the real damage could amount to. The burdens and costs of this risk are thus passed on to the population, while the profits from nuclear energy are made by the company Engie.
The production of highly radioactive spent fuel is more or less linear with the production of electricity, thus with the extending the operation of Doel 1 and 2 would generate more fuel elements and more irradiated fuel.
In April last year, ONDRAF/NIRAS presented a plan on long-term management of the long-lived nuclear waste, but it does not provide any concrete answers to the most pertinent questions, such as at what depth the nuclear waste would be stored, the nature of the soil layer or the exact location. Despite forty years of research by ONDRAF/NIRAS, there is still no concept for the proposed geological disposal.
It is hardly acceptable to produce more irradiated nuclear fuel, without any plan for what to do with it.
With the argument of the need to maintain supply security, the Doel 1&2 reactors are allowed to operate even after the Belgium Constitutional Court has annulled the 2015 life-time extension permit. An analysis undertaken by the German Umweltinstitut in 2020 however showed that even the immediate shut-down of the reactors Doel 1&2 would not have negative impacts on supply security in Belgium.
Without the argument of maintaining supply security there is no valid justification left to keep Doel 1&2 operating until 2025; both reactors could be shut down immediately.
The NPP Doel went into operation in 1975. At this time, there was no legislation on Environmental Impact Assessments in force. Therefore, the Doel plant has never undergone such an assessment.
Doel lies in one of the most densely populated regions in Europe. In an article in Nature from 2011, Doel was labelled as the European NPP site with most population living in a 75 km circle. In about 30 km distance is the agglomeration area of Antwerp, where about 1.2 million people live today. When Doel went into operation, population density was lower.
An analysis of the changes in the environment which have occurred since the NPP’s start of operation until the end of the planned 40-years lifetime has not been undertaken. It is not sufficient to limit the EIA on changes in the environment which have occurred since 2015.
According to the Espoo Convention’s 2020 Guidance on the applicability of the Convention to the lifetime extension of nuclear power plants changes in the environment can count as major changes in the meaning of the Espoo Convention.
It has to be assessed if such an increase in population density has to result in changes in emergency preparedness and response.
A few months ago, the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) together with Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) sent a joint letter – attached – to the European Commission and nuclear regulators calling to learn the lessons from the Russian aggression towards Ukrainian nuclear installations and carry out similar stress tests for all European nuclear installations as were carried out after the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima.
Acknowledging the relevance of this issue, the letter has finally been included on the agenda of this week’s ENSREG meeting.
Attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and the Nord Stream II gas pipeline are a stark reminder of the risk posed by energy infrastructure on EU citizens and the environment in times of military conflict. If the Commission and ENSREG decide to co-ordinate a series of stress tests on nuclear power plants, all installations shall be upgraded to include the lessons learned or shut down accordingly.
More information:
Jan Haverkamp, senior nuclear expert and vice-chair of Nuclear Transparency Watch –
jan.haverkamp@greenpeace.org
+31 6 21334619
20220519 Letter post-Ukraine nuclear stress tests NTW EEB
See also: https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/non-classe/open-letter-from-ntw-eeb-calling-for-reviewed-stress-tests-after-the-attacks-on-ukrainian-npp.html
Part 1: Do Bulgarian Citizens Know What to Do in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Attack?
/Research in the Kozloduy NPP 30-kilometer zone /
Dr. Petar Kardzhilov
Abstract
Radiation protection and emergency preparedness and response are the two topics directly relevant to the health and life of citizens in one of the three main thematic circles for expert analysis and synthesis at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – Nuclear Safety and Security. Through research in populated areas in the 30 km zone around the Kozloduy nuclear power plant (NPP), based on the Extended Parallel Process Model, we come to the conclusion that there is no well-organized informational and educational activity on these two topics in Bulgaria.
An expert and responsible organisation of public communication on the risks and crises related to the increase of radioactivity in the environment, with the participation of all institutions, media and public groups, becomes even more relevant and necessary in the context of the new regional reality after the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Key words: risk communication, radiation protection, emergency preparedness and response, perceived threat, perceived efficacy, nuclear power plant (NPP), Russo-Ukrainian war.
After the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian troops took over the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, Zaporozhye, firing at both, and a fire broke out in the latter. On several occasions, the Russian President and others at the top of the Kremlin have threatened Europe and the world with nuclear weapons. After the successive attacks on August 5 and 6, the Ukrainian nuclear regulator Energoatom reported serious damage with the forced shutdown of one of the units and the risk of leakage of hydrogen and radioactive substances at the Zaporozhye plant. The leaders of the IAEA, the EU and the UN condemned these events and called on the Kremlin authorities to allow a group of international experts to visit the NPP. In this context, the question arose for Bulgaria, a country very close to Ukraine and also operating its own nuclear power plant, whether the inhabitants of this country could protect themselves in a crisis situation with high radioactivity dangerous to health and life. Today, after the shutdown of all reactors in Zaporozhye NPP, the threat of attacks on the nuclear power plant has decreased, but Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons have increased. Despite all these challenges, the attention of politicians and medias to these threats for Bulgaria is almost absent.
The study on preparedness and response to increased radioactivity in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war is supported by the President of the Foundation for Environment and Agriculture, Albena Simeonova, with the help of the Ministry of Environment and Water, Minister Borislav Sandov, together with the Municipality of Kozloduy, the State Enterprise “Radioactive Waste”, the Municipality of Oryahovo, the Municipality of Mizia, the villages of Glozhene, Kharlets and Butan. It is conducted by myself, as a specialist in risk and crisis communication, following the model of American scientists in the field of risk communication, on 12 and 13 April in the towns of Kozloduy, Oryahovo, Mizia and the villages of Glozhene, Kharlets and Butan – all located in the 30-kilometer critical emergency planning zone around the Kozloduy NPP.
Scientific framework
The survey is not just a sociological or journalistic poll to capture attitudes and trends. It has a concrete practical and detailed scientific framework based on one of the most trans-disciplinary and complex areas of human knowledge – risk and crisis management. Risk and crisis communication is an integral part of risk and crisis management, which also carries trans-disciplinarity as its main characteristic and is studied in the developed countries as two separate academic disciplines – risk communication and crisis communication. The model in which the study was conducted is relevant to both disciplines, as it provides insights into how people perceive given risks, as well as how they react if those same risks manifested themselves as crises threatening their lives and health.
Human experience so far shows that increased radioactivity, in the event of a major accident in a nuclear power plant, or in the event of deliberate acts of terrorism or war, can create extremely serious threats to the health and life of the population and the state of the environment for decades to come.
But what should ideally be done? It makes sense to look for precisely the ideal option, because we are talking about a risk of loss of many lives and of great suffering for many people.
In order to react adequately in the event that these risks manifest themselves in the form of crises, and to minimise the negative consequences for people and nature, at the level of national and local institutions, the intervention of professional risk and crisis communicators is necessary.
They should fulfill the following tasks:
The results of the study based on the model of the extended parallel process in the city of Kozloduy and neighboring settlements in mid-April show that in our country the implementation of these tasks has never started as a complete process, with the exception of isolated campaign activities, highly limited in terms of time, periodicity, expert involvement and scope.
Research model
The Extended Parallel Process Model, created by Prof. Kim Witt of the University of Michigan, examines the extent to which people perceive a given risk as a real danger to themselves – perceived threat (to health and life), as well as the extent to which they feel safe and prepared to react adequately if the same risk manifests itself as a crisis with a direct danger to them – perceived efficacy (of the defensive response).
Perceived threat consists of two parallel human perceptions – of vulnerability and of severity. Perceived vulnerability refers to the degree to which someone believes that the risk is likely to manifest as a crisis, and perceived severity relates to the degree of severity of the consequences of the crisis that someone perceives. Perceived efficacy includes a person’s perceptions of the efficacy of the generally accepted response and of their personal efficacy. Response efficacy concerns the degree to which one perceives the safety and effectiveness of the recommended behavior, whereas personal efficacy depends on the extent to which one perceives that he/she has the necessary skills and resources to engage in the recommended behavior. This is how two pairs of parallel processes are obtained, which take place in our consciousness when we are faced with risks, crises and emergency situations.
Figure 1: The extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992)
There are three psychological reactions depending on the impact of information about the danger and the corresponding individual level of threat perception and efficacy:
1) when the perceived threat (vulnerability and severity) is low, an absence of reaction most often follows: a change in behavior and, accordingly, actions do not occur;
2) when perceived threat is high and perceived efficacy is low, several variants of situationally inappropriate behavior follow, summarized by the concept of fear control;
3) the adequate reaction for the protection and self-defense of citizens is realized at high levels of both the perceived threat and the perceived efficacy, which Prof. Witt defines as danger control.
Peculiarities of the study
The survey card is based on the model of the parallel process and includes a total of 13 questions, 10 closed (with indicating one of several answers) and 3 open questions (with writing one answer). One part of them relates to the perceived threat (vulnerability and seriousness), the other part – to the perceived efficacy (reaction and personal). The third part is additional questions that help form a conclusion about the most likely psychological reaction that will occur in society in the event of a real crisis with increased radioactivity.
It is important to note that almost all of those who accepted to fill out the survey were women – 141 women and only 30 men. On the one hand, the reason for this is that in general more women work in these institutions. On the other hand, in the field, there is a reluctance among some men to participate in the survey on the topic of radiation protection. These reactions among men should be studied separately, as they would create additional complications in the process of radiation protection preparation and response.
Presentation of the study, presented at an international online conference on the security of European nuclear power plants in the context of the war in Ukraine can be seen here: https://www.slideshare.net/PetarKardjilov/eprnppwar052022ppt
The perceived threat of high radioactivity events
Here there are four questions, three of which are variants of perceived vulnerability to the different nature of the event, and the fourth one is to the perceived severity of such an event. To the first question: “How likely is it, in your opinion, for a major accident at the Kozloduy NPP to result in high levels of radioactivity in the area where you live?”, 7.6% of respondents answered “completely impossible”. 35.4% with “rather impossible”, 20% with “50:50%” answer, 9.4% with “rather possible”, 27% with “completely possible”. Although by a little – with a total of 56.4%, three groups perceiving this risk as real prevail, one group accepts it as potential, but far from the possibility of its occurrence – 35.4% and only 7.6% perceive it as unreal. The perception of the risk of a major nuclear plant accident as real by most respondents indicates that their perception of vulnerability is rather high. This data enters as an asset in the overall level of perceived threat, which, if it remains high after adding the data of the perceived severity of the event, will reduce the probability of achieving the first of the three possible mental reactions according to the model – no reaction.
Perceived vulnerability is even more categorical in the answers to the question: “In your opinion, how likely is it that a serious accident at a nuclear power plant would occur in a war near Bulgaria, affecting Bulgaria as well?”. Here 10.5% responded with “completely impossible”, 18.7% with “rather impossible”, and 8.3% with “no more than before the war”. 28.6% define such an event as “rather possible”, and 33.3% as “completely possible”. A total of 61.9% (marking the last two answers) perceive this different from the previous risk as real. The data on the perception of this different type of risk in the new military context as real by most respondents further reinforces the indicators of perceived vulnerability in the context of a commonly defined event of high radioactivity in the environment.
The perceived vulnerability is most strongly expressed in the answers to the third question about vulnerability – the possibility of a nuclear attack near the country: “In your opinion, how possible is it that a military nuclear attack could happen near Bulgaria that would affect our country and part of the Bulgarian citizens?”. Only 12.8% think that such a situation is “completely impossible” and only 3.5% that it is “rather impossible”. According to 27% it is likely “50:50%”, for 29.2% it is “rather possible”, and for 26.3% it is “completely possible”. This is already a third type of risk, again in the current military context, which is perceived as real by even more respondents, which is evident from the last three answers, the sum of which is 82.5%. From the data in the answers to these three questions, we can assume that we have an undoubtedly firm perception of high vulnerability in all three different types of risks of a crisis situation with high radioactivity – an accident at the Bulgarian NPP, an incident/attack at a NPP close to the country and an attack with nuclear weapon near the country.
In the perceived threat asset, parallel to perceived vulnerability is the perceived severity of the emergency event for which there is a risk. This parallel psychological process of the perceived threat is particularly vividly defined in the study from the city of Kozloduy and the region. To the question: “What do you think would be the consequences for health and the environment if a major accident occurred at the Kozloduy NPP, or at another NPP near Bulgaria, or in the event of a military nuclear attack nearby – in all three cases with high radioactivity in the atmosphere and environment?”, none of the respondents answered “insignificant”, only 5% answered “significant but repairable”, 59% answered “very serious and long-lasting” and 34% marked the answer “very serious and irreparable”. The sum of those who indicated the three answers to the question about the perceived severity is as much as 98%, which undoubtedly means that the respondents are aware of the severe consequences for their health, life and well-being that could occur as a result of an accident or attack with high radioactivity.
Following the data from the responses to the three vulnerability questions, the data from the severity question simply “concrete” a definite conclusion about a high level of the first of the two main parallel processes in Witt’s model – perceived threat. The overall conclusion from the responses to the perceived threat questions is that it has sufficiently high values that the first of the three possible psychological reactions according to the model – the absence of a reaction – will not take place in the case of an emergency event with high radioactivity in the studied area. However, which of the other two behaviors will respondents have according to the other two forms of psychological response? Whether they will take one of the harming pathways of fear control or reach an adequate rescue response along the path of danger control, however, depends on the data for the second parallel process — the perceived efficacy.
Perceived efficacy in high-radioactivity events
While the threat of an event with high radioactivity is perceived by the respondents in a positive way, i.e. primarily as a real or potential risk with very serious consequences for health and the environment, the efficacy of an adequate response to such an event is perceived by them categorically in a negative way – as unknown, impossible, ineffective or unattainable. Similar to perceived threat, we measure perceived efficacy factors with four other questions – three on response efficacy and one on personal efficacy. I recall here that response efficacy concerns the degree to which one perceives the certainty and effectiveness of one’s recommended behavior, whereas personal efficacy depends on the extent to which one perceives that one has the necessary skills and resources to engage in the recommended behavior.
The first question is open: “In the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant or a nuclear attack with the presence of high radioactivity in the atmosphere near your place of residence, do you know what protective measures you should take yourself and what when ordered by the institutions?”, as after this question in the survey card, two lines are left to clarify the two types of protection measures. 39% answered “no”; 31% answered only “yes” but did not explain; 9% answer with “yes” and write measures that are, however, incorrect; 8.6 answer with “yes” but record only some and do not distinguish between the two types of measures; 2.5% write that the measures are useless, and 9.9% do not answer the question.
The conclusion from the answers to this open-ended question is that none of the respondents is sufficiently aware of what response would be most adequate when hearing signal sirens with a message of radiation danger. I will consider in detail the issue of radiation protection measures and actions related to preparation and response to an incident (or attack) with increased radioactivity in the second part of the article. There we will also dwell on specific answers of the respondents received in the survey. We will note here in general that these measures and actions are very rarely communicated, are difficult to find online and offline, are unclear, contain contradictions and cause many questions. However, there are clearly distinguishable measures and actions that citizens should take on their own, as well as those that they should only take when instructed by state institutions through the media. For example, among the first type of measures are maintaining a package for emergency situations in homes, insulating doors and windows, among the second – taking potassium iodide tablets and evacuation.
To the next question about the response efficacy: “In your opinion, are the protection measures recommended by the institutions safe and effective in the event of a major accident at the nuclear power plant?”, only 4% noted the answer “completely certain”, 18% noted “more almost certain”, 34% answered with “I can’t judge”, 16% with “rather uncertain”, 9% indicated “completely uncertain”, 19% noted the answer “I don’t know the measures”. This second question of reaction efficiency both complements the first and serves as a check on it. Those who marked the first two answers “completely certain” and “rather certain” are a total of 22%. However, taking into account all the answers to the first question, it is clear that these respondents have the delusion that they know the measures, but in reality this is not the case. The total of 78% of all other responses indicates a clear preponderance of low perceived. This multiple expresses firm uncertainty about the response efficacy.
The third question about the response efficacy is “Do you trust the government institutions to do everything necessary for your safety and that of your family in the event of an incident with increased radioactivity?”. Here, only 8.9% answered with “I trust them completely”, 29.2% with “I trust them, but I have doubts”, 19% with “I can’t answer”, 24.7% with “I don’t trust them” and 18.2% with “I don’t trust them at all”. Subject to this response efficacy question are the entities with (in theory) the most resources and capacity to act to protect society in a crisis event of this magnitude. If here too there is no feeling of stability and security among the respondents, then, together with the data from the answers to the other two questions, we come to the conclusion that the perceptions of the response efficiency are extremely low. Indeed, such a feeling is hardly present: it is present in only 8.9% against uncertainty and mistrust in the majority of 91.1%.
Fourth is the question of personal efficacy: “Do you have the necessary skills and resources to take the individual and general measures recommended by the institutions, in the event of a major NPP accident with high-radioactivity near where you live?”. Only 5.8% answered with “yes”, 17% with “rather yes”, 32.7% with “rather no”, 19.5 with “no” and 25% with “I don’t know what the necessary skills and resources are”.
It is unacceptable, under the standards set by the IAEA[1], which are mandatory for all countries with nuclear power plants, that in the 30-kilometer emergency planning zone, a quarter of the 171 citizens asked to answer that they did not know what skills and resources they need to protect themselves in case of a high-radioactivity crisis and half of them to indicate that they do not have or rather do not have any. Moreover, we speak about respondents working in institutions that should lead the response actions in such a crisis and radiation protection – schools, hospital, municipal administration.
With the data from the responses to the personal efficacy question added to that from the responses to the three response efficacy questions, we conclude that there is very low perceived efficacy in the event of a high-radioactivity crisis event. This is how we arrive at the answer to the equation according to the Extended parallel process model:
high perceived threat + low perceived efficacy = fear control
Additional questions on perceived threat and efficacy
We use several additional questions with the following tasks:
1) to obtain more detailed information about the current factual situation with the provision of information and training to local communities;
2) to check the propensity of citizens to search and remember information related to current risks on the subject in the context of the war in Ukraine;
3) to explore their willingness to seek a higher level of protection in the event of a high-radioactivity crisis in the new situation of close war;
4) to specify the conclusions we reach from the data from the answers to the previous eight questions, according to the of the Extended parallel process model used in the study.
The first three questions of the survey compile data on perceived threat in today’s current situation of nuclear power plants seized by military force and threats of nuclear attack. In accordance with the current information about the new risks in the context of the war, we ask in an open question: “Do you know which nuclear power plants in Ukraine were captured by the Russian army?”. Only 7% of respondents gave the correct answer “Zaporozhie NPP” and Chernobyl NPP”, 18% indicated Zaporozhye NPP, 20.5% – Chernobyl NPP, 45.7% answered “no”, 2, 3% indicate the non-existent “Mariupol NPP”, 6.5% didn’t answer.
To the next additional question about the perceived threat: “Can Bulgaria protect its nuclear power plant in the event of a military attack?”, 32.7% answered “yes”, 51.6% “no”, 9.3% noted ” I don’t know” and 6.4% do not give an answer.
To the third additional question about the perceived threat: “Should the European Union build a common system to protect the nuclear power plants of the member countries that operate them?”, 87.7% noted the answer “yes”, only 5.8% answered with ” no”, 6.5% didn’t answer.
Data from the respondents’ responses indicate that the level of concern at the possibility of vulnerability in the new context of close warfare is high. Half of the respondents remembered information related to the capture of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants by the Russian army, although both nuclear power plants were captured five and six weeks before the date of filling out the survey. The overwhelming responses to the other two additional questions on perceived threat show that respondents do not believe in the power of the state to protect our nuclear power plant and wish to take action to protect it at European level. The data from all three additional questions reinforce those from the main four questions about a highly perceived threat of a possible crisis with hazardous radioactivity in the new reality of a hot positional war close to Bulgaria.
Answers to the additional two questions on perceived efficacy also strongly indicate its particularly low, even tending to zero, level, confirming the result of the main four efficacy questions. Here, the clearest absence of a strategy and systematic communication (informational and educational) approach in radiation protection, preparedness and response to an emergency situation with increased radioactivity is found.
To one of the two additional questions related to perceived efficiency: “How often do you receive reminder information from the institutions regarding the necessary response and measures in the event of a major accident at the Kozloduy NPP with high radioactivity in the environment?”, as many as 63% of respondents answered with “I don’t remember receiving such information”. Another 7% answered “more than 5 years ago”, 2.3% highlighted “5 years ago”, and another 2.3% marked “3 years ago”, 1.6% answered “once every two years”, 12.3% – “once a year” and 8% – “twice a year”.
The other additional question about the perceived effectiveness is open: “Has a response exercise in case of a major accident at the Kozloduy NPP ever been organized in your locality? (If the answer is yes, please write when it was and what you remember from the teaching.)”. 59.4% answered “no”, 14% wrote that they did not remember participating in such an exercise, 12.4% did not answer, 5.3% answered “yes” but did not explain, 6% answered ” yes”, writing only the date and only 2.9% answered with “yes” and indicated a specific date and memory.
Conclusions of the study
Given the results of the answers to the last two additional questions, which are directly related to response efficacy and personal efficacy, it is very important to note again that almost all of the 171 citizens of various age groups who participated in the survey in the 30 km emergency planning zone around the Kozloduy NPP, reside mostly in institutions that should have leading roles in the public response to a crisis with high radioactivity – six municipalities, three schools, one hospital, as well as two hotels in the city of Kozloduy. In this situation, there is no reason to assume that the preparation for radiation civil protection in other cities and regions of Bulgaria outside this 30-kilometer zone would be at a better and adequate level. In this regard, we must bear in mind that, in addition to our nuclear power plant, the now captured Ukrainian NPP “Zaporozhie”, only 65 km from Silistra, the Romanian NPP “Black Water” is operating. We must not forget the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s intention to build a nuclear power plant next to Ineada, just 10 km from Rezovo.
As leading conclusions in the research based on the Extended parallel process model, on the one hand, we see the trend of:
Fear control has several variants of crisis-inappropriate behavior. When it comes to a message that warns people about a crisis that is expected to occur soon, fear control is expressed in maladaptive changes such as defensive avoidance (e.g., ignoring the information), denial (e.g., refusing to believe that the risk is real) or resistance (eg rejecting the message as manipulative). However, when it comes directly to a crisis alert message (in this case, human-damaging radioactive substances released into the environment in an accident or intentionally through a military attack), citizens will react according to what they know and what they don’t know at the time of receiving the alert message. Then, the fear control will transform into uncontrolled fear, from which panic actions will follow, that in turn will lead to an exponential increase in the negative consequences of the crisis. Therefore, I add to Witt’s model the state of panic as a possible maladaptive change in behavior when a crisis has suddenly occurred.
Figure 2: EPPM High Threat Low Efficacy example – Fear Control
Awareness of protection measures is very low even in the populated areas in the 30-kilometer zone around the Kozloduy NPP. One of the rare materials on the subject, for example, is a leaflet uploaded to the page of the Main Directorate “Fire Safety and Protection of the Population” on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, produced by the Kozloduy NPP, which contains some inaccuracies, ambiguities and raises questions that are not answered answered. There is an urgent need to update and refine information on preparedness and response to a high-radioactivity crisis by adequate specialists, as well as a program for its wide and periodic dissemination.
In the second part of the study, we will examine the factual situation with information about radiation protection in Bulgaria and the countries of the European Union. We will give specific guidelines for the necessary changes so that Bulgaria can build adequate planning for preparation and response to crises with the release of dangerously high radioactivity into the environment, as well as a communication strategy for informing and educating about the risks of such crises.
References
[1] Preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency section on the IAEA website here: https://www.iaea.org/publications/10905/preparedness-and-response-for-a-nuclear-or-radiological-emergency
20220519 Letter post-Ukraine nuclear stress tests NTW EEB
Last Month, the 19th May 2022, Nuclear Transparency Watch jointly with the European Environnemental Bureau wrote an open letter (here attached) to the European Commission and to ENSREG to point out the need for a stress test on safety related issues during nuclear security events, including acts of war.
As the ENSREG conference is taking place today, 20th June 2022, NTW wants to underline again the importance of this issue while some diversion could very well make it forget while last week again the news showed how crucial it was.
On 05 May 2022 Nuclear Transparency Watch hold a webinar on Rolling Stewardship with the following speakers and program:
Purpose
Being engaged in the field of Radioactive Waste Management with a particular focus regarding transparency on nuclear safety and radiation protection, Nuclear Transparency Watch took part as Civil Society participant in the EC EURAD Research Programme in
June 2019. This participation, understood in the perspective of the Aarhus Convention, implied some involvement in several research projects that are, for two of them, designed on a strategical perspective opening to a more comprehensive understanding of socio-technical aspects of Radioactive Waste Management. In this context, it was felt that NTW would take advantage to develop its own thinking on Rolling Stewardship while liaising with interested partners of EURAD. A specific cooperation with the SITEX network (gathering Technical Support Organizations of Regulators of RWM and Civil Society Experts in the field) is also considered.
First speaker: Robert del Tredici
Robert del Tredici has a master’s degree in Comparative Literature at the University of California, and he has been a teacher for much of his life, giving courses in Photography, Drawing, Mythology, and History of Animated Film at the University of Calgary in Alberta and at Vanier College and Concordia University in Montreal. He is and has been a prolific graphic artist and documentary photographer: The People of Three Mile Island (1980), At Work in the Fields of the Bomb (1987), Closing the Circle on the Splitting off the Atom (1993); Linking Legacies (1995); From Cleanup to Stewardship (1997).
Second speaker: Marcos Buser
Geologist with a degree from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich, Marcos Buser is a consultant and expert who has been active for more than four decades in the management of industrial and radioactive waste projects, and a former member of several scientific commissions for the Swiss government, including the Swiss Federal Commission for Nuclear Safety. He was a member of the Stocamine steering committee.
NTW introduced its first Open Radiation project started in Cumbria thanks to its member Colin Wales from Cumbria Trust for the Open Radiation Community on Friday 8th April 2022 at IRSN in France.
The presentation is available here after:
On 23 March 2022 Nuclear Transparency Watch hold a webinar on Rolling Stewardship with the following speakers and program:
Purpose
Being engaged in the field of Radioactive Waste Management with a particular focus regarding transparency on nuclear safety and radiation protection, Nuclear Transparency Watch took part as Civil Society participant in the EC EURAD Research Programme in
June 2019. This participation, understood in the perspective of the Aarhus Convention, implied some involvement in several research projects that are, for two of them, designed on a strategical perspective opening to a more comprehensive understanding of socio-technical aspects of Radioactive Waste Management. In this context, it was felt that NTW would take advantage to develop its own thinking on Rolling Stewardship while liaising with interested partners of EURAD. A specific cooperation with the SITEX network (gathering Technical Support Organizations of Regulators of RWM and Civil Society Experts in the field) is also considered.
First speaker: Niels Henrik Hooge
Master of Laws and Master of Arts in Philosophy. Interested in environmental and sustainability for a long time he has manifested itself in activism, cooperation with green NGOs in Denmark and abroad, as well as in many types of writing. In addition to editorial staff work in Danish environmental magazines, he has published several books, including most recently the novel “Kosova” (2016) and the poetry collections “Grøn nation” (Green Nation, 2015), “Miljødigte” (Environmental Poems, 2018) and “Miljødigte 2” (Environmental Poems 2, 2019).
Second speaker: Gordon Edwards
Ph.D. in Mathematics and Master of Arts in English Literature. Gordon Edwards has been a Professor of Mathematics and Science during all his career during which he did many publications in that field but not only. From 1970 to 1974, he was the editor of Survival magazine. In 1975 he co-founded the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility and has been its president since 1978. Edwards has worked widely as a consultant on nuclear issues and has been qualified as a nuclear expert by courts in Canada and elsewhere.
Nuclear Transparency Watch made an assessment for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the Life-Time Extension of Krsko Nuclear Power Plant. The document is here below :
What is happening right now in Ukraine is raising a lot of questions regarding nuclear safety therefore NTW will try gather all relevant information to help the members’ information !
To start the follow up done by the french association ACRO would be very complete for the french readers,
then a platform is accessible with some articles that will be added and organized along the way !
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