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Nuclear Transparency Watch

Prevent and anticipate through transparency and participation

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NUCLEAR TRANSPARENCY WATCH WARNS BELGIAN MINISTER TO RESPECT TRANSPARENCY LAWS IN LIFETIME EXTENSION OF DOEL 1 & 2 NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

The European watchdog organisation Nuclear Transparency Watch(NTW) warned today the Belgian federal minister of Energy Marie-Christine Marghem, that her legislative proposal to extend the lifetime of the 40 years old Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power reactors threatens to break international rules for transparency. If the right of the public to participate in an environmental impact assessment will not be respected, NTW will seek advice on initiating a formal complaint to the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention.

End February 2015, the Belgian Council of State warned the Belgian Energy minister that lifetime extension of old nuclear power reactors cannot be decided without organising an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a national and transboundary public consultation process, as prescribed by the European Directive 2011/92/EU and the Aarhus and Espoo conventions, both signed and ratified by Belgium.

On 5 and 6 May 2015, the final discussions before the vote on the Doel 1 & 2 lifetime extension will take place in the Economy Commission of the federal parliament. Before these discussions, NTW chair, Michèle Rivasi, sent today a letter to the energy minister to stress the importance of respecting international obligations to organise a full scale EIA and a cross border public participation process in advance of any final decision.

Ms. Rivasi commented: “The environment around Doel has fundamentally changed over the last 40 years and the risk of failure of the reactors increases exponentially over time. Ten years extra lifetime also adds 25% more time in which they are exposed to the risk of terrorist attack. This all on 12 km from the centre of Antwerp. It is important and legally prescribed that citizens get the chance to make sure all environmental concerns are taken into account when such a decision is taken. It would be completely inappropriate to look for loopholes to circumvent this obligation.”

The letter from NTW Chair, Michèle Rivasi to belgian minister of Environment, Marie-Christine Marghem: click here

UK Nuclear Subsidies: in between safety flaws and legal challenges

By Paul Dorfman

The UK new nuclear deal
The UK government has guaranteed EDF, the French nuclear corporation, an index-linked price of £92.50 – twice the current market price of electricity – for each megawatt-hour over a 35-year locked-in contract period. These subsidies will be funded through levies on all UK consumer energy bills. The UK Treasury has also offered a credit guarantee to underwrite up to £10bn of debt on the construction project.

The EC Competition Directorate-General’s initial view
Early last year, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for competition said that the deal provides utmost certainty of a stable revenue stream under lenient conditions by eliminating market risks from the commercial activity of nuclear electricity generation for the very long 35-year contract length. They went on to say that the deal seemed incompatible with EU State aid rules, and the proposed Investment Contract would provide EDF with a clear selective advantage.

The EC Competitions Directorate-General’s final decision on the deal
Late last year, the Commission concluded that the ‘modified’ UK measures for Hinkley Point nuclear power plant are compatible with EU rules. This seems interesting – as there have been no real ‘modifications’ in the UK position.
 
So what happened?
Well, maybe the Commission doesn’t want to be seen to be determining UK energy policy. Perhaps the Commission made the decision because of Eurosceptic undercurrents in the UK Coalition government – knowing that their decision has substantial flaws, especially in terms of energy market distortion? In other words, it could be that the Commission made this decision, knowing that it was open to legal challenge.

Why is it so important?
The EC decision sets an important precedent and could have significant consequences across Europe. It directly informs the future direction of EU energy policy. Annually, billions of euros rest on the result of this policy appraisal and it sends important signals internationally. Europe can overestimate its role in setting global norms – but many countries still look to Europe as a laboratory for low-carbon transition. This is because EU structural energy reform informs the kind of robust international energy regimes needed to combat ramping climate change.

The Austrian Legal Challenge
In response, Austria, quite properly and transparently, signalled and declared a clear intention to challenge the Commission’s decision to allow UK subsidies for new nuclear through the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Without knowing the details of the Austrian case, it seems likely that the key reason for this challenge is that the UK nuclear deal distorts both UK and pan-EU electricity markets – because vendors require large-scale pre-emption of the wholesale market in order to accept the commercial risks of construction.
UK targeted state aid to new nuclear construction through the Investment Contract and Loan Guarantees seem specifically designed to develop nuclear at the expense of other low carbon investments. This level of financial support and length of contract are not available to other low-carbon technologies. Because of this, there will be substantial repercussions on pan-EU trade and competition and state aid regimes. And given the risk profile of this project, the fees for the Loan Guarantees being offered to EDF by the UK government are well below the commercial rates – given the scale of risk in the light of current experience of constructing the French EPR Areva reactor planned for the UK.
So there seems to be a clear market competition failure here, and UK plans to provide operating State aid through price support mechanism to guarantee profitability seem incompatible with EU State aid rules.

The UK threatens Austria
It may not be cricket – but early this year, a leaked memo from Vijay Rangarajan, a Senior UK Foreign Office official, stated that the UK will take “every opportunity to sue or damage Austria if Vienna does not drop a legal challenge… The U.K. will take every future opportunity to sue Austria in areas that harm or that have strong domestic political implications”. However, the Austrian Environment Minister Andrae Rupprechter said that
“We won’t let ourselves be intimidated… No subsidies for atomic power”.
 
The UK refuses public access to information on key reports 
Now, Nuclear Transparency Watch is a European network that promotes a citizen watch on nuclear safety and transparency. Here, its important to know that the UK government has refused public access to information on key reports about the economic case for new nuclear subsidies, including studies by energy consultants: a study by KPMG on potential distortions to competition; a study by Oxera on market failures, proportionality and potential distortions of competition; a study by Pöyry on potential distortions to the internal market and alternatives to new nuclear; a report by Redpoint on the evolution of the UK electricity sector; and details of the Cost Discovery and Verification process, compiled by KPMG and LeighFisher.
Without question, all these documents will be subject to access to information requests to the Commission as the court case unfolds.

Areva and safety flaws in their EPR reactor pressure vessels
Unfortunately, Areva, the French nuclear corporation hoping to build their EPR in the UK, has just issued its fifth profit warning in seven months, saying it expected to report a 4.8 billion euros loss for 2014 as cost overruns ballooned on key European nuclear build projects. Areva has cut its wage bill 15% as prospects worsen – weighed down by heavy debt and suffering from an industry slowdown, a lack of orders, and legal troubles over huge costs over-runs and delays at the EPR nuclear builds in Finland, France and China. Their shareholders equity is ‘close to zero’.
Added to this, it has recently been revealed that there are significant flaws in the bottom and top of the reactor pressure vessels already installed at Flamanville in France and Taishan 1 and 2 in China. These flaws are serious and inevitably mean more significant delays, cost over-runs, or worse.
The flaws also put into question Areva’s quality assurance protocols and further damage the reputation of their reactor, the EPR – since, if there’s one place you really don’t want any faults, it’s the reactor pressure vessel. For there to be serious flaws in these components means that an unthinkable error has occurred in construction – and puts at risk the basic safety case for this reactor.

So What?
Well, between a lengthy EU court case and trying to negotiate around the important safety flaws found in the reactor planned for the England, things don’t look good for new nuclear projects anytime soon in UK. And given a significant aspect of the UK’s energy policy and carbon budget is built around subsidising new nuclear, this could even mean a sea change in energy policy – which, all things considered, is no bad thing.

Paul_Dorfman

Dr Paul Dorfman of the Energy Institute at University College London, is member of Nuclear Transparency Watch. He founded the Nuclear Consulting Group​ and is Nuclear Policy Research Fellow. He is Executive Board member of the International Nuclear Risk Assessment Group (INRAG), member of the European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility (ENSSER) and Advisory Group Member of the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) nuclear Submarine Dismantling Project (SDP). He served as Secretary to the UK government scientific advisory Committee Examining Radiation Risks from Internal Emitters (CERRIE) and led the European Environment Agency (EEA) response to Fukushima in ‘Late Lessons from Early Warnings’ Vol 2.

NTW PUBLISHES ITS ONE-YEAR INVESTIGATION ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN EUROPE

The current challenges with regard to nuclear safety from the civil society point of view

In the post-Fukushima era, one of the first steps of Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) was to establish a working group on Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R), which has conducted a one-year investigation of off-site EP&R. This report has been presented today in the European Parliament in the presence of Klaus Buchner, Ana Gomes, Jo Leinen, Michèle Rivasi and Julie Ward.

An independent expertise – Whereas the industry is well organized at the European level, this EP&R report aims to give a different point of view from the civil society and to contribute in increasing the quality of decision -making on safety.

“Civil society has a high valuable expertise which should be taken into account for off-site management of nuclear emergency and post-emergency, which have not been taken on board of the European nuclear stress tests. Furthermore, citizens and citizens’ organisations should be the principal partners in EP&R plans since they are the ones who are affected in a nuclear event.” said Nadja Železnik, chair of EP&R WG from NTW and director of Regional Environmental Center – Slovenia.

Europe didn’t take into account lessons from Fukushima – The NTW report presents a review of EP&R provisions, in the perspective of the main challenges identified in the management of the Fukushima emergency.

“The disaster of Fukushima has shed light on a number of very serious dysfunctions: in one of the evacuated city, Futaba, patients of the hospital have been left on their own for three days because the medical staff had run away. The panic made all plans useless, despite the famous “Japanese discipline”. Besides the unforeseeable reactions (which will lead in any way to chaos), the theoretical plans revealed totally inefficient. There are numerous shocking facts. Some patients were transported to places without any care facilities and the evacuation zone was ill defined and too small (it jumped arbitrarily from 2km to 3km and then to 10 and 20km, whereas the US authorities ordered their expats to leave from the 80km zone). Today, cities all over the world have dwelled and get denser in a way which is not taken into account and poses unsolvable problems”, said Michèle Rivasi, chair of NTW and Member of the European Parliament.

European challenges for EP&R – The heterogeneity of measures in different countries (like the distribution of iodine tablets, evacuation perimeters and zoning) is a crucial transboundary dimension. Vigilance on nuclear safety will remain a key European issue in the future that transcends borders whatever Member states choices will be made on the energy mix.

“There are no borders for nuclear accidents. We should work together on EP&R, whether we are pro or anti-nuclear!”, added Albena Simeonova, member of NTW and Foundation for Environmental Center – Bulgaria.

NTW urges the European Parliament, the European Commission, national governments, regional bodies and municipalities, together with nuclear operators, to provide access to relevant information and to support participation of interested citizens and civil society organisations in the development of better provisions and systematic transboundary arrangements.

Executive summary of the NTW report “Emergency preparedness & Response”

Position Paper of NTW Working Group on Emergency Preparedness & Response (15 pages)

Report of NTW Working Group on Emergency Preparedness & Response (180 pages)

 

EUROPE IS UNPREPARED FOR FUKUSHIMA-LEVEL ACCIDENT

Brussels, 11 March 2015 –The Fukushima nuclear disaster began four years ago. Although it was initiated by the great earthquake of East Japan and the tsunami that followed, responsible institutions have failed in recognizing the real risks of the reactors, in implementing appropriate nuclear safety standards and, ultimately, in protecting people. Has Europe taken into account all lessons to be learned from the Fukushima catastrophe? An upcoming NTW report identifies key challenges from the civil society point of view.

4th anniversary of Fukushima – has Europe learned anything?  NTW says no. Emergency preparedness is mostly based on an INES 5 nuclear accident and response plans generally cannot cope with an INES 7 accident, the level of the Chernobyl and Fukushima catastrophes. NTW notes that many regional and local authorities are not really prepared for a nuclear accident. In some cases, it seems that EP&R plans have been drafted a long time ago with poor updating regarding important recent spatial changes (new residential neighbourhoods, shopping malls, medical centres, schools, roads, etc.) and without taking into consideration recent changes in technology (internet, mobile phones, new social media, etc.). NTW notices that even during exercises, the communication and notification lines of the responsible institutions are not entirely working as necessary: contact data are sometimes wrong or out-dated, there is a lack of communication between different concerned administration services and warning messages are sometimes no clear or too late.

The heterogeneity of measures in different countries (like the distribution of iodine tablets, evacuation perimeters and zoning) is a crucial transboundary dimension. This heterogeneity is potentially a source of chaos, loss of credibility and, most importantly, of potential failure to protect the population. “European institutions are now debating a new directive on the radioactive contamination of food and feedstuff after an accident to harmonize norms. The chaos we saw in this respect in the EU after Fukushima should indeed never be repeated. But while safety agencies recognize that an accident can happen in Europe, accepting contamination norms that are twice the one of Fukushima is from public health perspective unacceptable”, said Michèle Rivasi, chair of NTW.

NTW’s assessment makes obvious that the usual top-down approach doesn’t work. This approach, which has been used to date in EP&R, should be changed and should involved local communities and interested civil society organisations to take an action to improve the situation. “EP&R provisions today are resulting from closed door discussions. Citizens and citizens’ organisations should be the principal partners in EP&R since they are the ones who are affected in a nuclear event. We need to encourage sharing of information among people and institutions, and to involve the local population in the development of better provisions and systematic transboundary arrangements”, said Nadja Železnik, chair of WG EP&R from NTW.

NTW urges the European Parliament, the European Commission, national governments, regional bodies and municipalities, together with nuclear operators, to provide access to relevant information and to support participation of interested citizens, citizens’ initiatives and civil society organisations in emergency preparedness and response planning, regardless of their general position on the commercial use of nuclear power.

The report will be published in April 2015 during a presentation in the European Parliament. Please find enclosed its executive summary: NTWexecutiveSummaryEP&R

Contact:
Marie-Alix Verhoeven, Delegate for NTW                    or Nadja Železnik, chair of NTW WG EP&R
ma.verhoeven@nuclear-transparency-watch.eu            NZeleznik@rec.org

Round table in Ukraine on nuclear emergency preparedness and response

The fifth NTW round-table on emergency preparedness and response has taken place in Kyiv, Ukraine, on January, 26th.

All materials are available on the website of Mama86, member of NTW and organizer of this event.

Press release:

Authorities and the Public Agreed to Cooperate on the Issue of Emergency Preparedness and Response in Case of Nuclear Accidents
Wednesday, 28 January 2015 18:43
captionOn January 26, 2015 the International Roundtable on Emergency Preparedness and Response in the Nuclear Sphere was organized in Kyiv by the Ukrainian Environmental NGO “MAMA-86” (UNENGO “MAMA-86”) and the State Inspectorate for Nuclear Regulation of Ukraine, with the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and the European public network Nuclear Transparency Watch.

25 years after the Chernobyl disaster, the 2011 Fukushima accident proved that no country which depends on the energy from nuclear reactors is immune to radiation accidents. While seeking to ensure a more secure energy future, we need to guarantee nuclear and radiation safety today. If there had been adequate emergency preparedness and competent response measures, the number of victims in both accidents could have been significantly smaller. For Ukraine, which will continue to suffer from the consequences of the Chernobyl accident for many decades more, nuclear emergency preparedness and response is a matter of the national level, and thus the interaction between the government and the public on this issue is very important to ensure effective security policy.

The responsibility for nuclear emergency preparedness and response in Ukraine is shared by different authorities and other bodies — “Energoatom”, which operates the nuclear power plants, the State Inspectorate for Nuclear Regulation of Ukraine, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Health and other central executive bodies, as well as regional and local authorities. Therefore the round table was attended by a wide range of stakeholders, representatives of central and local authorities, NGOs, the operator, research institutions, independent local and European experts, the media and others — 122 participants in total.

Representatives of “Energoatom” and the responsible authorities (the State Inspectorate for Nuclear Regulation of Ukraine, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Health and others) reported about the action taken in their areas of competence to minimize public health and environmental risks in case of a radiation accident at an NPP. The public and journalists were able to express their critical comments and ask sharp questions about the main challenges in this area — how to enable effective implementation of evacuation plans; iodine prophylaxis; staffing and logistics needed to carry out the necessary work in case of accidents and so on. Participants discussed ways to improve the regulatory framework, interagency coordination and cooperation with local authorities, cross-border cooperation and other issues.

The foreign speakers, including representatives of the Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW), which brings together civil society experts from nuclear EU countries and Ukraine, insisted on the importance of public control of the activities on emergency preparedness and response in order to ensure their effectiveness. NTW experts presented the results of the assessment of the situation with nuclear emergency preparedness and response in the EU, and described the practices of some European countries.

A particular attention of civil society experts was focused on the challenges of public information and participation relating to emergency preparedness and response action. Roundtable participants agreed on the necessity of systemic interaction to continuously inform citizens about the provision of effective emergency preparedness and response. The Roundtable findings will be disseminated among all stakeholders.

On January 27, 2015, Roundtable participants had an opportunity to visit the Emergency and Technical Center of “Energoatom” (ETC), located in Bilohorodka town near Kyiv. The Center, which has 270 employees (many of whom participated in the Chernobyl accident liquidation activities or have worked at a nuclear plant) is designed to ensure constant readiness of Ukraine to take rapid and effective action in case of a nuclear accident. Visitors, which included representatives of the public, authorities and media, listened to the presentation about the activities of the ETC and received answers to all their questions. They also were shown the equipment used by the ETC in its work.

Based on the summary of the findings of the International Roundtable and the study visit, “MAMA-86” will prepare a report to be published on the website, as well as the analysis, which will be included in the public assessment of the situation with emergency preparedness and response in Europe produced by NTW. In addition, the Roundtable conclusions and recommendations will be summarized and communicated to relevant actors.

       _MG_1742            _MG_1747

Presentations delivered at the International Roundtable:

SESSION I. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE IN THE NUCLEAR SPHERE IN UKRAINE: LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE

The legislative and normative basis for nuclear emergency preparedness and response at NPPs — Svitlana CHUPRYNA, expert of the State Scientific and Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety

The system of emergency preparedness of the State Enterprise “National Nuclear Energy Generating Company “Energoatom” — Oleh KRIKLIVETS, Deputy Head of Department of Emergency Preparedness and Response of NNEGC “Energoatom”

Comparative assessments of environmental consequences of accidents at the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear power plants — Mark ZHELEZNYAK, Institute of the Problems of Mathematical Machines and Systems of the Ukraine National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Environmental Radioactivity, Fukushima University (Japan)

Improving the normative and legislative basis for nuclear emergency and response in case of nuclear and radioactive accidents — Sofia SHUTIAK, legal expert of the International Charitable Organization “Environment.People.Law”

SESSION II. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT, AS WELL TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

The Unified State System of Civil Protection in Ukraine – Sergiy PALAHUTA, Chief Specialist of the Department of Civil Protection of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine

Ensuring iodine prophylaxis among the population and other countermeasures in case of an NPP radiation accident – Antonina MYSHKOVSKA, Head of Technogenic Safety and Medical Problems of the Chornobyl accident consequences,   Ministry of Health of Ukraine

Ensuring functions of the competent authority in accordance with the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident – Nataliya BIZHKO, Head of the Division of Emergency Preparedness and Response – State Inspector of the Department of Safety of Nuclear Installations of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine

Problems of emergency preparedness: Have the lessons of Chernobyl and Fukushima been taken into account? – Oleg NASVIT, Head of the Department of Energy, Transport and Communications, Environmental and Technological Safety of the National Institute for Strategic Studies

SESSION III: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, AS WELL AS RELEVANT PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND RESPONSE, IN THE EU

Public assessment of the emergency preparedness and response in the nuclear field: an overview of the NTW analysis – Nadja ŽELEZNIK, Director of the Country Office of REC in Slovenia, chair of the NTW WG EP&R (Slovenia)

Emergency preparedness and response in the nuclear field: the French experience – Gilles HERIARD DUBREUIL, member of the ANCCLI and NTW Boards, Director of the MUTADIS research group (France)

Emergency preparedness and response in the Slovak Republic: view from the technical support organisation coordinating stakeholders engagement process – Tatiana DURANOVA, Emergency Planning Expert of the Nuclear Safety Department, VUJE Inc. (Slovak Republic)

Preliminary results of the PREPARE project regarding Aarhus Convention implementation in the context of nuclear emergency preparedness and response – Gilles HERIARD DUBREUIL, member of the ANCCLI and NTW Boards, Director of the MUTADIS research group (France)

Belarus: still no information freedom

NTW forwards a call for international support from Belarus NGOs published in December:

The Belarusian powers started to "turn off" all known
independent Internet mass-media in the country. The official reason is
"to prevent the panic, related to the default of Belarus ruble". In 4
days all well-known and popular sites, including BelaPAN news agency
and web-portal onliner.by, providing information about
internet-shopping in Belarus were blocked and its domains in zone by
were paralyzed.

Never before the Belarusian authorities have done anything like
that. Such measures are possible in the case of the introduction of
martial law in our country. However, martial law is not entered.

 

BelaPAN’s statement on blockage of its websites

Minsk, 21 December.

The IP addresses of BelaPAN’s websites belapan.by, belapan.com and naviny.by were blocked on December 20th.

It is still unknown who did that and for what reason. However, it is clear that the decision to block the ID addresses could only be made by authorities as in Belarus the government has monopoly on providing IP addresses. BelaPAN had not received any official warning or notification about the coming blockage. The new amendments to the Media Law, which allow the blockage of websites, will come into force only on January 1st 2015.

In this regard we view the blockage of the IP addresses of BelaPAN as a gross infringement of freedom of expression and media freedom in Belarus. We are taking all possible measures to obtain exhaustive information from government agencies as to who made the decision to block our websites and on what grounds.

E-track: public participation in radioactive waste management

European Commission E-Track open seminar on public participation
The European Commission has started an effort called E-Track (Energy – Transparency Centre of Knowledge) for the promotion and enhancement of public participation in the implementation of energy policies. The project is a joint initiative from the Directorate General for Energy (DG ENER) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC). The area of radioactive waste management was selected as the E-Track pilot project .
On 23rd October 2014, the E-Track RWM project held a first open seminar in Amsterdam with the title “The role of public participation in radioactive waste management and other sectors: Lessons learnt from research and practice”. At the seminar, presentations were made by, amongst others, representatives from the European Commission, the Aarhus Convention Secretariat at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, nuclear waste communities, the nuclear industry and academia. It was clear from the presentations that much work remains to be done when implementing the articles on transparency and public participation in the Radioactive Waste Directive (2011/70/EURATOM) in the decision-making processes on radioactive waste projects in the member states.
You can find the report from the seminar with the presentations here as well as an information leaflet on the E-track project here.

NTW welcomes E-track
NTW supports E-track and Johan Swahn is the NTW representative in the E-Track Advisory Group. NTW is working for more environmental NGO representation on the agenda and in the audience of the E-track project.
NTW welcomes the concept of E-TRACK which strengths effective public involvement in Radioactive Waste Management decision-making, including taking due account of their opinions, and raise major public concerns. If we can raise the level of knowledge, debate and understanding among the general public it will give policy makers and implementers greater confidence in making long term decisions about sensitive projects and at the same time show how consumers and affected citizens can effectively bring in their own viewpoints and raise concerns.
One and a half years after E-track setting up, NTW shares the Advisory group concern about the current state and future of the project: inadequate resources, limited use of information collection, the lack of political support, etc. NTW fully supports the statement of members of the Advisory Group and calls for an assurance from the European Commission to further invest in the necessary human, financial and technical capacities for developing E-track.

Download the E-track Advisory Group statement of 29 November 2015.

Update: export of spent fuel from the Hungarian reactor Paks 2 to Russia

Nuclear Transparency Watch has been warning for over a year about planned export of nuclear spent fuel from the Hungarian power plant Paks to the Russian reprocessing center Mayak. Although the Commission was aware of possible illegality the export took place on August 2014, by train, across Ukraine and regardless of the actual crisis.

NTW now publishes two letters received by a Hungarian member of NTW, Benedek Jávor (see his blog in Hungarian). The first comes from the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (OAH) (here in Hungarian, page 1, 2 ,3, 4) ; the second (in Hungarian) from Miklós Seszták, the Hungarian Minister for National Development. They bring evidence of a dangerous lack of legal clarity and do not answer to our interrogations. The informal English translations can be found here: letter of the OAH; letter of the Minister.

According to the OAH, the “purpose of the transportation is the temporary storage and non-military reprocessing of the spent fuel on the territory of the Russian Federation and the temporary storage and final disposal of the radioactive waste produced during the reprocessing.[section 3]”

The OAH makes a formal distinction between the spent fuel sent from Hungary to Russia for reprocessing and the resulting waste, whose “temporary storage and final disposal […] is the obligation of the Russian party”[Section 4, section 6]. Nevertheless they state at the same time that the ownership of the spent fuel will be transfe´rred to Russia too[Section 6].

Although this information clearly indicates that the aim is the final disposal of the spent fuel, the OAH denies this fact: ““the purpose of the transportation is not final disposal” [Section 5]. It seems that the Authority does not want to give a precise answer, which could determine whether the transportation was legal or not. Indeed according to the Euratom Directive 2011/70, art 4, “Where […] spent fuel is shipped for processing or reprocessing to a Member State or a third country, the ultimate responsibility for the safe and responsible disposal of those materials, including any waste as a by-product, shall remain with the Member State or third country from which the radioactive material was shipped.” If Hungary transported the waste from Paks for the purpose of final disposal then it violated the Euratom Directive.

This directive article underlines a second interesting point: despite the declarations of the Hungarian institutions, even the waste produced during reprocessing should remain under the responsibility of the Hungarian state. It could stay in Russia only if there were a final disposal facility, which is not the case.

The second letter was sent by Miklós Seszták, Hungarian Minister for National Development. In contrast with the OAH, he clearly admits that the damaged fuel rods were, indeed, transported for final disposal. Another sign of the utter confusion among the respective authorities over what they have done exactly or what they should tell about it.

Nevertheless the Minister explains the legality of the procedure by stressing that the shipment was based on an agreement ratified by the Euratom Supply Agency, that states that “all obligations and rights are transferred to the Russian party with the condition, in accordance with the Agreement, that the spent (encapsulated) fuel shall not be used for military purposes.”

As explained before, according to the directive 2011/70/Euratom, there should be no transfer of responsibility for spent fuel or radioactive waste regardless of what will be done with it.

These letters have been shared with the DG Energy of the European Commission. NTW is now waiting for a real stance from the European Commission regarding the legality of such shipment.

Press release: ”Nuclear emergency plans: an unacceptable inefficiency kept secret”

A week ago, a journalist of the German newspaper TAZ revealed that a nuclear emergency exercise has taken place on September 17th, 2013, figuring an accident at the German nuclear plant Emsland. The outcomes were so catastrophic that the whole test has been hidden by the authorities.

Reaction of Michèle Rivasi, chair of Nuclear Transparency Watch:

“The facts highlighted by the TAZ are really worrying: the German authorities would have been totally unable to protect their population. The aim of this exercise was to test the decision and communication lines; the outcomes speak for themselves: More than one million inhabitants would have been affected by the radioactive releases before any public warning of the authorities.

What happened meanwhile? Over 200 civil servants have been discussing the sharing of responsibilities between the leading Federal Environmental Ministry BMUB and the environmental ministries of the German federal states….So that some regions received the security instructions (to close the windows, doors etc) five hours too late.

The reaction of the German authorities, who simply hide these embarrassing outcomes, is unacceptable.

Unfortunately the situation is not better in other countries. That is why the European network Nuclear Transparency Watch is investigating emergency preparedness and response measures from the point of view civil society, to get a real practical assessment of theoretical provisions often disconnected from the reality.”

Brigitte Artmann, German member of Nuclear Transparency Watch and speaker for fire brigades and emergency preparedness in her hometown Marktredwitz, underlines that: “nothing has been shared with Nuclear Transparency Watch during our national investigations on emergency preparedness and response prior to two roundtables gathering civil society organizations… We contacted the Federal Interior Ministry in Berlin and several Interior Ministries of German federal states but no one evocated this exercise.

From the perspective of a European network one question arises: how are the communication lines supposed to work between two neighbour countries if it is so chaotic on a national level? A way to bound states to transparency could be to organise international peer reviews on emergency plans, with a commitment to full transparency and involvement of populations.”

 Nuclear Transparency Watch claims for cross border and multilateral discussions – with real involvement of civil society organizations- on issues such as nuclear emergency preparedness or the further operation of nuclear plants close to the borders.

3rd roundtable on emergency preparedness and response: NPP Krsko

The third roundtable on emergency preparedness and response around the nuclear power plant Krsko has taken place on October, 20th.

Download the agenda (in English) and the presentations (in Slovenian; by presentation order: Zeleznik, Polic, Stritar, Stojanovic, Mocnik, Medakovic, Zaksek, Kalinic, Klemenc)

  DSCN4105-s

First report by Andrej Klemenc, REC Slovenia on behalf of NTW:

As the member of NTW REC Slovenia carried out on October 20th 2014 a round table on emergency and preparedness in case of nuclear accident in NPP Krško and its cross-border aspects. The round table took place in Brežice (Slovenia) at the border with Croatia. It was attended by 55 persons from all stakeholder groups from Slovenia and Croatia and the Slovene media.

Both countries have an equal share of equity in NPP Krško, a joint venture of two federal republics of former Yugoslavia and situated in the Slovene town of Krško, very close to the border and in the vicinity of the city of Zagreb, a capital of Croatia with about 1 million inhabitants.

The 696 MW Westinghouse designed PWR reactor that started its commercial operation in 1983 is considered as well operated in terms of safety and electricity generation and has already entered procedure to extend its design life time operation for additional 20 years, i.e. till 2043.

At the round table representatives of the NPP Krško, local communities, state, regional and local authorities from both countries presented official nuclear emergency and preparedness plans and activities. In the discussion that followed the citizens and NGOs raised their concerns regarding presumptions of the EP&R plans and asked whether in reality the plans could be implemented. Special concerns were raised on the fact that although the local people have trust in safe operation of the NPP they are- according to the public opinion surveys- poorly informed on how to behave in case of an emergency and sceptical about their chances to escape the worst even if act properly.

DSCN4069-s

Some issues of common concern and possible action about emergency preparedness and response have been identified:

– a lack of regular information and communication on the issue at various levels, including direct communication between the operator of the NPP and nuclear emergency authorities in Croatia

– a lack of permanent and balanced dialogue on nuclear safety, including EP&R issues, between the plant operator and authorities on the one side and citizens, independent experts and NGOs.

– Contradiction between planned evacuation of pupils in schools and kindergartens and intentions of parents to evacuate with private cars together with their children was also identified.

– Citizens also demanded transparent and clear answers regarding long term relocation and damage compensation in case of a major accident in the NPP Krško.

The round table however also identified progress in cross border cooperation. The cooperation between Slovenia and Croatia started at the end of the 90s; it has been continued in 2012 within an EU sponsored project on evacuation in a case of a nuclear accident involving Slovene towns of Krško and Brežice and the city of Zagreb.

The participants were unanimous about the necessity to organise similar events in the future to further discuss the open issues not only in Slovenia but also in the municipalities of Croatia that are situated within the emergency planning zones. It was agreed that a proper strategy for approaching local citizens need to be found. REC Slovenia will seek for possible support to link local population with authorities.

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