Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response

EP&R: Is Bulgaria ready to react in a nuclear crisis?

12 December 2023

Analysis by Dr. Petar Kardzhilov on the answer of the Ministry of the Interior to his application according to the Access to Public Information Act.

There is a delegation of responsibilities from the minister of interior to the Main Directorate Fire Safety and Protection of the Population (FSPP), which are not legally justified because, according to the regulations, they are expressly prescribed for the Мinister. On the other hand, there are serious gaps in the regulatory framework, which are a factor in an unnecessary and dangerous division between the structures of FSPP at the Ministry of Interior around the country and the regional and local authorities.

After the strong interest of 46,000 readings on the “Aktualno” website to the publication with questions in my application according to the Access to Public Information Act (APIA) to the Ministry of the Interior (MI), regarding the prevention and preparation in Bulgaria for a crisis with high radioactivity in the environment, I offer a comment and analysis of the answers in the access decision of the ministry , signed not by the minister but by director of the Legal and Normative Activity Directorate, Mr. Hristo Stefanov.

Regarding the first question, concerning the need for citizens to have prior knowledge of how to react in situations with high radioactivity, the MI answers that the preventive activity is carried out by the bodies of FSPP under the MI, although in the Disaster Protection Act (DPA) and in the Ordinance for Emergency Planning and Emergency Preparedness in the Event of a Nuclear and Radiation Accident (OEPEPENRA) there are duties and responsibilities assigned specifically to the Minister of the Interior. Neither in the act nor in the ordinance is written that the minister can delegate his duties and responsibilities to FSPP. In particular, no answer is given, for example, whether the Minister agreed together with the Мinister of Education on the requirements for training in disaster protection in the system of preschool and school education, which the latter is obliged to approve, according to Art. 16, par. 3 of the DPA. In the answer, there is also no information that the minister has coordinated educational activities in the system of higher education according to the following par. 4 and 5 of Art. 16. There is no answer to the question of whether the Minister has approved programs for training the population on behavior and actions in an emergency situation and for specialized training of the executive authorities on the implementation of the external emergency plan, for which he is obliged according to Art. 21, para. 7, points 5 and 7 of OEPEPENRA. No information is provided as to whether and how the FSPP fulfilled these duties that the Мinister illegally delegated to them.

Attention deserves the answer from the Ministry of the Interior to the first part of the first question: “In what ways, in which settlements, in what locations and how often do the specialized state bodies work with citizens to create, as well as refresh the necessary prior knowledge with the aim of strict implementation by the citizens of protective measures to limit the harmful consequences for them in case of emergency situations with increased radioactivity in the environment?” The answer is: “In MI-FSPP, systematized information is not processed and stored according to the criteria set in the application for the frequency and number of trainings conducted by FSPP authorities in populated areas specifically on the subject of nuclear and radiation accidents.”; The lack of such information and archive means that the citizens have no way to find out whether and how the statutory duties of the Minister directly delegated to FSPP are fulfilled, both to date and in previous years decades ago. From the overall answer to the first question in the application, according to APIA, it is clear that the MI does not implement the DPA and OEPEPENRA, which necessitates the need for legislative changes, both essentially in the regulatory framework for preparation and radiation protection, as well as for control over the fulfillment of the duties of the institutions liable according to the law.

From the answer to the second cluster of questions: “Are there external emergency plans developed for all regions, coordinated by the Minister of the interior and approved by orders from the regional governors according to Art. 9 of OEPEPENRA? For which regions and municipalities in the country do such plans exist, according to the provision of Art. 16, par.2 of OEPEPENRA and Art. 9 of the DPA? Please indicate where these emergency plans are available to the public? ”, after one page of general information, it is clear that the MI does not know at all whether and which districts and municipalities in Bulgaria have emergency plans. This means that the current or former ministers of the interior have not fulfilled the provisions of Art. 9, par. 17 of DPA (effective from 07.05.2016) – to conclude agreements with regional governors and mayors regarding the implementation of these plans: “(17) In connection with ensuring the implementation of disaster protection plans under para. 4, 8 and 10, agreements are concluded between the Minister of Interior, the regional governor or the mayor of a municipality and the persons under chapter four, section II.” In the answer to the question, there is no information that the Minister has coordinated the development of emergency plans for populated areas, which is his responsibility according to Art. 9, par. 3 and Art. 16 from OEPEPENRA.

From the answer to the third cluster of questions about siren systems for early warning, we understand that for 39.33% of the citizens of Bulgaria, alarming is provided with modern systems. That is, the people living in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas, Ruse, Pleven, Pazardzhik, Montana, Smolyan, Kardzhali, Vratsa, Stara Zagora, Galabovo, Tsarevo, Ahtopol, the village of Lozenets and all settlements in the 30 kilometer zone around Kozloduy NPP may hear various siren signals, accompanied by a message of what type and with what threats the emergency situation is. In other settlements in the country, air raid sirens are used, without a voice message. Regarding the latest
ones, the Ministry of the Interior says that they are checked once every two years, but they do not say when they were checked for the last time and whether they are all in working order. It is also clear from the answer to this question that no serious tests and studies have been conducted, and there are no written reports on the audibility of sirens by all citizens in a given settlement, as well as on the audibility and intelligibility of voice messages and commands. We also understand that for this important part of radiation protection there is no documentation and no archive has been created.

From the answer to the fourth cluster of questions about prophylaxis with potassium iodide tablets, we learn that suitable tablets are available almost all over the country. I write almost all of it because of the expression “(…) as well as partially for the regions of Veliko Tarnovo, Lovech and Pleven”. Although according to the law they are obliged to buy and deliver them to the municipalities, the MI doesn’t answer the exact amount of tablets in municipalities, but they write that there are enough, including for foreign citizens and guests of the country. There is also no answer to the question of where the tablets delivered to the municipalities are physically located and how they are stored.

After another half page of general info, we indirectly get an answer to the most important question in this cluster – there is no centralized and uniform protocol for the time, places and ways of distributing the tablets to citizens: “According to the Ordinance on the Order of Creation, Storage, Renewal , Maintaining, Providing and Accounting for the Stocks of Personal Protective Equipment, the mayors of the municipalities prepare logistical schemes for the provision of individual protective equipment to the population if necessary, which are updated annually. Logistic schemes should be available in the respective municipal administrations.” Since each mayor decides for themselves how to distribute tablets, and the MI has no idea and control over who decided to do what, the result in the event of a crisis will certainly be panic actions and severe consequences in places. This leads us to the conclusion of a very serious gap in the Bulgarian legislation.

The answer to the fifth group of questions concerning evacuation procedures also speaks of a serious gap in the legislation. The MI admits: “The legislation in the Republic of Bulgaria does not contain norms obliging MI to collect and store data on the settlements in the country that have evacuation plans. Calculations for evacuation and dispersion in the event of a disaster/accident are part of the respective regional or municipal disaster protection plans, which are published on the website of the relevant administration.” It is grossly inadequate that the MI, which is responsible for the public order and the security of citizens in the country, does not know who, where and how should evacuate in case of a crisis. This gap is a condition for chaos, incidents, accidents, looting, exposure of citizens to high doses of radiation and other damaging events in a nuclear accident crisis or attack. The ministry doesn’t even know how many and which settlements have evacuation plans.

Even more unacceptable, absurd and in complete contradiction to the law is the answer to the biggest sixth cluster of questions from the application under the APIA, concerning the availability of individual means of protection for citizens in a crisis with high radioactivity. The MI writes: “The Minister of the Interior, respectively the MI, is not obliged by law or by-law to collect statistical data on the individual means of protection available in the country. Because of this, they are not obliged entities within the meaning of Art. 3, par. 1 of the APIA for providing the requests in point 6.2 of the application for public information.” How then, if they think that they are not obliged to collect data, do they fulfill the obligations of the minister, arranged in Art. 21, par. 7, point 13 of the OEPEPENRA: “The Minister of the Interior supervises the maintenance of the readiness of the individual and collective means for the protection of the population” ?! There is no answer to the question of how Bulgarian citizens can get life-saving protective equipment, written in a leaflet by “Kozloduy” NPP, uploaded to the website of the MI – FSPP: civilian gas mask, children's gas mask, respirator, child safety camera. The answer to this group of questions also ends with the admission that the MI don’t store information and don’t have control: “At the Main Directorate FSPP to the MI no information is stored according to the criteria specified in the application – what exactly, how many individual means of protection, where they are located, how many of them are suitable and how they will be distributed in the event of a nuclear accident.” Thus, when a crisis with dangerously high radiation level occurs no one, including the MI, will know how, with what means to protect themselves and, contrary to the more correct decision to stay in the buildings, many people will run in panic, which will most likely lead to far more severe consequences.

The answer to the last seventh cluster of questions about information and communication doesn’t offer other options for activation, except for the siren system, national television and radio, the websites of the municipalities, the FSPP and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. With the highly developed modern telecommunication and online network capabilities, a much more secure and qualitative structure for information and communication can be developed, but, as can be seen from the response, the MI is not working in such a direction. Even the crisis call center, which is mandatory for every large-scale disaster/accident/attack, is not provided as an opportunity for information, communication and control over the situation by the structures of the FSPP in the country.

In conclusion, from the whole answer of MI it is clear the statement that there are several legal and by-law requirements in the DPA and OEPEPENRA, which are not complied with by the MI, because the institution does not accept them as their obligations. There is a delegation of responsibilities from the Minister to MD FSPP, which are not legally justified because, according to the regulations, they are expressly prescribed for the Minister. On the other hand, there are serious gaps in the regulatory framework, which are a factor in an unnecessary and dangerous division between the structures of MD FSPP in the country and the regional and local authorities. There is a lack of data on a sufficient number of quality activities for the preparation and prevention of crisis with high radioactivity levels, working together with the structures of the MI, local authorities, educational services, private organizations and citizens.

Petar Kardzhilov is a Doctor of Public Communications and Information Sciences at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, a specialist in risk and crisis communications, a member of the Union of Scientists in Bulgaria, a qualified expert at the international NGO for transparency in nuclear energy “Nuclear Transparency Watch”.

Abbreviations:
MI – Ministry of Interior
FSPP/MD FSPP – Main Directorate Fire Safety and Protection of Population
DPA – Disaster Protection Act
APIA – Access to Public Information Act
OEPEPENRA – Ordinance for Emergency Planning and Emergency Preparedness in the Event of a Nuclear and Radiation Accident

Leaflet for Emergency Preparedness and Response

12 June 2023

Nuclear Transparency watch developed a leaflet aiming to inform European countries citizens about the behavior to have and the actions to take in case of nuclear accident.

If you want to have this leaflet translated with the local information and contacts, you can write to nucleartransparencywatch[at]gmail.com asking for “EP&R translation”.

If you want to download the leaflet you can do so at the link below:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FfaBaQQ1P4vqM0UK9X-TtarfrHOgTPVf/view?usp=drive_link

You can also find it framed in a brochure:

EP&R: results from NTW’s participation in a European Project

22 December 2022

Here are the presentations given by NTW to the participants of this EP&R European Project. The goal was to share NTW’s results and views while considering the process and practices established towards Civil Society. Those presentations were given under the frame of two workshops.

… [Read More]

Russian aggression towards Ukrainian nuclear installations and safety

21 November 2022

A few months ago, the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) together with Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) sent a joint letter – attached – to the European Commission and nuclear regulators calling to learn the lessons from the Russian aggression towards Ukrainian nuclear installations and carry out similar stress tests for all European nuclear installations as were carried out after the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima.

Acknowledging the relevance of this issue, the letter has finally been included on the agenda of this week’s ENSREG meeting.

Attacks on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and the Nord Stream II gas pipeline are a stark reminder of the risk posed by energy infrastructure on EU citizens and the environment in times of military conflict. If the Commission and ENSREG decide to co-ordinate a series of stress tests on nuclear power plants, all installations shall be upgraded to include the lessons learned or shut down accordingly.

More information:
Jan Haverkamp, senior nuclear expert and vice-chair of Nuclear Transparency Watch –
jan.haverkamp@greenpeace.org
+31 6 21334619

20220519 Letter post-Ukraine nuclear stress tests NTW EEB
See also: https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/non-classe/open-letter-from-ntw-eeb-calling-for-reviewed-stress-tests-after-the-attacks-on-ukrainian-npp.html

Aarhus Convention on Nuclear roundtable – January 2022 “cross-border EP&R”

22 February 2022

The sessions recording of the ACN roundtable on cross-border EP&R – January 2022 – is now available on NTW’s YouTube channel:

The presentations given at the ACN roundtable are available at this link:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1e6t_FoBo695UFg15bqPs2xamk73J-uqf?usp=sharing

Here after, the detailed agenda of the 3 sessions (the recording of this event is in progress):

First Session (January 12th 2022, morning session) –
current progress of the implementation EU EP&R provisions together with a regional perspective

9:00 Introductory session
● Nadja Zeleznik, chair of Nuclear Transparency Watch
● Michael Huebel, DG ENER
9:15 Current arrangements at national and EU levels, transboundary aspects Chair: Representative of DG ENER
● Review of the Implementation of the Basic Safety Standards Directive in EU: results of recent studies launched by DG ENER on the effective implementation of EP&R requirements in the EU Member States and the neighbouring countries
o Yvan Pouleur, DGENER
● Outcomes of the IAEA/EC workshop(2018) on Emergency Preparedness and Response: Requirements and practical implementation
o Bharat Patel, DGENER
● Presentation of the ANCCLI WHITE BOOK on Emergency and Post emergency Management elaborated by ANCCLI, including specific aspects associated with transboundary EP&R
o Anne Laure Maclot CLI of Cattenom and Yves Lheureux, ANCCLI
● Modeling a major nuclear accident in a hypothetical EPR and understanding the dependence of the magnitude of transboundary radioactive pollution on meteorological situations
o Frank Paul Piguet, project director of Institut Biosphère 10:15 Plenary Discussion
11:00 Break
11:15 Regional Roundtables with national stakeholders
Effective involvement of the CS in the EP&R system will be discussed through regional roundtables. A focus will be made on complexity of transboundary aspects based on factual experience feedback, in two different EU regional contexts.
11:15 First regional Roundtable (France, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg) on non-radiological challenges in EP&R
Chair: Yves Lheureux, ANCCLI
● Economical and industrial issues, Aurélie Fournier, CLI of Gravelines, France
● Tourism issues and negative impact on the territory image, Bram Degrieck, Mayor of the City of La Panne, Belgium
● Worker flow and impact on health structures, Roger Spautz, Greenpeace Luxembourg
● Agricultural issues, German Representative, Germany
12:15 Second Regional Roundtable (Bulgaria, Greece, Ukraine, Romania) on identification of cross-border resources in nuclear accidental and post-accidental context
Chair: Nadja Zeleznik, NTW
● Natalia Bizhko, Deputy head of division on Emergency Preparedness and Radiation protection, SNRIU, Ukraine
● Christos Housiadas, Greek Atomic Energy Commission (EEAE), Greece
● Albena Simeonova, Foundation for Environment and Agriculture (FEA), Bulgaria
● Adi-Maria Simoiu, University of Craiova, Romania
13:15 End of First half day

Second Session (January 19th 2022, morning session)-
Post-accident governance Challenges

Chair: IRSN and NTW
Post-accident management and post-accident recovery remains an important and complex challenge involving a plurality of actors as well as competing priorities such as health protection, social activities, continuity of economic life, restart of business and trade, priorities regarding waste management, thus integrating radiological protection standards with other priorities (well illustrated by the current COVID situation).
The trend of centralisation that characterizes emergency management is not adapted anymore to the post- accident context where various components of society have to enter the decision-making. The session is intended to provide the participants with a better view of the challenges at stake.
● Topic 1 – Safety conditions at work in contaminated areas, equity and consistency of protection standards between workers and population (in cross-border context)
● Topic 2 – Management of the production and marketing of goods produced in a contaminated area (in cross-border context)
Facilitating the session will be done with the support of IRSN through a specific method based on a serious Game that have been developed in the EU R&D project TERRITORIES. The objective is to identify remaining challenges attached to Post-accident Governance notably in regard to Transparency and in the perspective of improving preparatory provisions and also for the framing of future R&D in the field of post-accident governance.

Third Session (January 26th 2022, morning session) –
Lessons from the COVID regarding nuclear post-accident challenges

Chair: Representative of DG ENER
9:00 Cross analysis nuclear post-accident/ COVID
● Local feedback from COVID
o David Reinberger, City of Vienna
● Meaningful lessons from the COVID experiences in the perspective of nuclear post-accident challenges
o Gilles Heriard-Dubreuil, Mutadis
9:45 Plenary Discussion
10:30 Break
10:45 Final Roundtable- Drawing from the lessons learned from COVID the emerging challenges for EP&R
Chair: Gilles Heriard-Dubreuil, NTW
What is different from past experience ? A new understanding of risks ? To what exchange does it change the vision for EP&R ?
● Representative from EC DG (ECHO)
● Jan Haverkamp, NTW
● Jerome Guillevic, IRSN
● Robin Gosnard, transboundary group of ANCCLI
● Representative from EC DG (EAC)
● David Reinberger, City of Vienna
11:45 Plenary Discussion – What are the next steps regarding EP&R for attending stakeholders based on the results of the discussions during these three roundtable sessions?
12:30 Conclusions
● Nadja Zeleznik, chair of Nuclear Transparency Watch
● Representative of DG ENER
12:45 End of the Roundtable

ACN roundtable on EP&R January 2022

14 December 2021

AARHUS CONVENTION AND NUCLEAR (ACN) PROCESS

The Aarhus Convention establishes a number of rights of the public with regard to the environment. It provides for a right of access to information on public decisions impacting the environment, a right to participate in environmental decision-making and a right of access to justice should the afore-mentioned rights be denied.

The ACN (Aarhus Convention and Nuclear) participatory process was initiated in early 2008 by the European Commission Directorate General for Energy (DG ENER) together with Nuclear Transparency Watch.
The aim of the ACN process is to investigate the implementation in practice of the Aarhus Convention in the context of nuclear activities. The ACN Roundtables involve various partners (national authorities, technical support organisations, operators of nuclear activities, civil society organisations, together with concerned international organisations).

INVITATION to the next ACN Roundtable – 12, 19 & 26 January 2022 – online event

We are very pleased to invite you to the next Aarhus Convention & Nuclear (ACN) European Roundtable on

« Cross-border Emergency Preparedness & Response to nuclear accidental and post-accidental situations » (EP&R)

Language spoken: English, French & German

The Nuclear Transparency Watch network and the European Commission (DG ENER) are organizing an Aarhus Convention and Nuclear (ACN) Roundtable on “Cross-border Emergency Preparedness and Response to nuclear accidental and post-accidental situations (EP&R)” with successive half-day morning sessions to be held on January 12th, 19th, and 26th, 2022.

An overview of current progress of the implementation EU EP&R provisions will be provided together with a regional perspective. A particular focus will be given to transboundary challenges of EP&R between EU member states. The roundtable will also examine the extent to which EP&R policies can reconcile various competing priorities such as health protection, continuity of economic life, recovery of life quality, remediation, and environmental protection. A plurality of participants will be involved. During the 2nd session, they will be proposed to participate to a serious game methodology, to foster dialogue on cross boarder situation involving Safety conditions at work in contaminated areas, on the one hand as well as on the Management of the production and marketing of goods produced in a contaminated, in the other hand. The 3rd session will draw lessons learned from Covid-19 that are relevant to EP&R.

This event is organized by the European network Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) and the European Commission (DG ENER). IRSN took part in the settlement of the second day session.

For more information (detailed agenda) and/or registration (before January, 10^th 2022) please write at the following email address nucleartransparencywatch[at]gmail.com by giving your: SURNAME/Name, organization, country, email address, day you want to attend and languages spoken (french, english and/or german).

We are looking forward to seeing you there !

“Fukushima Nuclear Catastrophe – Ten Years Later” – Online Event on March 12, 2021

18 March 2021

Event organised by Gabriele Mraz, member of NTW, and Patricia Lorenz on behalf of the CNFE.

The Cities for a Nuclear Free Europe (CNFE) held an online event on March 12th on the situation in Fukushima 10 years after the nuclear catastrophe and the impact of the accident on the city and on the region.

The agenda, the presentations and a report can be downloaded here.

A video will follow later in April.

Radiation Protection Report Joint Project

16 December 2019

Gabriele Mraz, December 2019

In the Joint Project, European NGOs and research institutions cooperate since 2003 on safe and sustainable energy issues with a focus on nuclear policies in Central and Eastern Europe. One topic we investigated is how requirements form Basic Safety Standard Directive are implemented in the field of emergency protection and response (EP&R). For more information see http://www.joint-project.org/.

In 2018, the Joint Project sent a questionnaire to the national authorities responsible for radiation protection in Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Austria and Poland. We asked about the implementation of the Basic Safety Standard (BSS)-Directive 2013/59/Euratom, the implementation and interpretation of Council Regulation (Euratom) 2016/52 and about Intervention levels and countermeasures in case of a radiological accident. See the evaluation of the answers to the Joint Project questionnaire on radiation protection (LINK).

The BSS Directive obliges Member States to re-assess their EP&R regimes, but on the other hand formerly lower reference levels or dose limits could be increased. It is necessary to get prepared for a severe nuclear accident by harmonizing radiation protection and EP&R in the EU – differences in countermeasures and dose limits will result in disturbance of the public. People will not understand if contaminated food is allowed to be put on the market in one country, but forbidden in another one, or if some people are advised for sheltering and taking iodine tablets, and other people receiving the same dose are not.

A basic problem is that the maximum dose limits and reference levels of the BSS-Directive are too high. The questioned Member States mostly do not prefer to deviate from the values and limits of the BSS Directive. Children, embryos, pregnant and breastfeeding women have to be protected better because they are especially vulnerable to radiation. Radon levels have to be reduced to lower the lung cancer risk. These topic needs to be followed up in NGOs’ work. It will be necessary to inform people not only about existing limits and levels, but also on critics of these limits and levels. Helpful are positive examples of countries which have lower levels, f. e. Austria with its lower reference levels for countermeasures sheltering and iodine prophylaxis.

For more information see also our report “Health effects of ionising radiation and their consideration in radiation protection”.

13th ENEF 04-05/06/18 Bratislava

11 June 2018

The 13th European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) organised by the European Commission with two hosting countries (Slovakia and Czech Republic) took place in Bratislava on 04-05/06.

This event, which received the mandate from the European Council to be to be a “platform for broad discussion of the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy”, focused this year on the topics ‘Maintaining a critical level of nuclear safety expertise in Europe’ and ‘Small Modular Reactors’.

Members from Nuclear Transparency Watch evaluated this year’s ENEF critically. We will keep you informed about our evaluation of the event, but would like to give already access to the presentations from civil society representatives.

Rebecca Harms, MEP Greens/EFA and Vice-Chair of NTW made an opening speech on the first panel where she emphasised the importance to focus on radioactive waste and decommissionning rather than new build.

To watch her full presentation, see the Webstream of Day 2. (min 13’34”).

Dr David Lowry, independant researcher at Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates and member of NTW made a presentation on the second panel regarding the “Inconvenient Truths of Small Modular Reactors.” Download here his full paper.

Download the full ENEF2018 programme.

Webstream of Day 1

Strong radioactive release finally recognized in Russia: analysis of the french association for control of radioactivity in the West (ACRO)

15 November 2017

Updates at the end of the document:

Russia recognizes ruthenium contamination, but denies leak, Nov. 20 2017
Russia tries to be reassuring, November 24
IAEA data leaked, November 27
Result of the “independent” survey led by Rosatom, December 8
Rosatom recognized ruthenium-106 released into the environment, December 14
Ruthenium 103 was also present in the rejection, February 5 2018

The Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) has just announced (in French and English) that traces of ruthenium-106, a radioactive element, detected in Western Europe last September, were probably due to a massive release, on the order of 100 and 300 terabecquerels, “somewhere between the Volga and the Urals without it being possible to specify the exact location of the point of discharge with the available data.“

The Institute adds that “the consequences of an accident of this magnitude in France would have required locally to implement measures to protect populations on a radius of a few kilometers around the place of rejection. “

Still according to the IRSN, the release would have taken place during the last week of September 2017 and would be finished.

Ruthenium-106

Ruthenium 106 is a radioactive fission product from the nuclear industry that does not exist in its natural state. Its half-life is a little over a year (373 days), which means that the present amount is halved each year. By disintegrating, ruthenium-106 is transformed into rhodium-106, which is also radioactive with a half-life of 30 seconds. Each decay of ruthenium-106 goes with the disintegration of rhodium-106, shortly after. Thus, the ruthenium-rhodium pair should be considered which doubles the quantity released of 100 and 300 terabecquerels announced by the IRSN.

Rhodium-106 will be responsible for most of the dose caused by the incorporation of inseparable pairs of radioactive isotopes.

Origin of the release

In case of release from a nuclear reactor, various radioelements are detected. Here, since ruthenium-106 and rhodium-106 are the only radioelements to have been identified, the origin can not be a nuclear reactor. On the other hand, it may be the accidental release of a spent fuel treatment facility or the manufacture of radioactive sources.

ACRO sometimes detects the ruthenium-rhodium pair around the Areva factories in La Hague. In 2001, two incidents in these factories led the association to demonstrate that the operator, still known as Cogéma, underestimated its ruthenium-rhodium releases into the atmosphere. In May and again in October 2001, the quantities actually released were about 1,000 times higher than what had been announced (see technical note in french). Studies following this ACRO alert showed that atmospheric ruthenium-rhodium releases have been systematically underestimated.

In February 2016, ACRO had again detected this pair of radioelements around the La Hague plants, which was indicative of greater atmospheric release than usual, possibly indicative of undeclared dysfunction.

Quantity released

IRSN announces a source term in Russia of 100 and 300 terabecquerels for the only ruthenium-106, and therefore the double also taking into account rhodium-106. A terabecquerel is 1,000 billion becquerels.

As a comparison, the authorization of atmospheric discharges from the Areva factories in La Hague is 0.001 terabecquerel (1 GBq) per year for beta-gamma emitters (including ruthenium-rhodium) other than tritium, rare gases and iodines. For liquid discharges, for the only ruthenium-106 released at sea, the limit is 15 terabecquerels per year.

The quantity released during the incident reported by the IRSN is therefore considerable and this event should be classified at Level 5 of the INES international scale. Chernobyl and Fukushima were at 7, which is the maximum level. However, no information is available on the IAEA website.

Provisional conclusion

60 years after the Kychtym disaster in the Urals and more than 30 years after the Chernobyl disaster, the fact that an event of this magnitude can remain secret for more than a month is incredible. This is particularly serious for local populations who have been exposed without any protection, as in 1957 and 1986.

It should be noted that as early as October 11, the Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz in Germany pointed to the South of the Urals (communicated in German and English), stating that IRSN shared this point of view. There was therefore no progress in a month in identifying the origin of this rejection.

Is such secrecy explained by the fact that a military installation is involved? Russia has denied being behind this rejection. It should publish all its measurement data in the environment.

Mayak?

Several websites are targeting the Mayak nuclear complex in Chelyabinsk Oblast as the source of this contamination, without our being able to validate these claims. Originally, this secret military-industrial complex is designed to manufacture and refine plutonium for nuclear warheads and has become infamous for its serious nuclear accidents, including that of Kychtym. The site is still active and serves as a spent fuel treatment center (operator’s website).

Russia recognizes ruthenium contamination, but denies leak , Update on November 20

At the request of Greenpeace Russia, it was the Russian meteorological agency that finally admitted that the origin of the leak is in Russia (release in Russian). The press releases is entitled: “extremely high and high pollution”. Meanwhile, the state-owned company Rosatom still denies being at the origin of this pollution. (release in English). In its press release, the weather agency does not give the ruthenium-106 or rhodium-106 contamination, but rather the total beta contamination of aerosols. But we can suppose that the excess is essentially due to this couple of radio-elements.

The highest concentration was found in Argayash, in Chelyabinsk Oblast, which includes Mayak and Kychtym between September 26 and October 1: 7,610 × 10-5 Bq / m3, or 986 times more than is usually measured in this station. In Novogorny, still in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, it was 5,230 × 10-5 Bq / m3 these days, 440 times more than the usual values. Excessive radioactive aerosol values were also detected in the North Caucasus, up to 2,147 × 10-5 Bq / m3, or 230 times background noise, and in Tatarstan. Other data is available in this document in Russian.

It is now confirmed that a serious rejection has taken place on a Russian nuclear installation which is still secret. But the meteorological agency has apparently not launched a warning and it is the local populations, who live in an already highly polluted environment, who have been exposed. What are its tags for? The meteorological agency explains that the levels recorded are well below the local limits set at 4.4 Bq / m3. A non-event in Russia. These concentrations are very high compared to what is usually measured and is the unambiguous signature of an abnormal rejection. On the other hand, the atmospheric concentrations announced do not require sheltering or evacuation, even under French standards.

The measurement station at Argayash (Aragasy), where the highest concentration has been measured, is about thirty kilometers from the Mayak nuclear complex. Near the point of discharge, pollution may be higher. Independent environmental measures are essential. The Russian meteorological agency also mentions fallout from 10 to 50 Bq / m2 and per day, in places. the IAEA website still does not indicate anything. It should be noted that the weather agency also mentions radioactive iodine pollution in the Obnisk region (Обнинск), located about 100 km southeast of Moscow. Concentrations reached 1.85 × 10-3 Bq / m3 on 18 and 19 September and would be due to a local research center.

On November 21st, IRSN stated in French media that the results of its modeling gave much higher values in the immediate vicinity of the discharge point. But, if the tags whose results have been published are not under the winds at the time of rejection, it remains compatible. And the Institute adds: “We can therefore ask ourselves the question of the role of the IAEA. It is not normal to arrive at this situation. It is not normal to observe ruthenium in the air of all Europe, without ever knowing the source.

Russia tries to be reassuring, Update on November 24

The regulator of agricultural products Rosselkhoznadzor issued a statement (in Russian only) denying the contamination of Russian agricultural products. It talks about panic in the grain market that would be due only to rumors and media speculation, but gives no measurement results.
Meanwhile, the Institute of Nuclear Security of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE RAS) announced the creation of a commission of inquiry in a statement (in Russian only) whose purpose is to determine the origin ruthenium and rhodium pollution. It is also reassuring by saying that the levels found in Russia are largely in the norms and has already concluded that Rosatom, the Russian national company, is not involved. And Rosatom will inform the public of the results of the investigation.
In the absence of an independent laboratory on site, there is still room for improvement in terms of public transparency and radiation protection in Russia.

IAEA data leaked, Update on November 27

ACRO uploads data collected by the IAEA on ruthenium pollution detected in Europe that the UN agency refuses to make public. This table, dated October 13, 2017, does not contain any Russian data. As for Rosatom, the Russian state-owned company, it invites journalists and bloggerson its Facebook page to visit Mayak, which, according to Western journalists, has become the cradle of ruthenium. On the agenda, “literacy” on ruthenium.

Result of the “independent” survey led by Rosatom, Update on December 8 2017

The state-owned nuclear company Rosatom held a press conference to communicate the findings of the “independent” ruthenium-rhodium contamination survey carried out in late September throughout Europe: it is not responsible for this pollution. Nothing on his website for the moment … To be continued!

Only an independent international inquiry will shed light on this rejection. Russia could start by publishing all its environmental data in the suspected area.

Rosatom acknowledges releasing ruthenium-106 in the environment, routinely, Update on December 14, 2017

According to News Agency AP, Yuri Mokrov, an adviser to the Mayak Nuclear Center’s managing director, acknowledged that processing spent fuel leads to releases of ruthenium-106 into the environment. He then added that Mayak plant is not the cause of the abnormally high rejection that was detected throughout Europe last September. According to him, discharges would be minimal and hundreds of times below allowable limits. Authorized levels are not given in the article.

Our summary:
–Russia first didn’t detect radioactive ruthenium detected throughout Europe;
–Then, following the calculations made in Germany and France that pointed to the Urals, the country ended up admitting to having detected it at extremely high levels, but without danger. In fact, the advertised levels are much higher than what is measured routinely, but do not require any particular protection measure. The measurement of an air pollution is done by filtering the air for several days. This may be a long-term average that mitigates the peak pollution. The measurement period is not given.
–Rosatom, the state nuclear industry in Russia denies any involvement in the rejection. It sets up an “independent” commission which concludes in the same direction and which brings out the thesis of the fall of a satellite. And there, all of a sudden, Rosatom recognizes regular rejections of ruthenium-106 in the environment and declares these rejections are within the admissible limits. And there wasn’t any particular incident to report. This means the limit must be very high.

The conclusion is that Russia has not changed much since Chernobyl. Without an independent laboratory on site, glasnost did not affect the nuclear sector.

Ruthenium-103 was also present in the rejection , February 5 2018

A meeting with international experts took place in Russia at the end of January 2018 about this ruthenium case, including IRSN. It appears that in some countries ruthenium-103 was also present in the radioactive cloud. Surprisingly, there has been no official communication so far, which gives some indication of the potential source of this contamination. On January 22nd, the Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz in Germany was still saying that there was only ruthenium-106.

The half-life of ruthenium-103 is 39.26 days, which means that it disappears much faster than ruthenium-106, which has a half-life of 373.6 days. And so the nuclear fuel at the origin of the rejection must not be out of the reactor for a long time: 3 to 4 years maximum. However, in general, the treatment of spent fuels is done on older fuels.

The Russian press deduces that this exonerates the Mayak site. It does makes it possible to exclude a priori vitrification which was strongly suspected until now, unless, for some obscure reason, young fuel could be treated and the residues vitrified. On the other hand, the manufacture of radioactive sources is generally done on “young” spent fuel. And Mayak makes sources …

French press mentions the commission by CEA and INFN in Italy to the Mayak nuclear complex of a source of cerium-144 for a physics experiment. However, the production of this source requires the treatment of “young” fuels, less than 5 years old. The article speaks of troubling coincidence.

This rejection is mysterious enough to put everything on the table and we hope for an official communication from the international experts present in Russia.

On February 6, IRSN posted a briefing note in French and English and a report in English only summarizing its investigations confirming the detection of ruthenium-103 and studying the hypothesis of the manufacture of a source of cerium-144. The report is rich in information.

Article initially published on November 11, 2017 on the ACRO website.

ACRO is a French non governmental organisation that operates a laboratory for radioactivity analysis. It was created in 1986 as a response to people’s demands for information and reliable independent testing. It is a member of NTW since 2013.