Transparency and Public participation

New report for the European Parliament demands action on transboundary nuclear safety and nuclear liability

13 February 2019

by Jan Haverkamp, 13 February 2019

The petition committee of the European Parliament (PETI) received over the last years several large petitions expressing concern about transboundary nuclear issues in countries like Belgium, the Czech Republic, the UK, Hungary and others. In reaction to that, it asked the Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union to commission a study to address the issues raised in these petitions. The lead authors of that study, prof. Michael Faure from the Netherlands Maastricht University department of environmental law and the Rotterdam based Erasmus School of Law and Dr. Kévine Kindji of the Maastricht European Institute of Transnational Legal Research (METRO) at Maastricht University, produced a comprehensive overview of legal developments around transboundary nuclear issues, including a large chapter on the developments of environmental liability.

The study addresses the EU situation within the framework of international bodies and agreements like the IAEA and the Convention on Nuclear Safety, issues of public enforcement of international legal obligations on transboundary nuclear issues, addresses the tension between the EU Treaties and Euratom, covers citizen en NGO involvement in decision making, and comes with ten recommendations in which the European Union could improve the haphazard current situation with better regulatory oversight, harmonisation of rules, and improvement of the nuclear liability regime and implementation thereof.

The study gives a very good overview of the state of play of what is a very dynamic legal situation.

The study can be downloaded here.

Dr David Lowry unearths important information about the nuclear fall-out of Brexit on the loss of co-operation and the ownership of plutonium, by Jan Haverkamp

15 January 2019

NTW member Dr David Lowry is widely known for his stubborn and very effective work on nuclear transparency in the UK. Over the years, he has used all the tools in the legal toolbox to prevent important information being kept out of the public domain and in that way influenced many important nuclear debates in Britain. His instruments include access to information requests, but also parliamentarian questions and intensive on-line research. Dr David Lowry calls on NTW members and others following nuclear developments to more intensively use these instruments. That is an important call, because his work shows that the lack of transparency in the nuclear sector still enables politicians to hide the complexity of nuclear decision making, including issues around the true cost of nuclear energy, the important role of co-operation in nuclear medicine, the ongoing radioactive waste problem, and even the link between civilian and military nuclear sectors. Lowry’s work gives extremely good examples how to go about delivering more transparency in real life and we certainly will feature more of them here in the future. NTW also plans to set up a library where this kind of information will be stored so that other nuclear transparency activists can maintain access.

Last month, Lowry revealed key-information on the nuclear fall-out of the Brexit process on the loss of co-operation in the field of nuclear power, that he had obtained over parliamentarian questions. In a detailed blog including the full response from the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee in the British Parliament, Rachel Reeves, to the Energy Minister Richard Harrington, he sharply analysis how the industry bias of this MP leaves out important issues from the national debate and counters that with what a different Committee in the House of Lords has found on the subject and explanations and reactions from different other UK politicians, and adds background material.

A second blog addresses the thorny issue how title swaps of plutonium from reprocessing will be influenced by Brexit. Again, Lowry extensively quotes from official answers Green MP Caroline Lucas received on Parliamentarian questions from the relevant responsible politicians.

This surfaces, amongst others, that special fissile material (e.g. plutonium left over from reprocessing in Sellafield) is collectively owned by Euratom, “but the operator with the legal title to the material has an ‘unlimited right of use and consumption’ over it, subject to their complying with the obligations imposed on them by the Treaty.” The Business and Industry department (BEIS) continues that Euratom’s overview will cease after Brexit, claiming that “These provisions will not have any practical impact on the day to day management and use of the material.”

Lowry then continues to analyse how this is fundamentally wrong and illustrates that with how Swedish plutonium from its closed R-1 reactor in Oskarshamn, now in the UK after reprocessing in Sellafield, is to be transferred into UK ownership, one of several of such transfers. This opens for me from this side of the Channel the concern that without Euratom overview, it becomes unclear what the long-term fate of this plutonium stockpile will be. Will it end up in MOX, will it have to be disposed of in a for now non-existing disposal in the UK, or may it be diverted to the UK’s military programme? The background documentation that Lowry gives only increases the picture of a lot of high-brow talk but little assurances.

NTW and EEB leave European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) and call for its termination

3 December 2018

On 28 November, Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) and the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) informed the European Council and the European Commission of their decision to suspend cooperation with and participation in the European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF). ENEF is presently a conference held every year in Bratislava or Prague, and was set up in 2007 by the European Council as a platform for discussion by all stakeholders about the future of nuclear energy in Europe. The ENEF conferences organised by the Czech Republic and Slovakia together with the European Commission. NTW and the EEB have participated in the Steering Committee of the forum, together with representatives from the EESC, Foratom, Eurelectric, the Commission and the two organising member states.

In the letter (1) the two organisations explain that ENEF is still not fulfilling its Council mandate and that civil society actors like representatives from NGOs, independent academics and others have basically been used as greenwash for a nuclear propaganda event from the Czech and Slovak governments. NTW and the EEB also call on other civil society actors to further boycott ENEF.

In 2015, the European Commission had invited NTW and the EEB to participate in the Steering Committee in an attempt to reform ENEF, in order to make it fulfil the Council’s mandate. It became soon clear that the format of panels followed by a few questions from the room was not the basis for a constructive discussion about all the factors that influence the role of nuclear energy in the European Union energy policies. Attempts to introduce more participative formats were met with scepticism by the Czech and Slovak organisers and part of the industry participants. NTW and the EEB lauded the attempts to attract more participants from civil society by covering travel and accommodation for those who could not afford it themselves, but this did not create sufficient balance against attempts from the Czech and Slovak organisers to create a nuclear promotion event, mainly for the own market. Press conferences lacked translation and focused only on local political issues, not on the role of nuclear energy and its myriad of problematic issues that were to be discussed in the forum. After three years of constructively trying to support the European Commission in its effort to create a real participative and transparent event with open discourse among participants, NTW and the EEB concluded that their efforts were a waste of energy and called on the Council and Commission to find other more inclusive and participative ways to assess the role nuclear power in the future of the Union.

The Commission’s failed attempt to improve ENEF came after Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth Europe and Sortir du nucléaire together with the French umbrella of nuclear information committees ANCCLI in 2007 attempted to support the creation a forum on the basis of inclusion of all stakeholders according to the mandate given by the Council. In 2009 the three NGOs decided to leave the Forum because also then they felt abused by the industry and the organising member states for nuclear propaganda purposes, whereas their input was marginalised in publications related to the forum. This led to the formation of an alternative organised by the European Commission, ANCCLI, Greenpeace, and others in the form of the round-tables on the implementation of the Aarhus Convention in the Nuclear sector (ACN), and annual counter conferences to ENEF in Prague and Linz organised by the government of Upper Austria and Czech and Austrian NGOs. Nuclear Transparency Watch grew out of the ACN round-tables with support from members of the European Parliament and the EEB. In the meantime, ENEF withered away as a Czech and Slovak industry event. The European Council asked the Commission to reform ENEF in 2015, and the Commission invited NTW and the EEB to help in the effort as members of the Steering Committee overseeing ENEF’s organisation. During that period, both organisations several times drew the attention of the Commission during Steering Committee meetings and in formal letters to issues that systematically block fair discourse in the Forum.

Jan Haverkamp, NTW vice-chair and representative in the Steering Committee of ENEF during the last three years: “The initial idea for ENEF is brilliant – a space where industry, governments, nuclear regulators, NGOs, politicians, academics and citizens can meet to seriously discuss issues that determine how nuclear power develops in Europe. A place where the top of the industry, of authorities can meet face to face with important critics from outside their bubble. An open and transparent discussion about all the issues around this technology can only improve the way in which policy making in the European Union can find answers on the challenges of climate change, security of supply, resource needs and environmental protection. But this has to be an honest discussion and not one where make belief and the limited needs of one branch of industry overshadow the overall picture, while pushing out sincere concerns. The host countries did everything they could to make ENEF look as one large confirmation of their very one-sided support policies for the nuclear industry. Such conferences happen already in many places and do not need to be funded by public money.”

David Lowry of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies sat as NTW’s invited expert in the 2018 ENEF conference in a panel on small modular reactor programmes. He noted: “I accepted to participate after one of our colleagues understandably refused to be put into a one critical versus five industry panel set-up. I was then surprised to find that the draft conclusions of the 2018 ENEF did not include any of the detailed criticism on small modular reactor programmes presented, despite the fact that most of the two hour post presentation discussion was taken up by these issues. The European Commission corrected that after NTW and the EEB pointed out this omission, but if every attempt from the side of civil society to be heard has to be this hard fought, it is not an open discussion between all stakeholders.”

Johan Swahn, director of the Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review MKG and the EEB representative in the ENEF steering committee concluded: “Although good in its mandate, ENEF failed to deliver. It is time to move on and assure that the necessary discussions take place where they really can make a difference.”

As reasons for their suspension, NTW and the EEB highlighted the following issues:

The failure of ENEF to engage all Member States of the Union, including nuclear and non-nuclear countries, resulting in poorly informed one-sided positions on the issue of nuclear energy;
The failure to engage all stakeholders in the discussion, more specifically the failure to actively and systematically include nuclear regulators, stakeholders from other energy sectors than the nuclear one, stakeholders with a strategic bird-eye view on the overall Union and global energy policy developments;
The failure to generate wide interest in ENEF among other departments and Directorates of the European Commission than DG ENER’s nuclear ones, as well as other European institutions (incl. the European Parliament, the European Ombudsman, the EIB and others);
The failure of the organising Member States to position this platform for discussion on nuclear energy as a part of the overall Union energy policy developments;
The failure to elicit Europe-wide media interest in the discussions concerning issues relevant for the development of nuclear energy within context of the overall Union energy policies;
The failure to introduce discussion processes that allow all participants to exchange information, viewpoints and opinions in a way that facilitates cross-fertilisation.

(1)Letter to EU Commission and EU Council, 28/11

Finnish, Swedish and Russian environmentalists ask for attention to problems in Finland’s nuclear energy projects with petition

27 November 2018

Early November, five environmental and peace groups asked attention for a host of problems that is currently facing the nuclear energy policy of Finland.

Women against Nuclear Power and Women for Peace from Finland, Nuclear-free Gulf of Botnia and the Peoples’ Movement Against Nuclear Power And Weapons from Sweden together with the Public Council of the South Coast of the Gulf of Finland, Sosnovy Bor, Leningrad Oblast of NTW member Oleg Bodrov from Russia started a petition that highlights among others the cost overdraws and increase of construction time of the Olkoluoto 3 and Hanhikivi power plants, and the complications for the country’s high-level radioactive waste site Onkalo from the doubts about the viability of the KBS-3 waste containers under development in Sweden, which face a negative advice from that country’s environmental court. They call for a fundamental shift in orientation of Finland’s energy policy towards renewable energy sources.

The organisers call on organisations, networks and movements to join the petition before it will be delivered to the Finnish president, government and parliament in the start of 2019, and need to participate before the 15/12/18.

The petition is available here and more information can be obtained at ullaklotzer@yahoo.com.

Important Victory for Aarhus Convention In Nuclear: Borssele Findings ACCC

18 October 2018

On Friday 12/10/2018, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) communicated its final findings to the parties involved in the complaint launched by Greenpeace in 2014 on the design lifetime extension of the Borssele Nuclear Power Plant. The findings will be submitted for confirmation to the 7th session of the Meeting of Parties in 2021.This decision represents a major step in the implementation of the Aarhus Convention in Nuclear.

Find here the full analysis by Jan Haverkamp, vice-chair of Nuclear Transparency Watch, nuclear energy and energy policy expert for Greenpeace, who filed the complaint for Greenpeace Netherlands.

The findings in short:

The ACCC came to the conclusion that the Netherlands are in non-compliance with the Convention because they did not carry out proper public participation as obliged under art. 6(10) of the Convention. (point 82)

The ACCC concluded: “The Committee considers that the permitted duration of an activity is clearly an operating condition for that activity, and an important one at that. Accordingly, any change to the permitted duration of an activity, be it a reduction or an extension, is a reconsideration or update of that activity’s operating conditions. It follows that any decision permitting the NPP to operate beyond 2014 amounted to an update of the operating conditions.” (point 65)

The ACCC “considers it inconceivable that the operation of a nuclear power plant could be extended from 40 years to 60 years without the potential for significant environmental effects. The Committee accordingly concludes that it was “appropriate”, and thus required, to apply the provisions of article 6, paragraphs 2-9, to the 2013 decision amending the licence for the Borssele NPP to extend its design lifetime until 2033.” (point 71)This means that it can no longer be argued that nuclear life-time extensions or Long Term Operation has no environmental effects.

The Dutch government could not have made the covenant with the operator in 2006, that included the obligation for compensation payments in case of closure earlier than 2033, without previously having carried out public participation concerning environmental issues. That earlier closure is still possible because of nuclear safety is not sufficient. (point 76 – 78)

The authorities “must as a minimum provide the public concerned with access to the information listed in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of [art. 6(6)].” The authorities should have made “information on the environmental effects of such longer operation […] available to the public concerned.” An attachment submitted to parliament in 2006 does not amount to access to all available information for a procedure carried out in 2012-2013, i.e. more than six years later. (point 85)

The Netherlands must “take the necessary legislative, regulatory and administrative measures to ensure that, when a public authority reconsiders or updates the duration of any nuclear-related activity within the scope of article 6 of the Convention, the provisions of paragraph 2 to 9 of article 6 will be applied.” (Recommendations, point 89) This means that for every coming decision, this decision needs to be informed by public participation that concerns also the environmental impacts of longer operation of the NPP.

NTW EVENT: Radioactive Waste Governance in Europe 01-02/10/2018

25 September 2018

Nuclear Transparency Watch together with the German office of Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Greens/EFA organised an event in Berlin on 01-02/10, in the premisses of Heinrich Boll Stiftung.

Participants will discuss how Europe can find a sustainable solution to nuclear waste. The deep geological disposal of radioactive waste in underground containers is being pursued as an affordable and viable solution. For this method, one needs to identify a site and a safe containment technology, and achieve broad public acceptance – and none of these steps are easy.

In the last years there have been dynamic developments on nuclear waste disposal in Germany, France, and Sweden. In Germany, public opposition against disposal in Gorleben has resulted in a special commission tasked with finding a proper site. In France, the government has unilaterally opted for disposal in Bure, but is facing tough public resistance as well numerous technical issues. In Sweden, a broadly accepted site and storage concept was stopped last February in the Environmental Court due to its risky technological containment solution.

A special emphasis will be put on the recent policy developments in Sweden, Germany and France, but the workshop will also allow time to discuss nuclear waste concerns in other European countries.

The discussion will be based upon inputs by

Rebecca Harms (Member of the European Parliament for the German Greens/EFA),
Professor Andrew Blowers (expert on nuclear legacies and the role of citizens, UK), (1)
Johan Swahn (activist from the Office for Nuclear Waste Review, Sweden),
Sylvia Kotting-Uhl (Member of German Parliament for Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and of the German radioactive waste commission),
Delphine Pellegrini (French Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute) and
Jan Haverkamp (Nuclear Transparency Watch Europe).

Download programme.

13th ENEF 04-05/06/18 Bratislava

11 June 2018

The 13th European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) organised by the European Commission with two hosting countries (Slovakia and Czech Republic) took place in Bratislava on 04-05/06.

This event, which received the mandate from the European Council to be to be a “platform for broad discussion of the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy”, focused this year on the topics ‘Maintaining a critical level of nuclear safety expertise in Europe’ and ‘Small Modular Reactors’.

Members from Nuclear Transparency Watch evaluated this year’s ENEF critically. We will keep you informed about our evaluation of the event, but would like to give already access to the presentations from civil society representatives.

Rebecca Harms, MEP Greens/EFA and Vice-Chair of NTW made an opening speech on the first panel where she emphasised the importance to focus on radioactive waste and decommissionning rather than new build.

To watch her full presentation, see the Webstream of Day 2. (min 13’34”).

Dr David Lowry, independant researcher at Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates and member of NTW made a presentation on the second panel regarding the “Inconvenient Truths of Small Modular Reactors.” Download here his full paper.

Download the full ENEF2018 programme.

Webstream of Day 1

An Taisce Welcomes Public Consultation on UK Hinkley Point C, Nuclear Power Plant

22 February 2018

On 20/02, The Irish Government has launched public consultations on the UK’s Hinkley Point C, nuclear power station, 5 years after it should have under UN Conventions. The UK Government are building a nuclear power station, Hinkley Point C, on the north coast of Somerset, some 150 miles (~242 km) from Ireland’s East Coast.

Charles Stanley-Smith, An Taisce’s Communication Officer stated “These consultations have been hard won through court cases and escalation to the compliance committees of two UNECE conventions on consultation rights and obligations. This is the hard work of An Taisce, The Environmental Pillar and Friends of the Irish Environment and German MEP Ms Sylivia Kotting-Uhl”

He continued “The peoples’ rights to these consultations will become increasingly important in our ability to address transboundary impacts of UK projects on our environment, health and economy, into the future. Under UN Conventions, the peoples of neighbouring countries that could be affected by a project need to be consulted. Post Brexit, we may not be able to rely on EU law to safeguard us, but these are UN conventions For instance, the Irish people will now need to be consulted in terms of any other 5 proposed nuclear power station on the UK’s west coast”

Charles Stanley-Smith continued “An Taisce welcomes this Consultation and we would like like to encourage people to participate, in this consultation which is being organised through the Local Authorities across the country. The deadline for your submissions is 17th April 2018”

Find the full press release and recommandations of An Taisce here.

Find here the radio interview of Prof John Sweeney of Maynooth University on the subject.

Nuclear transparency under threat in Turkey, by Pinar Demircan

21 December 2017

Nuclear developments currently play a front-role in political discussions in Turkey. In this article, we give a sketch of the situation around the most advanced of the three proposed nuclear plants – the Russian build, owned and to be operated project at Akkuyu. We will reflect on methods used during this process, transparency, involvement of civil society, public participation and access to justice.

Nuclear in Turkey

Being one of the first countries to sign an agreement based on to the “Cooperation With Other Nations” article 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, establishing US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’ s Atoms for Peace programme, different Governments of Turkey have pushed nuclear energy as the “development key of the country”. Turkey established an Atom Energy Commission as early as 1956 to work on nuclear energy and radiation safety, which in 1982 was transformed into the current nuclear regulator and licensing authority TAEK (Turkish Atomic Energy Commission). Today there are two research reactors at the Nuclear Research and Training Centre in Istanbul.[1] For further development of the sector, bidding processes were started in 1965, 1972, 1982 and 1993 respectively, but they were never realized due to political and economical uncertainties formed in the atmosphere of military coups that happened almost every 10 years.[2]Also, a strong anti-nuclear movement played an important role. This started in the 1970’s with protests of fishermen and citizens in Mersin and was enhanced by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. In the end of the 2000s, the plans were once more revived and currently three projects are being pursued: Akkuyu in the South-East, Sinop in the North-East and Igneada in the West. The official justification is a need to reduce dependence on foreign sources.[3]

By the end of July 2017, Turkey is 74% dependent on imported energy sources [4]. Of its electricity generation, 34% is from natural gas, 31% from coal, 24% from hydraulic power, 6% from wind, 2% from geothermal energy and 3% from other sources.[5]70% of its natural gas comes from Russia.

In 2010, Turkey signed an Intergovernmental Agreement with Russia to have a nuclear power plant established near Mersin, on a site at the Mediterranean coast. This agreement lets the Russian company Rosatom establish the four-reactor Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant under a so-called Built-Own-Operate (BOO) model, the first example realised in the world.[6] Under this scheme, the estimated cost of the Akkuyu project is 22 billion dollars for four reactors of the VVER1200 design, and electricity produced by Akkuyu will be bought at a guaranteed price of 12,35 Dollarcent per kWh for 15 years.*

As an international agreement, this deal was reached outside of the public eye and cannot be evaluated within the constitutional rules.

Although Turkey is not a signatory of the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions, which oblige public participation and an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Turkish law does enshrine the need for an EIA. On the basis of the negotiations for accession to the EU, this law reflects much of the EU EIA Directive. The EIA report of the Akkuyu project was twice refused by the Ministry for Environment and Urbanisation. A third application was approved in the end of 2014, within a week after president Vladimir Putin visited Turkey.

Around the entire process, there was strong public debate. In reaction to the approval of the EIA, a group of 13 civil society organisations and 80 individuals, including physicians, lawyers and engineers associations, environmental organisations and local associations, filed an appeal. Despite local and national public discontent, feasibility studies for the nuclear power plant site were started on 14 April 2015.[8]

Sinop and Igneada – the other Turkish nuclear projects

The Akkuyu nuclear power plant is the first one to enter the construction phase. But in 2013, Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement with Japan for a second nuclear power station near Sinop, a city on the Black Sea coast. Also here, a Build-Own-Operate (BOO) agreement is foreseen. The Atmea reactors are to be delivered by Mitsubishi in cooperation with French Areva. The Atmea design so far only exists on paper and Turkey is currently the only interested country. The nuclear reactors, according to the agreement, should be capable of using mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, including plutonium from reprocessed spent nuclear fuel. In spite of the project still being in a very early stage and no related permits being given, 600 thousand trees were cut on the land that was transferred from the Ministry for Environment and Urbanisation to the Energy Ministry.

In 2016, the government announced a third project, potentially in cooperation with Chinese nuclear constructor CNG. Igneada is famous for its rainforest nature, located at the border with Bulgaria on 220 kilometres from Istanbul.

The use of three different technologies, implemented and owned by three different countries, raises serious concerns about whether different safety procedures and rules will fit in the still infant nuclear legal infrastructure in Turkey.

Problems around Akkuyu

Although it was envisioned in the BOO model that Rosatom would become the sole owner of the project, difficulties for Russia in financing its part forced it to sell in November 2017 49% of shares[9] to CKK, a consortium of three Turkish companies: Cengiz, Kolin and Kalyon, who currently demand an equal say in the management of the project.[10]

In 2014, an “Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Overhaul” (INIR) mission from the IAEA concluded that the Turkish legal and procedural structures needed improvement.[11] The findings of this mission were only leaked six months after the report date. One of the central critiques in the mission report was the lack of independence of the nuclear regulator TAEK as prescribed in the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).

Although Akkuyu is far away from most of its neighbouring countries, because Turkey is not a signatory of the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions even 100 km far Cyprus was not able to participate in the EIA procedure.[12]

The project is situated on a remote piece of Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. Critics allege that during the project preparation too little attention is given to nature protection. This includes threats to the wetlands around the Göksu River, and to important Mediterranean red-listed species like loggerhead turtles (caretta caretta) and monk seals (Monachus monachus).[13] There are furthermore concerns about the effects of a 2 degree temperature increase in the waters surrounding the plant due to cooling water.[14]

Turkey is situated in an active earthquake zone and its coasts have an elevated tsunami risk. The civil society appeal of the EIA report highlights the risk of an active fault line at 30 kilometre distance from the Akkuyu project site.

High level radioactive waste from the Akkuyu nuclear power plant

The EIA report contained no explanation regarding radioactive waste issues. At the expert review process of the EIA court case, Rosatom clarified that Russia would, under art. 12 of the Russian Constitution, never take nuclear waste for final storage from foreign sources. There is therefore no clarity about how especially spent nuclear fuel will be treated and high-level waste will be disposed of. Concerns exist in this respect especially about the high seismic risk in the entire Turkish territory, that makes finding a safe final deep depository virtually impossible.

The Turkish-Russian agreement seems to foresee reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in Russia with repatriation of resulting vitrified high-level waste. There is, however, no clarity about the transport of spent nuclear fuel and vitrified waste, which might have to pass the highly inhabited area of Istanbul through the narrow Bosporus strait.

Concerns about transparency development

In March 2017, the Turkish government took a decision to start the project in spite of the EIA appeal still pending in court.[15] A decision on this EIA appeal is expected in late December 2017 or early 2018. However, president Erdoğan dashed any hopes on substantial changes to the project or a sincere assessment of its justification by declaring that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant project will be realized despite any environmentalist concerns. This message of the President was interpreted as a directive given to judicial bodies.[16]

NGOs and professional organisations also severely criticise the quality and insufficiency of the information shared with the public around the project, among others in their EIA complaint.

Government seems to attempt to reduce civil society participation in nuclear power plant decisions in other ways. It declared nuclear power plant projects as strategic mega projects, and decisions, including environmental ones, will directly fall to the Prime Minister and the President.[17]

Environmental NGOs, but also professional associations and media that have brought themselves into the public debate around Akkuyu and other nuclear projects, have faced strong verbal attacks by regime-friendly media and on social media, including from the President himself. As a result, they have become extremely careful in their activities and communication around nuclear issues, fearing it might be used as a reason for further intimidation or even legal steps endangering their very existence. Where nuclear power for more than 40 years was a strongly visible element of environmental debates in society, the civil society movement now turns to international solidarity to help save at least a bare minimum of transparency and public participation.

by Pınar Demircan

project coordinator of Nukleersiz.org & Nuclear Energy Editor at Yesil Gazete

Jan Haverkamp (editor)

vice-chair Nuclear Transparency Watch

[1] http://www.taek.gov.tr/kurumsal/birimler/bagli-kuruluslar/cnaem.html

[2] http://www.nukleersiz.org/dosya/tr-nuekleer-karsiti-hareket

[3] http://aa.com.tr/tr/politika/basbakan-yildirim-enerjide-disa-bagimliligi-azaltacak-projeler-uzerinde-calisiyoruz/680440

[4] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-stratejisi.tr.mfa

[5] http://www.enerji.gov.tr/tr-TR/Sayfalar/Elektrik

[6] The first BOO was to be signed in the US to have one reactor of the Calvert Cliff nuclear power plant by Japanese Mitsubishi, but this was refused because of military security interests under section 104 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

[7] * 1 Dollar was 1,9 Turkish Lira when the project was started in 2010 and in 2017 1 Dollar is 3,8 Turkish Lira

[8] https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2015/04/14/son-dakika-akkuyuda-nukleer-karsitlarina-polis-mudahalesi/

[9] https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2017/06/19/rosatomdan-bile-tehlikeli-akkuyu-nukleer-santralinin-yuzde-49u-cengiz-kolin-ortakligina-satiliyor/

[10] https://tr.sputniknews.com/ekonomi/201706291029067022-turk-sirketler-akkuyu-esit-yonetim/

[11] https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2015/06/01/uluslararasi-atom-enerjisi-ajansinin-akkuyu-raporu-ortaya-cikarildi/

[12] https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2015/06/01/uluslararasi-atom-enerjisi-ajansinin-akkuyu-raporu-ortaya-cikarildi/

[13] http://chk.barobirlik.org.tr/dokuman/makaleler/3.pdf

[14] http://chk.barobirlik.org.tr/dokuman/makaleler/3.pdf

[15] https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2017/02/27/akkuyu-nukleer-santral-projesini-aklayan-bir-bilirkisi-raporu/

[16] https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2017/11/23/bu-dava-siyasidir-akkuyu-ngs-ced-iptal-davasindan-degerlendirmeler/

[17] https://yesilgazete.org/blog/2017/04/11/akkuyu-yer-lisansinin-iptali-davasina-sipsak-bilirkisi-incelemesi/

Public Participation and Involvement in EU Energy Policy Decision-making – why is it important?Paul Dorfman, UCL Energy Institute

19 December 2017

Recent climate change research suggests that, over the next few decades, there will be unprecedented global change, consequently affecting European human welfare and environmental systems. European Union (EU) policy already seeks to mitigate change through low-carbon, energy reduction and efficiency policies – but adaptation will clearly be necessary. Achieving this transition and adaptation at the pace and scale required will not be straightforward, and public knowledge, views and values about energy futures choices and ‘trade-offs’ will play a critical role, with significant implications for EU energy policy.

Creating a low carbon and resource efficient economy will involve major structural changes to the way EU States work and live, including how we source, manage and use our energy – and an ambitious long-term target of 80-95 % reductions in greenhouse gases by 2050 have been set by the EU[1]. In order to start to achieve this, the EU concludes that we need to collectively triple our annual investment in low-carbon technologies over the next decade to EUR 8 billion and make a EUR 20 billion annual investment in energy infrastructure.

The challenge of achieving a transition to sustainable energy will involve different supply and distribution options combined with centralised forms of renewable energy; new European-scale networks for energy distribution; large-scale infrastructures for carbon sequestration; bridging combined heat and power (CHP) gas generation; local scale distributed energy; coal and nuclear fission (with their associated proposals for carbon sequestration and nuclear waste management); significant restructuring of our transmission networks and changes to our transport systems and built. However, these developments will vary in their acceptability to differing sections of the public and for different stakeholders, and will also vary from country to country.

So, we are faced with collective choices – and the purpose of energy appraisal is to inform these choices. Long-term decisions across the entire field of industrial strategy depend on the resulting pictures. It is in this way that we justify scientific research programmes, technology development projects, infrastructure investment portfolios and the implementation of entire suites of policy instruments like taxes, standards, regulations and subsidies. Taken across the full range of public and private actors engaged in energy systems, annual commitments of many billions of Euros rest (directly or indirectly) on the framing of energy policy appraisal[2].

Given the size of the long-term investments that are now needed across low carbon ‘energy futures’ options, European citizens should play a key role in taking these critical, social, environmental and economic decisions. The EU has recognised in the Lisbon Treaty this capacity-building of knowledge and trust via involvement and dialogue between statutory and non-statutory civil society actors at pan-EU, State, Region, and Local levels[3]. The EC Energy Road Map 2050[4]concludes that:

“The current trend, in which nearly every energy technology is disputed and its use or deployment delayed, raises serious problems for investors and puts energy system changes at risk. Energy cannot be supplied without technology and infrastructure. In addition, cleaner energy has a cost. New pricing mechanisms and incentives might be needed but measures should be taken to ensure pricing schemes remain transparent and understandable to final consumers. Citizens need to be informed and engaged in the decision-making process, while technological choices need to take account of the local environment.”

There is a range of strongly EU centred drivers to this dynamic, based on a perceived crisis of legitimacy in ‘top-down’ decision-making models. As a result, throughout the EU, there are clear policy moves to integrate public and community knowledge into decision-making processes. This shift has seen moves toward a two-way dialogue between specialists and non-specialists as a means of forging a more lasting consensus by increasing social involvement and participation, thereby fostering a sense of community[5].

The underlying social force that underpins this move is the drive for more accountable, transparent, and publicly acceptable decision making, with participatory dialogue no longer seen as an optional ‘add-on’ to policy making. It is in this context that civil stakeholder involvement provides a way forward to ensure that future policy solutions meet the needs of the public, and that these solutions are socially, culturally and politically acceptable as well as technologically feasible.

What is participation and involvement?

Participation and involvement is an approach to decision making that allows people to come together to consider information, discuss issues and options and develop their thinking together. Building on dialogue and consensus-building techniques, this kind of engagement provides policy and decision makers with much richer data on stakeholders knowledge, views and values, offers opportunities to more fully explore and express people’s thoughts and ideas, and allows the time to develop options and priorities. For participants, the experience helps them collectively develop their views with experts and decision makers. Participants can also take their recommendations forward to inform policy, which can encourage shared responsibility for implementation[6].

Dialogue about complex and controversial issues, such as energy futures, can also enable greater public confidence in eventual policy decisions. This is because dialogue allows a diverse mix of civil society stakeholders with a range of views and values to:

Learn from written information and experts.
Listen to each other, share and develop their views in discussion with experts and energy  sector researchers.
Arrive at thought-through collective conclusions, and communicate those conclusions directly to inform decision making.[7]
It is important that dialogue should be face-to-face, in order to give all sides the chance to speak, question and be questioned by others. It should take place far enough ahead of policy being made to be able to have some influence over eventual decisions[8].

Involvement methods and tools

There are a very broad range of involvement methods, including: stakeholder dialogues, public meetings, citizens’ panels, events, forums, workshops, ‘kitchen round-tables’, ‘test-beds’, mentoring, ‘visioning’, peer exchange, interactive web-sites, and external communication through press and media.

Central to these involvement methods are practical decision support dialogue tools, and a number of projects applied them very well through framing boundaries, exploring scenarios, quantitative modelling, and evaluation and review. Decision support tools work well, especially in exploring ‘what if’ questions and resulting ‘trade-off’ options, risks and outcomes. Some specific tools are key, including: Scenario building and modelling, participatory multi criteria analysis (PCMA), virtual reality techniques (including 3D visualization and geographic information systems [GIS] mapping), life cycle analysis (LCA) and quantitative environmental assessment.

Of these decision-support tools, the most commonly used is scenario-building. Here, project findings suggest that complex energy and climate change information can be successfully applied and understood through use of coherent scenarios. This is because scenarios shed light on the long- term impacts of energy pathways decisions, especially infrastructure change. It’s also interesting to note that the EC Energy Roadmap 2050 has also used scenario-building as a way to better inform and involve people.

Participatory multi criteria analysis (PMCA) tool is employed in trying to balance and account for both quantitative data and social values. PMCA is used to test technical options and choices, and the social acceptance of change and adaption strategies. Although PMCA is resource intense, it encourages learning, and allows for the acknowledgement of uncertainties, and multiple legitimate perspectives. However, care should be taken in ‘weighting’ options, as this can impact significantly on eventual outcomes.

In terms of digital innovation, virtual reality techniques help people visualize alternative energy transition and climate adaption, mitigation scenarios and the potential consequences of those responses.

Stakeholders and the public can work with complex data

Independent expert involvement is a key part of an even-handed process. Dialogues draw on differing sets of stakeholder knowledge, experience and values. Working with, and integrating, diverse streams of information from multiple sources, sectors and disciplines forges better dialogues and results in more practical outcomes. By adding this element, an important step is made by distinguishing between what is technically and economically possible to what is feasible and acceptable to stakeholders. Encouragingly, in the right circumstances, civil society stakeholders are able to analyse, understand, respond and act on complex data.

‘Better practice’ involvement mobilises people

A very broad range of statutory and non-statutory stakeholders and civil society organisations should be enabled to actively engage in energy futures dialogue, including: policymakers, government departments, devolved administrations, local government and local authorities, energy regulators, transmission system operators, industrial corporations and businesses, trade associations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local community based organisations (CBOs), independent energy sector experts, and academic institutions.

But there are challenges to involvement

It is not always a simple task to encourage citizens and the industry to participate co-operatively, and it can be complicated to combine several different tools for decision making into a single coherent process. Tensions have arisen over a number of issues, including: the framing of boundary conditions for dialogues, whether all main stakeholders were included in discussion, the acceptance of all stakeholders as equal contributors, levels of planning options offered, and over perceived openness to serious policy influence.

Given that dialogue should happen over a reasonably extended time frame, an important cause of lack of local acceptance is the absence of a coherent and timely ‘upstream’ and on-going involvement strategy. Although participation of civil society is considered crucial for the implementation of ambitious involvement strategies, a few implementation programs and activities have not yet consistently involved all main stakeholders – focusing more on the business, industrial and research sectors.

So can involvement enable low carbon transition?

‘Business as usual’ energy policy will not deliver sufficient change at the rate and scale required to lower climate change emissions – and public, energy sector, and government stakeholders will all need to play their part in transitioning to low-carbon economies.

The published literature suggests that involving the public in dialogue around complex and technical policy issues is an important contribution to a more transparent and open way of governing – demonstrating that members of the public have the ability to engage with and contemplate large quantities of complex information, and provide detailed responses that inform and enhance governmental decisions.

Holding dialogue on difficult and controversial issues is a fundamental enabler for decision-makers to feel confident in the public’s ability to hold the Government to account. There is also clear evidence that engaging people in a meaningful way has the potential to change attitudes, behaviours and actions. In order to better enable participatory deliberation, dialogue should be well informed and appropriately connected to representative democratic decision-making processes. Effective involvement results from a holistic set of pre- conditions, working best when informal non-statutory civil society networks are empowered to interact with formal statutory networks.

Involvement-led innovation can be a powerful means for agreeing and/or delivering national, regional, city, and local strategic objectives, at a lower cost to the public purse and with less bureaucracy than traditional processes. However, formal mechanisms for energy futures involvement, and linking that involvement to policy and decision-making structures, are not yet in place within all EU states.

Whereas the goal in the scientific-technical community is to find the single best solution to a problem, the facilitation of public debate has a broader function – to find a workable process that holds the participants together in a ‘safe space’ and encourages collective negotiation within the bounds of scientific, technical, economic and political feasibility.

[1]1 EC Communication (2009): IP/09/1431, 07/10/2009.

[2]Stirling (2007): Choosing Energy Futures: Framing, Lock-in, and Diversity, In: Dorfman (Ed) Nuclear Consultation: Public Trust in Governance, NCG.

[3] This is underpinned by the Directive on Public Participation in Environmental Plans and Programmes, the EU Public Participation Provisions of the Aarhus Convention, and the EU Directive on Strategic Environmental Assessment. Other public participation related EU legislation includes Directives on Integrated Pollution and Prevention Control and Environment Impact Assessment.

[4] EU, EESC & CR (2011): A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM/2011/0112 final, Brussels.

[5]Dorfman P. et al (2011): Enhancing consultation practices on Air Quality Management in local authorities, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 53 (5) pp. 559-571.

[6] Involve, NCC (2008): Deliberative Public Engagement: Nine Principles, NCC. 7 Sciencewise-ERC, Guiding Principles for Public Dialogue:

[7]http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk/cms/assets/Uploads/Publications/Guiding-PrinciplesSciencewise-ERC-Guiding- Principles.pdf

[8] Sciencewise: The Government’s Approach to Public Dialogue on Science and Technology, UK BIS:http://www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk/cms/assets/Uploads/Publications/Guiding-PrinciplesSciencewise-ERC-Guiding- Principles.pdf

Transparency and Public participation

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