Transparency and Public participation

HINKLEY POINT C: UK should have consulted possible affected Parties over risks

10 August 2016

United Kingdom is not in compliance with the Espoo Convention

The Espoo Convention Compliance Committee^{^[1]} has closed its investigation on compliance by the United Kingdom in the case of Hinkley Point C. It found that the United Kingdom has not met its obligations to discuss the impact of a nuclear accident with the affected public in other countries. The findings from the Implementation Committee will be presented for endorsement to the next plenary session of Parties in Minsk in June 2017.

The Espoo Convention Implementation Committee was informed about the matter by the Green member of the German Federal Parliament Sylvia Kötting-Uhl and the NGO Friends of the Irish Environment in March 2013. They alleged that the UK failed to consult the public about the potential transboundary implications of the construction and operation of the proposed Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor.

Austria did participate in the procedure, after it had actively notified its interest under the Espoo Convention. It then showed with its own studies that there should be consultation because of the possibility of a severe accident that could lead to radioactive materials being spread by wind across Europe. At the request of the Espoo Convention Implementation Committee, the Netherlands and Norway also informed that transboundary impacts in their viewpoint could not be excluded. France, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, Spain and Germany did not challenge the UK claim that transboundary impacts would be impossible.

In its findings, the Implementation Committee concluded that the United Kingdom should have notified countries other than only Ireland of the potential impacts of the Hinkley Point C project. It concluded on the basis of the Guidance on the Practical Application of the Espoo Convention, that “notification is necessary unless a significant adverse transboundary impact can be excluded.” It stated that the fact that the UK agreed to honour the request of notification by Austria means that these two Parties agreed that a likely significant environmental impact on Austrian territory could not be excluded. On the basis of the Austrian study, it noted that a severe accident could also cause significant adverse impact in Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland. It concluded that the originating party should take into account the worst-case scenario.

The Committee recommended that the UK should discuss what to do now with potentially affected Parties and that for all future nuclear power plant construction projects it will have to notify other countries for a transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).

Jan Haverkamp, consultant for Greenpeace and board member of Nuclear Transparency Watch has followed the case closely: “These are important findings for nuclear decision processes in Europe. This confirms that the potential victims of severe accidents in new nuclear power stations have the right to participate in procedures. One of the lessons of the Fukushima catastrophe was that decision makers should think the unthinkable and any installation with a high concentration of highly radioactive material can lead to catastrophic emissions. Whether that is by unforeseen circumstances, acts of terror or war. These findings will help in reducing nuclear risks.”

Two complaints at the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee for lack of international public participation in the Hinkley Point C project are still ongoing with findings expected before the end of the year.

The final conclusions are in the Annex of the report of the Committee’s 35th session (page 12 and further):
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2015/EIA/IC/ece.mp.eia.ic.2016.2.advance_copy_for_typo_3.pdf

^{^[1]}The UNECE Espoo Convention, named for the Finnish town in which it was signed in 1991, requires governments to provide an opportunity to the public in transboundary areas likely to be affected by a project to participate in the relevant Environmental Impact Assessment procedures regarding proposed activities. It must ensure that the opportunity provided to the public of potentially affected Parties is ‘equivalent to that provided to the public of the Party of origin’.

Assessing the safety of Nuclear Installations In Belarus

20 June 2016

The territory of Belarus received 70% of the radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accident. As a result, nearly 23% of its territory was contaminated. However, thirty years after the accident, Belarus is building its first nuclear power plant at Astravyets / Ostrovetsonly 20 km from the border with Lithuania. The first unit is set to become operational in 2018 with Russian assistance. But as the project advances, safety concerns are mounting. The alarming lack of transparency and safety of this project calls for an urgent reassessment.

Belarus to realise nuclear power aspirations with help from Russia
The aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine – which contaminated nearly a quarter of Belarus but remains a taboo subject to this day[1] – stalled Minsk’s own budding nuclear aspirations for decades.

In 2006, however, the government approved plans to build Belarus’s first NPP. Ostrovets, some 50 km east of Lithuania’s capital, was chosen as the site in 2008, confirmed by presidential decree in 2011.

In 2009, Minsk announced that Russian company Atomstroyexport would be the general contractor. The first concrete was poured in 2013. Russia is to deliver a VVER 1200 reactor by the end of 2016. It will be cooled with water from the river Neris, which flows downstream through Vilnius. The NPP first power-generating unit is scheduled for commissioning in 2018, and the second one in 2020. Two more units are proposed for operation by 2025.

Violation of international regulations
The construction of Ostrovets NPP faces international opposition on safety grounds.While all domestic opposition to the NPP is muted by Belarus’s President, Lithuania is openly accusing Belarus of violating the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions, by failing to complete an environmental impact assessment, notify Lithuania about the project and inform the public about the impact on the river Neris and on drinking water in Lithuania[2].
In July 2014, at the Ministerial Conference of the Aarhus Convention, the parties declared that the project failed to comply with the Convention’s requirements in the construction of the NPP[3]. The same year, the Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention stated that Belarus had violated the Convention by not providing Lithuania with the information necessary to assess the possible environmental impact of the nuclear project.[4].

In March 2016, the committee suggested that an international inquiry commission help resolve the dispute. And EU Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Canete supported Lithuania’s position that Belarus’ nuclear power plant under construction in Astravets, some 50km from Vilnius, must comply with all Espoo Convention and nuclear safety requirements. According to Miguel Arias Canete, the Commission will ensure that the assessment of the Astravets NPP’s impact on the environmental conditions will be properly made[5].

An accident occurred in April 2016
In early May 2016, the Belarusian Minister of Energy confirmed, under pressure from the EU, that an accident occurred a month earlier[1], on April 8, at the construction site, causing partial destruction of the structure supporting the confinement. Without any consequences according to the Belarusian authorities.

Inappropriate stress tests
Following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, the European Council in March 2011 requested stress tests of all EU NPPs. In this context, the Commission undertook, with seven neighboring EU countries including Belarus, to perform stress tests in nuclear power plants in neighboring countries[2]. But apparently nothing has been done. For its part, Belarus is committed to making these stress tests by the same company which is in charge of building the plant, Rosatom which violates an independence of expertise.

On 20 May, the Lithuanian Commissioner (EU Health and Food Safety Commissioner Vytenis Andriukaitis) pledged that European standards should be applied on the site of Ostrovets, by declaring: “the Commission will demand that Belarus review the project before switching the Astravyets plant on. The stress tests will be reviewed in Brussels as well”. The Commission has promised to put the item on the agenda of their weekly meeting in early June[3].

MEPs quizzed Commission on Belarus nuclear power plant safety
The EU Commission was quizzed on the safety of building work at the nuclear power plant in Belarus in a plenary debate on 6 June 2016. Most MEPs raised concerns about its safety and compliance with international standards.

MEPs asked the Commission whether the Ostrovets plant complied with EU nuclear safety rules and urged it to use all available instruments to ensure that the plant undergoes proper safety stress tests. Many MEPs highlighted the cross-border nature of the issue – a nuclear fallout cannot be contained within a country’s borders – and the difficulty of verifying reports of the risks around it.

The MEP Julie Ward emphasised that “we must continuously strive for greater nuclear safety and transparency and support the civil society organisations who work in the field to advance that transparency.The nuclear power industry is a big player in the energy industry, with huge subsidies from the public purse. It therefore has a duty to work closely with host communities and Nuclear Transparency Watch to ensure that the plants are operating to the highest standards. ” Her full speech : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo10AVo1B-Y&feature=youtu.be

The Commission – which played an observer role in the construction of the Ostrovets plant – said it would use all instruments available to ensure the highest safety standards. However, Commissioner Christos Stylianides also reminded Parliament that the nuclear stress tests called for by many MEPs were voluntary and a national competence. He nonetheless said that the independence of Belarusian nuclear regulators needed to be strengthened. The Commission expects the Belarus National Assessment Report on the plant to be presented in 2016/17.

[1]http://en.eurobelarus.info/news/society/2016/05/07/belarus-energy-ministry-commented-on-the-accident-at-astravets.html

[2]https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20110623_stress_test_joint_declaration_eu_neighbouring_countries.pdf

[3]http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/energy/?doc=121036

[1] “Belarus’s Chernobyl taboo”, 27 april 2016: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/tatyana-ivanova/belarus-s-chernobyl-taboo

[2]https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/compliance/MoP4decisions/Belarus/frLithuania_19.03.2014.pdf

[3]http://www.urm.lt/default/fr/news/la-bielorussie-est-de-nouveau-appelee-a-construire-la-centrale-nucleaire-conformement-aux-engagements-internationaux

[4] 6^th Meeting of the Parties to the Espoo Convention, 2-5 June 2016:http://www.unece.org/env/eia/meetings/mop_6.html

[5] “EU energy commissioner backs Lithuania’s position on Belarus nuclear plant”, 15 April 2016:http://belsat.eu/en/news/eu-energy-commissioner-backs-lithuania-s-position-on-belarus-nuclear-plant/

[6]http://en.eurobelarus.info/news/society/2016/05/07/belarus-energy-ministry-commented-on-the-accident-at-astravets.html

[7]https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20110623_stress_test_joint_declaration_eu_neighbouring_countries.pdf

[8]http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/energy/?doc=121036

Can civil society directly influence policy and decision-making?

7 June 2016

Citizen control over nuclear safety and policy.
Jan Haverkamp ’s presentation at the conference RICOMET 2016

On 3rd June, Jan Haverkamp, member of NTW, made a presentation at the Second International Conference on Risk Perception, Communication and Ethics of Exposures to Ionizing Radiation – RICOMET 2016. NTW remains attached to RICOMET’s concerns. There is no doubt that social sciences play a central role to improve transparency and public participation in the nuclear sector.

Please download Jan Haverkamp’s presentation and his text – en.

Abstract
Access to information, public participation and access to justice – the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention – are increasingly securing transparency in the nuclear sector. Members of the European Parliament, NGOs, academia and local information committees three years ago founded Nuclear Transparency Watch – an organisation that seeks to implement those three pillars of the Aarhus Convention in the nuclear sector. In that way, it already ensured more openness in areas like emergency preparedness and response and radioactive waste management. It supports citizens to implement their rights in access to information and public participation around nuclear decisions. This is still an ongoing process, but the contours of what the nuclear industry really stands for are slowly becoming more clear.

Is Belgium able to extend its Doel 1 & 2 reactors?

10 December 2015

On 30 November 2015, an agreement between Electrabel and the Federal Government was reached to extend by 10 years the nuclear reactors Doel 1 & 2 lifetime. But this decision breaks international rules for transparency and safety. Lifetime extension of power plants must take into account a high level of safety measures to protect the population, but also the environment. The right of the public to participate in an environmental impact assessment should be respected.

A denial of international obligations for transparency
To extend the lifetime of Doel 1 & 2 reactors, Belgium must carry out an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and a national and transboundary public participation, as prescribed by Aarhus and Espoo conventions that apply notably to all member countries of the European Union. In May 2015[1], NTW had contacted the Belgian energy minister Christine Marghem to emphasize the importance of respecting international obligations to organize large-scale EIA and a process of cross-border public participation before any final decision. But it seems that the minister, who has still not responded, has no knowledge of international standards of transparency.
These international obligations are essential for safety. Doel 1 & 2 have been designed on the knowledge and technology of the 1970s. The last past years, the understanding of accident scenarios and nuclear technology have evolved, but also the environment of the nuclear reactors and the society as a whole have changed drastically. Therefore, a decision to extend the lifetime of nuclear reactors should automatically involves a comprehensive and transparent environmental impact assessment and public participation process for Belgian citizens, but also Dutch citizens.
NTW strongly supports the complaint filed by Greenpeace Belgium on 30 November with the Council of State to challenge the decisions of the government and the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC) for approving the 10-year extension of Doel 1 and 2. NTW also welcomes the complaint filled by Benegora[2], a Dutch environmental organisation, with the Belgian State Court, because Dutch border municipalities and their citizens are not able to participate in a cross-border public participation and environmental impact assessment process. Meanwhile, the Dutch Province of Zeeland has also passed a motion in which they call upon the Belgian authorities to allow the citizens of Zeeland to participate in a consultation process concerning the lifetime extension of Doel1&2.

A flawed decision from a safety perspective
Questions in terms of safety arise in case of lifetime extension of nuclear plants designed initially for a period of 30 years. The FANC speaks of “the safest reactors in Belgium”, but are the highest-level safety criteria applied? Are preparedness and response measures to emergency situations suitable for this extension?
This issue is very important for the Doel nuclear power plant, which is the plant installed in most populous region in Europe. Considering a radius of 30 km, the population around the Doel plant (1,510,000) turns out to be 9 times greater than the population who lived around Fukushima, at the time of the accident (172,000 residents). In addition, a serious nuclear accident in Belgium will certainly have repercussions beyond its borders. The Netherlands is situated a less than 3 km from the Doel plant.
An example of EP&R failure is the issue of receptions places in case of a large-scale evacuation, which is not sufficiently studied by the Belgian authorities. Of the four planned reception centers in the preceding Antwerp emergency plan for the Doel plant (the Sports Palace, the civil protection in Brasschaat, the slaughterhouse of Antwerp and Haasdonk’s Fort), the last two are completely dilapidated buildings[3]. For the new response and emergency plan of the province of Antwerp, there is only one reception center that is mentioned: Campus Vesta in Ranst, whose capacity is not indicated. Providing a single reception center, for a nuclear plant in a densely populated area, is not consistent.
Lifetime extension of power plants must take into account a high level of safety measures to protect the population, but also the environment. It is high time that EP&R measures take into account the lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster. The environment around Doel has fundamentally changed over the last 30 years and the risk of reactors failure increases exponentially over time. Ten years of extra life adds 25% additional time in which these reactors are exposed to various risks.

The challenges of decommissioning
Extending the lifetime of Doel 1 &2 has halted preparations for decommissioning. An amount of € 24.7 million has already been spent for the preparation of Doel 1 & 2 decommissioning[4]. Indeed, as the nuclear phase-out law passed in 2003 provided the closure of Doel 1 and 2 plants for 2015, Synatom, branch of Electrabel specializing in the management of radioactive materials, had already begun preparing decommissioning for an amount of 24.7 million, when the parliament was finally given the green light last June to the extension. Will the results of this study be still valid in 10 years?

[1]https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/activities/nuclear-power-plants-ageing/nuclear-transparency-watch-warns-belgian-minister-to-respect-transparency-laws-in-lifetime-extension-of-doel-1-2-nuclear-power-reactors.html
[2]http://www.benegora.nl/28-levensduurverlening-doel-1-2
[3]Study commissioned by Greenpeace Belgium, “Insuffisances des plans d’urgence nucléaire belges :les leçons de la catastrophe de Fukushima n’ont pas été tirées”, David Boilley et Mylène Josset, Janvier 2015. http://www.greenpeace.org/belgium/Global/belgium/report/2015/RapportDavidBoilleyFR.pdf
[4] Response of the Energy Minister Marie-Christine Marghem to a written parliamentary question posed by the Member Jean-Marc Nollet

Overview of the EIA procedure for the Paks II nuclear project in Hungary

10 December 2015

The Paks Nuclear Power Plant is located on the right bank on the Danube, approximately 100 km south of Budapest. A new project with two reactor units from Rosatom (VVER1200) is planned as an addition to the existing four-block nuclear power plant, Paks-1 that currently generates some 40% of the Hungarian energy production.
The environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure for this project is currently being conducted. It’s made under Hungarian law, implementing the Espoo Convention (the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context), the EU EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment) and the Aarhus Convention (the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters).

THE EIA REPORT
In April 2015, Hungary submitted the EIA Report for the transboundary EIA procedure. This EIA Report was prepared in order to identify and evaluate the impact of the planned nuclear power plant technology on the environment. The study was prepared by the project company MVM Paks II Ltd[1], which has submitted its application for the development consent together with the EIA documentation to the competent Hungarian authority, South Transdanubian Regional Inspectorate for Environment and Nature. Today, The Paks EIA process belongs to the Baranya County Government Office.
A few months after the official documents for the EIA procedure have been published, Benedek Jávor, Member of the European Parliament and of NTW, obtained secret documents. On our website[2], he declared that the MVM documents contain fundamental mistakes. The grid integration was not modelled as would have been necessary. The construction was not budgeted and planned, as would be needed at this stage of implementation. The analysis completely ignored external factors like the application of the EU competition law. The thermal pollution of the Danube caused by the cooling water was miscalculated.

To better analyse the EIA report, several expert assessments have been published:

Download: Expert statement on the Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of the PAKS II NPP
by Oda Becker, commissioned by Greenpeace Germany, October 2015.
The independent nuclear expert Oda Becker was commissioned by Greenpeace Germany to prepare an Expert Statement on the EIA report. The objective of the assessment was to investigate whether the information presented in this study is reliable and sufficient to determine the potential risks for other countries, in particular Germany. This expert evaluation comes to the following conclusion: “The content of the EIS was found to not to be in line with the EIA Directive general requirements and IAEA specific recommendations. Much additional information is necessary to assess the possible consequences of the Paks II for Germany. However, the information at hand indicates that a severe accident with a major release and consequences for Germany cannot excluded.”

Download: summary of Expert analysis on the environmental impact assessment documentation (EIAD)
by experts commissioned by Benedek Javor, Member of the European Parliament and NTW, November 2015.
The conclusions of the expert analysis reveal that the EIAD is extremely low-quality; it is based on false data and false assumptions and has very little to do with reality.
Zsuzsanna Koritár, expert of Energiaklub and member of NTW, also pointed out the main deficiencies of the EIS, such as the unresolved problem of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, the inadequate analyses regarding nuclear safety, the heating problems, as well as the lack of alternative energy scenarios.

PUBLIC HEARINGS
On 7 May 2015, public hearings were held in Hungary, Paks and in Autumn 2015 all over Europe (Germany, Ukraine and Austria).

Find feedbacks from NGO representatives:

Public hearing in Paks, Hungary
According to Jan Haverkamp, the Paks hearing did not fulfill EIA and Aarhus specification, some of the reasons being the restrictions for participation of citizens and NGOs and the fact that only short questions were allowed during the hearings.
Download: Comments on the environmental impact assessment implementation of new nuclear power plant units at the paks site made by MVM Paks II
By Ir. Jan Haverkamp, expert consultant on nuclear energy and energy policy for Greenpeace in central and eastern Europe, qualified member of NTW
+ Addendum

Public hearing in Vienna, Austria
On 23rd September 2015, a public hearing for the planned new reactors in Paks was held in Vienna, with 65 attended people opposing a podium of 20 hungarians delegates. The deadline for public participation for Austria has to be prolonged, as 7 additional official documents were published on the MVM website, without have been officially submitted to Austria. Therefore the public was not aware of their existence while participating in the hearing.
Download: Summary of the public hearing in Vienna, transboundary environmental impact assessment NPP Paks II
By Gabriele Mraz, Austrian institute of ecology, member of NTW, September 2015.

Public hearing in Munich, Germany
The public hearing for Germany was held in Munich on 20 and 21 October 2015.
According to Brigitte Artmann, member of NTW, “this public hearing didn’t answer to every raised question, questions still remain open. Further serious questions about the lack of rescue staff in the emergency case were raised. Moreover, 30.000 submissions from Germany demand that German public concerns must be included into the EIA procedure without discrimination. Hungarians will get technical information of the chosen reactor and another hearing with documents in Hungarian language. German NGOs demand the same for Germany.”
Download: Summary of the public hearing in Munich, transboundary environmental impact assessment NPP Paks
By Brigitte Artmann, Greens Fichtelgebirge, member of NTW, October 2015.

Oda Becker commented also that: “On the basis of the known factors and the formally issued, more than 2,000-page environmental impact study, the biggest problem with Paks-2 is that serious accidents involving large quantities of radioactive material emissions cannot be ruled out. From the received reactions of the Hungarian delegation, the picture emerges that they believe that if something is highly unlikely, then it doesn’t have to be, because it “cannot happen”. This is not a modern, not a responsible way of thinking.”

THREE PROCEDURES LAUNCHED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
End of November 2015, the European Commission announced the launch of three procedures about the new nuclear power plant in Paks. First, an infringement procedure was launched by the Internal Market Commissioner on the violation of EU public procurement rules. Secondly, the DG Environment decided to further examine the classification of information contained in the Paks documents, as they might violate rules concerning the publicity of environmental information. And lastly, Margrethe Vestager, the Commissioner in charge of competition, drew the conclusion following her preliminary investigation that state aids by the Hungarian government cannot be excluded despite the contrary claims of the government. Therefore, she wishes to have a more thorough investigation on the question.

[1]http://www.mvmpaks2.hu/hu/Dokumentumtarolo/International%20chapter.pdf
[2]https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/a-la-une/recent-developments-on-paks2.html

Limited access for the Civil Society in the COP process

6 December 2015

COP 21 AND TRANSPARENCY

Two years ago, a significant portion of civil society delegates to COP19 simply walked out. They had agreed to leave the COP19 together to denounce the perceived closeness of governments to industrial lobbies, and to express their rejection of the false solutions. Today, the COP 21 seems to offer to multinationals advertising opportunities and privileged access of economic agents to policy makers and the negotiations space.

The sponsors of the COP21 – an advertisement for big corporations
Among the official sponsors of the COP 21[1], we find a large number of multinationals (including Engie, Renault-Nissan, EDF, BNP Paribas, etc.). We find notably key actors of the nuclear sector: EDF, which operates the 58 reactors at 19 nuclear plants across France, Areva, which manages the chain from fuel to plant – extraction and enrichment of uranium, transportation, recycling some of the waste … – and builds reactors, Engie (ex GDF-Suez), which has investments in Chooz and Tricastin plants and operates seven reactors in Belgium by Electrabel, Bouygues, specialized in plants structures – from the construction of the Flamanville EPR to the “sarcophagus” covering the Chernobyl plant- and Alstom, which designs turbines for nuclear power plants. BNP Paribas is also one of the sponsors, which is the largest bank in the euro area but also one of the most involved banks in the financing of nuclear power (13.5 billion euros between 2000 and 2009). Bolloré and Renault-Nissan are also key actors by defending the nuclear-powered electric cars.
To be one of the COP21 sponsors is a major opportunity for advertising. The brochure “Become a partner”[2], developed by the Secretariat responsible for the organization of the COP in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides the business case to attract sponsors: “The partners of COP21 will have the opportunity to Showcase their actions to the most important climate stakeholders. “Brand your organisation as a climate leader before and during COP21”. “Network with more than 500 leaders.” “Speak on panels with high-level leaders from the public and private sector”.Moreover, they are ensured of having a 60% tax-exempt for their contribution.

The exhibition “COP21 Solutions” – solutions by and for multinationals
The exhibition “COP21 solutions”, which takes place from 4 to 10 December at the Grand Palais in Paris, is expected to attract nearly 50,000 visitors. Event partners, such as Engie and Renault-Nissan[3], have paid large sums to obtain high visibility within the exhibition and privileged access to policymakers. Among the “solutions” presented on the climate solutions hub, there is a near monopoly of the multinationals. On the 284 “solutions”, more than two-thirds come from companies, to which should be added solutions from professional associations and research institutions with very similar economic backgrounds. SMEs can be counted on the fingers of both hands. In this way, the solutions advocated by large companies are present in force. For example, Engie has presented 27 solutions, nearly 10% of solutions presented on the website. A little more than forty solutions come from local authorities, and only 17 come from associations.
The French government has never hidden that his choice to focus on “solutions” was intended to advertise the products and technologies of French companies. The sponsors of the COP21 and the COP21 Solutions partners are recruited among the leading names of the French CAC 40. There are the two “historic” operators of the French market for electricity and gas, EDF (Electricité de France) and Engie (formerly GDF-Suez), for which the French state still holds respectively 84 and 33% of these companies. They have made a point of advertising themselves as the “Official partner of a low carbon world” for EDF or Engie, as the “European leader in energy transition”.

The events around the COP 21- a privileged access for multinationals
Beyond advertising offered to multinationals, there is the issue of privileged access of economic agents to policy makers and the negotiations space. “COP21 solutions” is not the only major event scheduled in December to promote “solutions” from multinationals. Many others events promoting business will also take place around the COP21, such as:
–       World Climate Summit, on 6 December at the Hotel Potocki, which describes itself as an ” original business, finance and government forum”. The entrance ticket is 1100 dollars for this summit and for the Sustainia charity gala that will bring together “senior business leaders and government officials”[4].
–       The “caring for climate business” Forum on 7 and 8 December in Le Bourget, is only accessible by invitation. It’s organized by the Global Compact of the UN, which continues to give privileged access to multinationals.
–       – The “Energy for Tomorrow” conference is organized by the New York Times on 8 and 9 December at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Paris. The entrance ticket costs 1200 euros for this event sponsored by Total, Renauld-Nissan and the American Chamber of Commerce in France.
–       The “Sustainable Innovation” Forum organized on 7 and 8 December by the United Nations Environment Programme and sponsored by BMW and nuclear giant Vattenfal. It is the largest official event parallel to COP21 and is presented as “the most important event focused on the business world during the COP”. It also has a web site whose address is confusing: http://www.cop21paris.org/.

The civil society organisations seem to have disappeared from the landscape of these events planned around the Grand Palais in December. Nevertheless, solutions are not possible without civil society participation. During the 15 days of negotiations, NTW supports civil society organizations presence in Paris to weigh into the debate.

[1]http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/partners/business-and-sponsors/
[2]http://cop21.org/become-a-partner/
[3]http://www.solutionscop21.org/en/
[4]http://cop21.org

NTW supports the RICOMET’s appeal

29 October 2015

NTW supports the RICOMET’s appeal to address social, ethical and participatory dimensions in the nuclear field

NTW supports the RICOMET’s appeal “Appeal to implement Responsible Research and Innovation in Euratom nuclear research, development and activities”.During core scientific and nuclear research and development, NTW highly recommends the incorporation of activities to broaden the social, participatory and ethical dimensions.

The relationships between technology and society should evolve
Nuclear power is far from being solely a technical subject. In the debates and discussions around nuclear power development, there is considerable attention to technical questions such as design and cost, but attention is also needed to social issues such as safety, justice, public perception, risk assessment, ethics, political acceptability, and public accountability.

Addressing social, ethical and participatory aspects is a lesson learned from Fukushima
The Fukushima catastrophe has profoundly altered the nuclear debate, as did the accidents at Three Miles Island and Chernobyl. In the 30 years between Three Miles Island and Fukushima, nuclear technology itself has not fundamentally evolved, but the way societies approach it has changed. Today, faced with risks of nuclear energy and waste management uncertainties, nuclear operations have to be reframed along the lines of transparency, governance and public participatory.

We need social sciences to understand the nuclear world
We feel that the ethical and societal dimensions of nuclear technologies and applications are of high importance and need to be strengthened. Nuclear risk, for example, has been a specific focus point, studied from the standpoint of accidents and their consequences on popular perceptions of risk. We need associations, unions and collectives in framing national and local debates on nuclear policy and sites.

The inconstancy of legislators and governments
Social science research is needed and even often requested by legislators and governments. But a difficulty is the scarcity of funding for social sciences in nuclear research. For example, social sciences and humanities deserve a more prominent place in Horizon 2020 Euratom projects. They should have an equal place to technical and industrial research, which are highly supported by EU funds and by different national funds especially established for their purpose (like radioactive waste management funds, decommissioning funds, special resources devoted to finance public institutes, etc.). In order to fulfill the full range of targets identified, it is important that the upcoming Euratom Horizon 2020 calls ensure the continuity of a forum for different stakeholders and include social, governance and transparency topics to the extend necessary.

NTW supports RICOMET’s position and calls the European Commission to take actions now rather than wait for the next nuclear crisis.

Aarhus hotline concerning EU financial support for lifetime extension of Ukraine’s nuclear reactors

22 September 2015

Lifetime extension of nuclear reactors in Ukraine

12 of Ukraine’s 15 reactors were designed to finish operations before 2020. Ukraine’s national energy strategy for 2030 envisages that all of the country’s 15 nuclear reactors will have their lifespan expanded. The Safety Upgrade Programme (SUP) includes safety modernisation measures for all 15 nuclear reactors in Ukraine and is partly necessary for the reactors’ for lifetime extension, as an independent expert’s review has shown.
The EBRD and Euratom are co-financing the EUR 600 million Upgrade Program. However, the reactors 1 & 2 at Rivne have already received a lifetime extension of 20 years beyond their 30 years design lifetime without the implementation of a proper environmental impact assessment (EIA) and a transboundary public consultation process in Ukraine and in neighboring countries, as prescribed by the Espoo and Aarhus conventions, both signed and ratified by Ukraine and all EU countries. Although such conduct has been assessed by the Espoo Convention implementation committee as a violation of this international treaty, Ukraine does not seem to be approaching the upcoming lifetime extensions differently.

A joint letter from MEPs

Since this is the matter of European safety, adherence to EU, international rules and transparency, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are convinced that all EU policy makers should be informed and take action. At a meeting with campaigners from Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) and CEE Bankwatch Network on 1st July 2015 in the European Parliament, MEPs from six political groups have decided to join the call for freezing the loan proceedings until a proper transboundary EIA and public consultation are carried out. A joint letter signed by 27 MEPs was sent the same day to representatives of EBRD and Euratom.

NTW Is pleased to have an important number of MEPs signing the letter. The challenge to face nuclear issues is not only technical, it is also political. European Parliament’s role in the decision-making process under the Euratom Treaty is limited since it has only consultation powers. Nevertheless, it has consistently put emphasis on the importance of improving safety and has a crucial role to enhance European cooperation and transparency.

A reply from the European Commission

To this letter, MEPs have received a reply from the Vice-President of the European Commission, Mr. Katainen, one of the four addressees.

Recent developments on Paks2

20 July 2015

by Benedek Jávor

A new nuclear power plant with two blocks from Rosatom (VVER1200) is planned as an addition to the existing four-block nuclear power plant, Paks-1 that currently generates some 40% of the Hungarian energy production. According to the contract, Hungary signed with Russian Federation, the two reactors of the new plant will be operational by 2025 and will cost 12,5 billion EUR. 80% of the foreseeable capital cost is financed by an intergovernmental loan from Russia.

Although the Hungarian government states that everything is perfectly planned, the project is fiercely contested by experts, political stakeholders and the public both on the Hungarian and the European level. Some are infuriated by the lack of preliminary investigations, impact assessments, public consultation, lack of transparency and alternative scenarios and the centralization of the decision and the energy systems. From Europe, there are concerned voices due to lack of tendering, the obstacle the plant poses to restructure the Hungarian energy mix and to add renewables and also due to risk of corruption and illegal state aid. I organized a hearing together with Energiaklub and NTW on the issue in late March. You can find the summary here.

Since, I have been working on several issues related to the new nuclear power plant and I would like to share the latest developments:

STATE AID CASE

The NGO Energiaklub of Hungary submitted a complaint to the European Commission to start a non-notified state aid procedure in 2014. Recently Commissioner Vestager replied to our joint letter with Energiaklub and she states that the HU government formally notified the Paks 2 project to the Commission on 22/05/2015.The Hungarian government claims that financing Paks-2 is not a state aid, as they think the return of investment is more than favourable. The EC is currently waiting for further explanation from the Hungarian government and after receiving all the relevant data, the EC have 2 months to come up with its position.

Energiaklub has recently made an analysis, which claims exactly the opposite.

LEAKED PRELIMINARY DOCUMENTS FOR FEASIBILITY STUDY

Despite the fact that the District Court of Budapest ruled in a decision that Energiaklub could not have been given access to the preliminary and background docs for the new NPP as they did not exist according to the Hungarian government, I published a series of short documents that were given to me from the electricity management company MVM and from academia that indirectly prove the existence of the above mentioned documents and give also some insight to the weak points that have been raised by many people, some of whom are specifically connected to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The opinion from MVM states that there are elementary mistakes and out-dated data in the modelling and no appropriate modelling of the system integration. The grid integration is not modelled as needed. The work is not budgeted and planned, as would be needed at this stage of implementation. The documents affirm our hypothesis that the promoters do not actually know costs, they just have estimates. The costs are underestimated and exclude a series of additional investments needed for the operation of the NPP. External factors like the EU competition law are totally ignored in the analysis.

The first document from academia says that when Paks2 will operate with both blocks, it will be necessary to cut operation time for Paks 1. The document actually estimates that block 4 will be able to run for only 1000h/year, in other words 30-35% less production. It also states that a pumped storage facility will be needed for the grid system regulation and this has not been budgeted for.

The second is specifically about cooling water and highlights mistakes committed for the cold-water channel of Paks1. It states that the new NPP will cause serious nature protection problems and that excess heat will call for (partial) capacity reduction which will in itself hinder the 95% planned use of the new NPP and the financial prospective won’t be achieved. Furthermore, it is likely that nature protection standards are likely to rise in the coming 60 years and might lead to new situations like the one in the Rhône where drought threatens the cooling of nuclear plants.

The authenticity of the documents has been confirmed by both MVM and the Hungarian Academy of sciences.

PUBLIC HEARINGS ALL OVER EUROPE

Over the summer the international phase of the Environmental Impact assessment for Paks-2 is running and we expect public hearing in the concerned countries in the early autumn. So far dates for Germany (16/09), Ukraine (17/10) and Autria (23/09) have been fixed.

Benedek Jávor is a member of NTW and member of the European Parliament for Together – Dialogue for Hungary Alliance. He is first vice-chair of the Committee for Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and is a substitute member of the Committee of Industry, Research and Energy. Furthermore, Benedek is a founding member of the environmental NGO Védegylet (Protect the Future!) and holds a PhD. in biology.

THE FEDERAL NUCLEAR KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

20 July 2015

OR HOW TO UNDERMINE NUCLEAR TRANSPARENCY

When Belgium decided in 2003 that it wanted to change direction towards a clean energy future and phase out its nuclear fleet after 40 years of operation, it probably had not expected the mess it is currently facing. Or maybe it did. Politics in the kingdom can be messy.

Belgium followed France in building nuclear capacity when it noticed its coal mines could not be operated economically in the late 1960s. The oil crisis in the early 1970 further paved the way for a nuclear option. Seven reactors were built on two sites. Four of them in Doel, on the doorstep of the port town of Antwerp. The other three in Tihange on the Meuse river bank between Namur and Liège. But when the date of the first shut-downs was nearing, Belgium’s nuclear operators Electrabel / ENGIE and EdF together with their political fan-club indicated the government that switching off the oldest three reactors, Tihange 1, and Doel 1 and 2 in one year might lead to shortages on extreme winter days. Despite the existence of alternatives strategies, the Belgian government decided in 2013 to give Tihange 1 a life-time extension of another 10 years, while confirming the limited lifetime of 40 years for the others.

In the summer of 2012, two of the “newer” reactors, Tihange 2 and Doel 3, were found to have thousands of cracks in the form of hydrogen flakes in their reactor vessel. There was no documentation to explain this phenomenon and several tests remain inconclusive about the question whether these cracks have been there from the start or could have grown over time. As a result, both reactors are off-line and kept off-line until further investigations give more clarity.

Doel 1 and 2 were slated for closure in February 2015 and December 2015 respectively and Engie/Electrabel and the new pro-nuclear Belgian energy Minister Marie-Christine Marghem saw their chances. They saw non-availability of Tihange 2 and Doel 3 as a good excuse to grant also Doel 1 and 2 an extra life of 10 more years. Official reason was again a potential shortage in unprecedented cold periods in the coming winter.

For Tihange 1, a secret agreement was made in which Engie/Electrabel and EdF will have to give the state 70% of their windfall profits from this move. In return, the state guarantees that whatever happens politically, Engie/Electrabel and EdF will be able to run those reactors up to the final date in October 2025. If not, the state will pay them all lost profits. Of course, technical malperformance or radioactive risks can lead to a shutdown without payments. But whenever there is an accident elsewhere in the world and the Belgian government would like to follow Germany’s wise lead and shut down all reactors older than 32 years, this agreement could become very costly indeed. This political guarantee is the same trick that EdF also smuggled into its agreement with the British government for the construction of the Hinkley Point C power station. The people carry the financial risks for politicians that make choices involving nuclear risks. The Belgian government declared the whole agreement as confidential and thus opposed its publication. Even against the ruling of Belgium’s independent Commission on Access to Information, and against valid Belgian and European laws and the Aarhus Convention on access to environmental information, which give the public interest prevalence over limited commercial ones – apart from the fact that there is no real commercial information in this agreement anyway. A few courageous parliamentarians from the Greens then decided to quote the entire agreement in a resolution, and thus we were able to have a look at it.

One important thing that the government forgot is the fact that for a life-time extension also an environmental impact assessment (EIA) needs to be made under the same Aarhus Convention and the Espoo Convention on transboundary EIAs as well as European and Belgian law. If the Belgian minister would take into account this obligation, that could mean that Tihange 1 would not be able to operate until such an EIA would have been carried out – with Belgian and transboundary public participation, that can easily take a year. In this case, according to the terms of the agreement, the Belgian state has to pay the missed profits to Engie/Electrabel and EdF.

It explains why the Belgian government is fighting the legal obligation of an EIA with all means available, despite the legal opinions from the country’s highest legal institution, the Council of State. The legal advice that the Belgian government quotes comes from Engie/Electrabel and the Dutch nuclear lawyers office Stibbe. Those acknowledge the obligations, but give tips to the Belgian government to help it to escape its obligations.

In the Energy Union discussions, Belgium supports the European aim of having the safest nuclear fleet in the world. Everywhere it states that nuclear safety always will be priority number one. However, the recent developments give us serious concern that financial objectives may have predominance over safety objectives.

Tihange 1 and Doel 1 and 2 are already 40 years old, while their design lifetime was only 30 years. A recent study commissioned by Greenpeace [1] shows that they faced many issues in the EU stress tests and many others were conveniently moved under the carpet. Another [2] shows that they are situated next to large populations and their emergency preparedness and response provisions in case of large accidents are fully inadequate

Instead of continuing to flog these old horses to work, it is essential to respect transparency laws and to focus on nuclear safety. Belgium is not a Banana Kingdom.

[1] Critical Review of the Updated National Action Plans (NAcP) of the EU Stress Tests on Nuclear Power Plants, June 2015, Greenpeace

[2] David Boley’s study of the Belgian emergency and response situation , Janvier 2015, ACRO

OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AROUND BELGIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS

Belgium decided for a nuclear phase-out after 40 years of operation of its reactors in 2003. In 2013 it decided to grant Tihange 1 an extra 10 years to prevent generation shortages in case of extreme cold weather periods in the winters of 2015 / 2017.
The Belgian government made a secret agreement with operators Engie/Electrabel and EdF to cover the 10 years life-time extension. In this agreement, the nuclear operators receive a quasi profit guarantee, as well as the assurance that the life-time extension decision will not be reversed by another government.
In the summer of 2012, Electrabel discovered thousands of cracks in the reactor pressure vessels of the Tihange 2 and Doel 3 reactors. An initial assumption that these hydrogen flakes were caused during production and did not increase over time is still under debate. Currently the reactors are off-line, waiting more investigations, and it is not sure that they will ever restart.
In June 2015, with wired-up fears for generation shortages during extreme cold periods, the Belgian parliament passed a law granting also Doel 1 and 2 ten years life-time extension.
Few days after that decision, the Belgian grid operator published an assessment concluding that Belgium is well incorporated in the European electricity grid structure and has spare gas capacity available so there will be no risks for black-outs even in winter.
Under the Espoo Convention, the EU EIA Directive and Belgian law, an environmental impact assessment should be made for a nuclear plant life-time extension. The country’s highest legal body, the Council of State, confirmed this position in an advice to the Minister. Last April, NTW sent a letter to stress the importance of respecting international obligations to organise a full scale EIA and a cross border public participation process in advance of any final decision. The Minister did not respond to NTW’s request, but continues to refuse an EIA on the basis of legal assessments from operator Electrabel and the Dutch nuclear lawyers firm Stibbe.

Ir. Jan Haverkamp (1959) is board member of Nuclear Transparency Watch and expert consultant on nuclear energy and energy strategy for Greenpeace Central and Eastern Europe and the World Information Service on Energy (WISE).