Transparency and Public participation

MEPs and NGOs contest EU financial support for lifetime extension of Ukraine’s nuclear reactors

2 July 2015

27 Members of the European Parliament have signed a joint letter warning the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Euratom to suspend the loan proceedings for nuclear units lifetime extension until a full transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a public consultation are launched and carried out in accordance with international treaties to which Ukraine is a party.

Lifetime extension of nuclear reactors in Ukraine – The EBRD and Euratom are co-financing the EUR 600 million Nuclear Power Plant Safety Upgrade Program to modernise all 15 of the country’s operating nuclear reactors. The reactors 1 & 2 at Rivne have already received a lifetime extension of 20 years beyond their 30 years design lifetime without the implementation of a proper environmental impact assessment (EIA) and a transboundary public consultation process in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries, as prescribed by the Espoo and Aarhus conventions, both signed and ratified by Ukraine and all EU countries. Although such conduct has been assessed by the Espoo Convention implementation committee as a violation of this international treaty, Ukraine does not seem to be approaching the upcoming lifetime extensions differently.

“Spending millions of EU tax payer’s money on keeping open high risk and out-of-date nuclear power stations in Ukraine is utter madness. Ukraine’s nuclear authority (the SNRIU) has a record of ignoring safety risks and cannot be trusted. In 2013, the SNRIU extended the life of a reactor in the South Ukraine Power Plant until 2023, despite independent studies showing that safety limits have been breached by up to 10 times the acceptable levels! With war still raging in Ukraine, the EU approach to extending the lifetime of nuclear power plants in the country is like having a sword of Damocles hang over the heads of all European citizens”, said Dario Tamburrano, Member of the European Parliament (EFDD, Italy).

A joint letter from MEPs – Since this is the matter of European safety, adherence to EU, international rules and transparency, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are convinced that all EU policy makers should be informed and take action. At a meeting with campaigners from CEE Bankwatch Network and Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) yesterday in the European Parliament, MEPs from six political groups have decided to join the call for freezing the loan proceedings until a proper transboundary EIA and public consultation are carried out. The joint letter signed by 27 MEPs has been sent today to the representatives of EBRD and Euratom.

“Euratom and the EBRD are also committed to apply the principles, standards and procedures established by international and European laws, namely the Aarhus Convention, the EU Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and the Espoo Convention. When tax-payers’ money is not used as it should have been, we must suspend payments. EU institutions should make sure that rights of its citizens are fully respected. The prolonged operation of nuclear reactors implies an increased risk of a severe nuclear accident with potentially devastating impacts on the environment and the people “, said Michèle Rivasi, Chair of NTW and Member of the European Parliament (Greens/ALE, France).

“Nuclear energy requires the highest levels of safety, and civil society plays an essential role in ensuring this. International rules for transparency should be respected”, added Jo Leinen, Member of the European Parliament (S&D, Germany) and of NTW

Ukraine is not the only country in this situation – Several European examples show that more has to be done to promote increased transparency and strengthen international rules on subsidies in Europe. In Belgium, the legislative proposal of the Energy minister to extend the lifetime of two 40 years old nuclear power reactors breaks the Espoo and Aarhus Conventions by ignoring the right of the public to participate in an environmental impact assessment and a public consultation involving also the neighbouring countries. Another example is Austria, where the government has the intention to take the commission to the European court of justice over state subsidies for UK-based two nuclear reactors at Hinkley Point. These subsidies – which Austria considers to be competition distorting, illegal state aid – are to be funded through levies on consumer bills.

Download the joint letter

NUCLEAR TRANSPARENCY WATCH WARNS BELGIAN MINISTER TO RESPECT TRANSPARENCY LAWS IN LIFETIME EXTENSION OF DOEL 1 & 2 NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS

30 April 2015

The European watchdog organisation Nuclear Transparency Watch(NTW) warned today the Belgian federal minister of Energy Marie-Christine Marghem, that her legislative proposal to extend the lifetime of the 40 years old Doel 1 and Doel 2 nuclear power reactors threatens to break international rules for transparency. If the right of the public to participate in an environmental impact assessment will not be respected, NTW will seek advice on initiating a formal complaint to the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention.

End February 2015, the Belgian Council of State warned the Belgian Energy minister that lifetime extension of old nuclear power reactors cannot be decided without organising an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a national and transboundary public consultation process, as prescribed by the European Directive 2011/92/EU and the Aarhus and Espoo conventions, both signed and ratified by Belgium.

On 5 and 6 May 2015, the final discussions before the vote on the Doel 1 & 2 lifetime extension will take place in the Economy Commission of the federal parliament. Before these discussions, NTW chair, Michèle Rivasi, sent today a letter to the energy minister to stress the importance of respecting international obligations to organise a full scale EIA and a cross border public participation process in advance of any final decision.

Ms. Rivasi commented: “The environment around Doel has fundamentally changed over the last 40 years and the risk of failure of the reactors increases exponentially over time. Ten years extra lifetime also adds 25% more time in which they are exposed to the risk of terrorist attack. This all on 12 km from the centre of Antwerp. It is important and legally prescribed that citizens get the chance to make sure all environmental concerns are taken into account when such a decision is taken. It would be completely inappropriate to look for loopholes to circumvent this obligation.”

The letter from NTW Chair, Michèle Rivasi to belgian minister of Environment, Marie-Christine Marghem: click here

Belarus: still no information freedom

14 January 2015

NTW forwards a call for international support from Belarus NGOs published in December:

The Belarusian powers started to "turn off" all known
independent Internet mass-media in the country. The official reason is
"to prevent the panic, related to the default of Belarus ruble". In 4
days all well-known and popular sites, including BelaPAN news agency
and web-portal onliner.by, providing information about
internet-shopping in Belarus were blocked and its domains in zone by
were paralyzed.

Never before the Belarusian authorities have done anything like
that. Such measures are possible in the case of the introduction of
martial law in our country. However, martial law is not entered.

BelaPAN’s statement on blockage of its websites

Minsk, 21 December.

The IP addresses of BelaPAN’s websites belapan.by, belapan.com and naviny.by were blocked on December 20th.

It is still unknown who did that and for what reason. However, it is clear that the decision to block the ID addresses could only be made by authorities as in Belarus the government has monopoly on providing IP addresses. BelaPAN had not received any official warning or notification about the coming blockage. The new amendments to the Media Law, which allow the blockage of websites, will come into force only on January 1^st 2015.

In this regard we view the blockage of the IP addresses of BelaPAN as a gross infringement of freedom of expression and media freedom in Belarus. We are taking all possible measures to obtain exhaustive information from government agencies as to who made the decision to block our websites and on what grounds.

Update: export of spent fuel from the Hungarian reactor Paks 2 to Russia

10 November 2014

Nuclear Transparency Watch has been warning for over a year about planned export of nuclear spent fuel from the Hungarian power plant Paks to the Russian reprocessing center Mayak. Although the Commission was aware of possible illegality the export took place on August 2014, by train, across Ukraine and regardless of the actual crisis.

NTW now publishes two letters received by a Hungarian member of NTW, Benedek Jávor (see his blog in Hungarian). The first comes from the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (OAH) (here in Hungarian, page 1, 2 ,3, 4) ; the second (in Hungarian) from Miklós Seszták, the Hungarian Minister for National Development. They bring evidence of a dangerous lack of legal clarity and do not answer to our interrogations. The informal English translations can be found here: letter of the OAH; letter of the Minister.

According to the OAH, the “purpose of the transportation is the temporary storage and non-military reprocessing of the spent fuel on the territory of the Russian Federation and the temporary storage and final disposal of the radioactive waste produced during the reprocessing.[section 3]”

The OAH makes a formal distinction between the spent fuel sent from Hungary to Russia for reprocessing and the resulting waste, whose “temporary storage and final disposal […] is the obligation of the Russian party”[Section 4, section 6]. Nevertheless they state at the same time that the ownership of the spent fuel will be transfe´rred to Russia too[Section 6].

Although this information clearly indicates that the aim is the final disposal of the spent fuel, the OAH denies this fact: ““the purpose of the transportation is not final disposal” [Section 5]. It seems that the Authority does not want to give a precise answer, which could determine whether the transportation was legal or not. Indeed according to the Euratom Directive 2011/70, art 4, “Where […] spent fuel is shipped for processing or reprocessing to a Member State or a third country, the ultimate responsibility for the safe and responsible disposal of those materials, including any waste as a by-product, shall remain with the Member State or third country from which the radioactive material was shipped.” If Hungary transported the waste from Paks for the purpose of final disposal then it violated the Euratom Directive.

This directive article underlines a second interesting point: despite the declarations of the Hungarian institutions, even the waste produced during reprocessing should remain under the responsibility of the Hungarian state. It could stay in Russia only if there were a final disposal facility, which is not the case.

The second letter was sent by Miklós Seszták, Hungarian Minister for National Development. In contrast with the OAH, he clearly admits that the damaged fuel rods were, indeed, transported for final disposal. Another sign of the utter confusion among the respective authorities over what they have done exactly or what they should tell about it.

Nevertheless the Minister explains the legality of the procedure by stressing that the shipment was based on an agreement ratified by the Euratom Supply Agency, that states that “all obligations and rights are transferred to the Russian party with the condition, in accordance with the Agreement, that the spent (encapsulated) fuel shall not be used for military purposes.”

As explained before, according to the directive 2011/70/Euratom, there should be no transfer of responsibility for spent fuel or radioactive waste regardless of what will be done with it.

These letters have been shared with the DG Energy of the European Commission. NTW is now waiting for a real stance from the European Commission regarding the legality of such shipment.

Opinion: Spent fuel transported from Hungary to Russia

5 September 2014

Hungary transports spent fuel from accident to Russia – through Ukraine

by Jan Haverkamp

Last August, Hungary transported spent nuclear fuel by train to the nuclear reprocessing complex at Mayak in the Southern Urals, Russia. The transport went through Ukraine. It was agreed between the governments of Hungary, Russia and Ukraine, overseen by their nuclear regulatory authorities and tacitly or openly approved by the IAEA and European Commission (under Euratom). [1]

I for one am shocked. Shocked because Hungary is dumping radioactive waste outside of its country. But even more shocked because of the irresponsible risk taken with this transport through a war-torn country and because of the fact that the interested public has been led by the nose.

First some background. The spent nuclear fuel originates from an INES 3 accident in 2003 in the fuel pool of the Paks 2 nuclear reactor in Hungary. Workers of Framatom had tried to clean the fuel elements with too cold water, they broke and the following clean-up operation was only finished in 2011. The broken fuel was packed in special containers and then stored in the pool awaiting further management. The logical option would be to let the spent fuel cool and then store it in existing dry storage for spent fuel on-site until some final disposal solution is found. Leaving the material at Paks, however, could impact the basis for life-time extension of the Paks 2 unit from 30 to 40 years. This life-time extension is to be approved by the Hungarian nuclear regulator HAEA in Autumn of this year.

In order to get this spent fuel out of the way, Hungary has set up an agreement with Russia and the Russian Rosatom fuel daughter TVEL to move it to Mayak in Russia. The basic agreement was signed two days before EU accession of Hungary in 2004, because the Hungarian government feared that it might be difficult for an EU / Euratom member state to dump its radioactive waste in another country. The factual contract was much more recently signed – as far as my information goes well after the new Euratom Radioactive Waste Directive 2011/70/Euratom became valid. This directive forbids in art. 4.4.c that radioactive waste is shipped to a third state that cannot prove it has an operational disposal facility. Shipping spent fuel to a third country for reprocessing is possible, but then the resulting waste has to be returned or has to fall also under the conditions of art. 4.4.c – needing a functioning disposal facility. Russia has no such facility – nobody has. Nuclear Transparency Watch and several MEPs and Hungarian MPs are still waiting on a satisfactory answer on whether the fuel and its resulting waste are to stay in Russia or will remain in ownership of Paks and will be returned at some time to Hungary – and if, when. If they will not be returned, it is an illegal transport. If they will be returned, it would be good to know when and what will happen with the resulting vitrified high-level waste, as Hungary has no functioning disposal programme for that either.

Now my concerns. Because of the complex legal situation of this transport and because of the hard stance of Energy Commissioner Oettinger against export of nuclear waste [2], Nuclear Transparency Watch was in contact with the European Commission for over a year. The European Commission had promised NTW to actively keep it updated about the situation and in July still confirmed that no decisions were taken. Since then, NTW did not receive any information from the Commission. Hungarian MEPs, MPs and citizens were in August confronted with a complete fait accompli when the media informed them that the transport had taken place. So far for transparency, so far for the rule of law.

Then the transport itself. Spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste transports are highly risky. For that reason they happen as much as possible in secret and under high levels of security. The transport in Hungary rolled through the centre of towns like Kesckemet and Debrecen before it left the country in Zahony to Chop in Ukraine. It passed numerous unprotected rail crossings, LPG tanks along the tracks and the high bridges at Baja and Szolnok. Then it went into Ukraine and the rest of the route is unknown. There are several possibilities – the most direct ones leading through separatist-held Donetsk, but it could also have been transported along a more Northern route. In August, Ukraine was facing a full-out civil war. The passenger flight MH17 was shot down on 17 July. The fronts were unclear and there was always the possibility of unexpected attacks outside the war zone. We know that in August, the pro-Russian separatist forces had the availability of BUK missiles and heavy artillery as well as smaller but hardly less destructive mobile weaponry. The chance on a malevolent attack on the nuclear transport was many factors higher than in peace time. Still it went ahead. The question is, of course, who would attack a nuclear rail transport? But the question is also who would shoot a passenger airliner with over 300 passenger out of the air. From nuclear safety perspective, this transport should never have passed a country in a civil war situation.

Place where the transport left Hungary for Ukraine.

The urgency for the transport was driven by the wish to approve Paks 2’s periodic safety reviewand 10 further years of operation, that is, by the opportunity to create income for its operator, the giant 100% state utility MVM. There was no overriding safety argument to have this spent fuel removed from Paks now. Even if the legality of this transport could be argued, about which I am still in sincere doubt, MVM could have waited easily until Ukraine would be a peaceful country again. This is a clear violation of the principle that nuclear safety should have priority over everything else.

Operator MVM, nuclear regulator HAEA, the Hungarian government, the European Commission and the IAEA, all elements of a system that is supposed to prevent these kind of risks, should have stopped the transport. The system we rely upon for nuclear safety has fundamentally failed in all its links.

Nothing happened during the transport. We have been lucky once again. But without a credible safety system in place, a next time it might well go wrong.

Ir. Jan Haverkamp (1959) is board member of Nuclear Transparency Watch and expert consultant on nuclear energy and energy strategy for Greenpeace Central and Eastern Europe and the World Information Service on Energy (WISE). He investigated the nuclear transport route from Paks to Ukraine on potential risks in 2004 and was involved in Nuclear Transparency Watch’s attempts to get clarity about this transport for Hungarian and European citizens and NGOs in 2013 and 2014.

[1] http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/ENF-Damaged-Paks-fuel-sent-to-Russia-2008145.html

[2] http://euobserver.com/news/29644

NTW side-event: “implementing the Aarhus Convention in the nuclear sector”

8 July 2014

NTW has organized a side event during the Meeting of the Parties of the Aarhus convention, on July, 2nd in Maastricht.

The aim was to provide an overview on our activities and to present the last news concerning the Aarhus convention and its implementation in the nuclear sector. A special focus has been put on the recent outcomes endorsed by the Meeting of the Parties of the Espoo convention.

To learn more about this, have a look on the presentations!

Introduction about NTW; NTW’s recent work; Aarhus and Espoo conventions in the nuclear sector.

NPP news in Europe

25 April 2014

News feed from nuclear power plants in Europe : informations, incidents, … to promote transparency !

Nuclear power plant	Date	Link
Mühleberg, Switzerland	19/05/2014	Permanent shutdown in 2019 (FR)
Golfech, France	15/05/2014	Fire outbreak (FR)
Cattenom, France	09/05/2014	Ten employees were contaminated (FR)
Golfech, France	03/05/2014	Incident level 1 (FR)
Gravelines, France	25/04/2014	Four of the six reactor units are shut down (FR)
Fessenheim, France	24/04/2014	Electric incident (FR)
Civaux, France	23/04/2014	Incident: fire beginning (FR)
Fessenheim, France	19/04/2014	Two reactors are stopped (FR)
Temelin, Czech Republic	10/04/2014	CEZ cancels Temelin expansion tender (EN)
Blayais, France	03/04/2014	Incident level 1 (FR)
Grafenrheinfeld, Germany	28/03/2014	Permanent shutdown in 2015 (DE)
Doel & Tihange, Belgium	26/03/2014	Doel-3 and Tihange-2 nuclear reactor units are shut down (FR)
Dungeness, United-Kingdom	18/03/2014	Power station quietly taken offline (EN)
Santa Maria, Spain	26/02/2014	Recovery of a nuclear site (FR)
Chooz, France	21/02/2014	Incident level 1 (FR)
Blayais, France	19/02/2014	Incident level 1 (FR)
Gravelines, France	18/02/2014	300 000 hours of maintenance work (FR)

Map of Nuclear power plants in Europe

Tutorial :

The nuclear plants are listed in three categories (shutdown plants, in operation, under construction / planned plants) in the drop down menu. Select one of the three categories to see the corresponding plants.

You can then move around the map and click on the plant of your choice to access basic information (number and type of reactors, power, date of construction, supplier and operator, link to more information).

You can also enlarge the map by clicking on the square “full screen” in the black strip at the top of the map.

To open the map, click on the image below:

Or on this link: https://mapsengine.google.com/map/viewer?mid=zNY0rQTK0ON8.kz7iDd-8KYgg

Request regarding the access to an European Commission study on Emergency Preparedness and Response

17 March 2014

DG ENER commissioned in 2013 a study with the title “Review of current off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and response arrangements in EU member states and neighbouring countries”. Study was prepared by consortium ENCO (Austria) and UJV (CzechR).

The objective of the investigation was:

Assess the status of the existing arrangements and capabilities for off-site emergency preparedness and response (EP&R) within and between the EU Member States (MS) and neighbouring countries in respect of their coherence and completeness;
Identify best practices, gaps and inconsistencies, in particular related with cross border arrangements;
Assess how current arrangements and capabilities could be made more effective (in particular optimized to make better use of available resources and avoid duplication, both nationally and across borders); and
Make recommendations on potential areas for improvement.

This study was conducted in 28 EU countries, plus Norway, Russian federation, Switzerland, Ukraine and Armenia.

Methodology for the study included:

Collection of information on current arrangements: 2 questioners sent to national contact points;
Benchmarking against the requirements (IAEA and European Union):
GS-R-2: Preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, 2002.
Council Directive laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation, 96/29/Euratom, 1996.
Council Directive on informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, 89/618/Euratom, 1989.
Council Regulation laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and of feeding-stuffs following a nuclear accident or any other case of radiological emergency, 3954/87/Euratom, 1987, as amended by Council Regulation 2218/89/Euratom, 1989.
Mapping against International or European requirements, guidance or recommendations;
Involvement of Stakeholder Group to internally review the work;
Case studies – limited to cross border arrangements: AT–CZ and CH-DE-FR;
Collection of information on future improvements (questionnaire and discussion).

The aim of this new request is the access to this study commissioned by the European Commission on Emergency Preparedness, which had not been published.

Action	Date	Condition
Request sent by letter to the European Commission	03/03/2014	Sent
Reply from the Commission	07/05/2014	Received
NTW received the study on Emergency Preparedness and Response from the European Commission.	08/05/2014	Received

We received a reply from the European Commission. In its letter, EC inform us that they have received the results of the study and they will publish it shortly.

One day after, we finally succeed to access to the final report “Review of Current Off-site Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response Arrangements in EU Member States and Neighbouring Countries” that you can now download and watch here!

Download the letter adressed by NTW to Mr. Oettinger, the European Commissionner for energy concerning the access to an European Commission study on Emergency Preparedness and Response.

Or read it below :

Dear Commissioner Oettinger,

On February 6th & 7th last Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) held an inception seminar of its Working Group on Emergency Preparedness & Response (EP&R) in Paris. The participants, drawn from a wide spectrum of nuclear-related official bodies and NGOs, discussed the current situation regarding EP&R in Europe following the lessons learned from evaluation of the Fukushima nuclear accident three years ago. An action plan of the Working Group’s activities for 2014 was agreed.

In the course of the seminar NTW learned of an important study on EP&R in EU Member States and some third countries commissioned by DG ENER in 2012. According to our information the study entitled “Review of current off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and response arrangements in EU member states and neighbouring countries” has been completed recently. Given the goals and objectives of this study the members of the NTW Working Group are very eager to have full access to the study and to use its results in their work. This would make a substantial contribution to the activities of the Working Group that aims to improve the level of EP&R in Europe through increased engagement of civil society.

Nuclear Transparency Watch has been informed that the European Commission does not intend to make the study available to the public but rather to integrate its results into a Communication to be published before summer this year. NTW believes that is in best interest of EU citizens, the European institutions and the nuclear sector to make the study publicly and fully available as soon as possible, including the questionnaires and any other ancillary material.

Access to the study would permit feedback to civil society on its results and enable evaluation beyond the self-assessments of the authorities involved. It would help civil society to contribute to the improvement and harmonisation of EP&R provisions and arrangements and enhance the management of transboundary activities in the nuclear sector.

Please regard this as a formal request for access to information made under the terms of the

Aarhus Convention (Article 4 on Access to Information) to which the European Commission is a Party.

The following Regulation also apply:

a) REGULATION (EC) No 1367/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies

(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:264:0013:0019:EN:PDF)

b) REGULATION (EC) No 1049/2001 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:145:0043:0048:EN:PDF)

With regards,

__________________

Mrs. Michele Rivasi,

Chair,

Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW)

ESPOO convention (1991)

5 February 2014

The Espoo (Environmental Impact Assessment) Convention sets out the obligations of Parties to assess the environmental impact of certain activities at an early stage of planning. It also lays down the general obligation of States to notify and consult each other on all major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries.

The Convention was adopted in 1991 and entered into force on 10 September 1997.

Complaint to the European Commission about radioactive waste export from Hungary to Russia

25 January 2014

Nuclear Transparency Watch sent a letter addressed to Mr Oettinger, the European Commissionner for Energy concerning illegal radioactive waste export from Hungary to Russia.

It is a first step in order to monitor nuclear activities and improve transparency in this sector !

We received an acknowledgement of receipt and two months later a reply from the European Commission.

However, this reply does not give us the answers we are entitled to wait for. That’s why we decided to send a new letter to the European Commission asking to be more precise and in order to clarify the issue.

Action	Date	Condition
First complaint sent by letter to the European Commission	26/11/2013	Sent
Acknowledgement of receipt from the European Commission	19/12/2013	Received
Telephone reminder	11/02/2014	ok
Reply from the European Commission	26/02/2014	Received
New letter to have more precisions	03/04/2014	Sent
Waiting for a response.	16/05/2014	Still waiting

Letter sent to Mr Oettinger : Radioactive waste export from Hungary to Russia

Brussels, 26 November 2013

Dear Mr. Oettinger,

Nuclear Transparency Watch has been informed that the Hungarian nuclear energy operator MVM is currently preparing the export of high-level nuclear waste from the INES 3 incident in 2003 in the Paks 2 unit to Mayak in Russia. We have been informed that the contracts for this export foresee transfer of ownership of this waste to Rosatom/ TVEL or another institution in Russia, and do not foresee any return of the waste for final disposal in Hungary or another EU country.

The 2011/70/EURATOM Directive of 19 July 2011 states the following:

Art. 4(1): Member States shall establish and maintain national policies on spent fuel and radioactive waste management.

Without prejudice to Article 2(3), each Member State shall have ultimate responsibility for management of the spent fuel and radioactive waste generated in it.

Art. 4(2): Where radioactive waste or spent fuel is shipped for processing or reprocessing to a Member State or a third country, the ultimate responsibility for the safe and responsible disposal of those materials, including any waste as a byproduct, shall remain with the Member State or third country from which the radioactive material was shipped.

Art. 4(4): Radioactive waste shall be disposed of in the Member State in which it was generated, unless at the time of shipment an agreement, taking into account the criteria established by the Commission in accordance with Article 16(2) of Directive 2006/117/Euratom, has entered into force between the Member State concerned and another Member State or a third country to use a disposal facility in one of them.

Nuclear Transparency Watch has been informed that the shipment of this high-level waste to Mayak will not be for the purpose of reprocessing with consecutive return of the reprocessing products and waste by-products to Hungary, but for a transfer of the waste, including transfer of ownership of the waste, to Rosatom / TVEL or another institution in Russia.

Nuclear Transparency Watch has been informed that even in case the new owner would decide to reprocess the waste, waste produced as by-product as well as retrieved products for which no further use can be found will remain in Russia and under ownership of the new owner, i.e. out of the ultimate responsibility of MVM.

Nuclear Transparency Watch is aware of the fact that neither Rosatom / TVEL nor any other Russian institution, nor Russia as state has a licensed and operating final disposal facility for high-level waste. The agreement(s) made between MVM and Rosatom / TVEL or another Russian institution therefore cannot provide any insurance concerning final disposal of this waste or products and by-products of reprocessing in case the new owner would use that option.

The operations of Rosatom / TVEL in Mayak include temporary storage of high-level wastes, but no operational final disposal that would fulfil EU quality standards. As far as we have been informed, the agreement between MVM and Rosatom / TVEL or another institution does not foresee repatriation of the waste to Hungary in case Rosatom / TVEL or any other institution in Russia fails to provide such a final disposal.

Nuclear Transparency Watch is furthermore aware of the dismal track record of Rosatom / TVEL’s Mayak operations and the historical and current exposure of the surrounding population to unacceptable levels of radioactivity and lack of sufficient care and compensation for the effects of historical exposures. Given that track record, Nuclear Transparency Watch has severe concerns about whether even temporary storage or processing and consecutive storage of the waste would fulfil EU standards.

Nuclear Transparency Watch is not convinced that MVM or Hungary will be able to execute its ultimate responsibility for care of this waste in case the new owners or Russia fail to fulfil EU quality standards, nor is Nuclear Transparency Watch convinced that MVM or even the Hungarian Armed Forces would be able to repatriate the waste in case EU quality levels would be flouted by the new owners or Russia.

With that, Nuclear Transparency Watch is convinced that MVM and Hungary under this plan are giving up their ultimate responsibility for this waste.

Nuclear Transparency Watch hereby asks the European Commission the following:

1. Is the European Commission informed as prescribed in art. 4.4 of the Directive of this planned export of high level radioactive waste?

2. Given the above, what is the opinion of the European Commission concerning the legality of this export?

3. Given the fact that this export means a de facto transfer of ultimate responsibility of high-level radioactive waste from an EU Member State to a third state, which steps will the European Commission take to prevent this waste export?