Opinion Columns

German elections and nuclear energy

27 February 2025

On February 23, 2025, the Bundestag members were elected by the German people 🇩🇪.

The party with the most representatives, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), forming the CDU/CSU, will build a governing coalition to hold a parliamentary majority

CDU/CSU already refused to form a coalition with the far right party AfDn therefore it’s likely to see one of the coalition represented below to be formed by Easter.

Source: Federal Returning Officer – February 24, 2025

Now regarding the impacts of this new political scene on nuclear energy, we can first refer to the CDU/CSU’s programme where can read:

“We remain committed to nuclear power.

We are focusing on research into fourth- and fifth-generation nuclear power, small modular reactors and fusion power plants.

We are studying the possibility of resuming operation of recently closed nuclear power plants.”

However, considering the political situation and the views of nuclear experts in Germany, it’s not likely that they will be able to reopen the recently closed nuclear power plants. In fact even the companies that operated them don’t support it.

Regarding the “new developments in the nuclear field, whether it is research or later industrial manufacturing” our German member, Jo Leinen, who is a former member of the European Parliament (SPD) thinks that “the conservatives want to be part of the technological race”.

Another member of Nuclear Transparency Watch, Dr. Hauke Doerk a consultant for radioactivity and energy policy at the Umweltinstitut München e.V. also thinks that research in new generation nuclear, SMR and Fusion is likely continued to be funded.

Article on “Myths of nuclear energy”

4 February 2025

Myths of nuclear energy
Questions we need to answer before deciding
by Miroslav Gregorič

Translation of an article by Miroslav Gregoric, Member of Slovenian National Assembly 🇸🇮 entitled “Myths of nuclear energy” ☢️ published in Saturday supplement of newspaper 📰 DELO on 📆25 January 2025.

With the fifth revision of the National Energy and Climate Plan [1] (NECP) and after the failed attempt for a quick referendum and the failed decision to build the second (and third) unit of the NPP, the professional public and all taxpayers should ask themselves whether we have enough data for a competent and informed decision-making.
It would not be good for the public to fall into the trap of half-truths, or even lies, as was the case with the thermal power plant – TEŠ6 project and the Velenje Coal Mine. It would also not be a good idea to witness the increase of the investment during construction by the Pi factor.

In this article, I would like to shed some light on some myths of nuclear energy.

Myth 1. More energy means more GDP.

For a long time, it was believed that the higher the consumption of (electricity) energy in a country, the higher the standard of living of the people, the more developed the industry is and the higher is the GDP. Our planet, shared by more than eight billion people, has the ultimate natural capacities and capacities that humanity has greatly challenged over the past two hundred years. One of these challenges is greenhouse gas emissions which is the result of the increase in fossil fuel consumption [2] by thirty-three over the past 220 years (world primary energy consumption rose from 5600 TWh in 1800 to 183 thousand TWh in 2023 (Figure 1), which has enabled today’s level of civilization, with an annual production of 2 billion tons of crude iron [3] (Figure 2), 4 billion tons of cement [4] (Figure 3), 200 million tons of fertilizers[5] (Figure 4), 413 million tons of plastics [6] (Figure 5), and other metals and minerals. We can ask ourselves whether this is sustainable and whether the trends are sustainable? The answer is clear – it’s not sustainable!

Figure 1 Global primary energy consumption by source

Figure 3 Global cement production from 1995 to 2023

Figure 4: Global production of fertilizers N, P, K from 2005 to 2023

Figure 5: Global plastic production 1950 to 2019

Some, especially western countries, have achieved extremely high energy consumption which can in no way be sustainable at the global level: for example 227 MWh/capita/year of primary energy in Kuwait [7], or 167 MWh/capita/year in Iceland or 101 MWh/capita/year in Norway. On the other hand, some countries have remained in the worst energy poverty: such as 0.217 MWh/capita/year in Somalia or 0.286 MWh/capita/year in the Central African Republic. (Figure 6)

Figure 6 Primary energy consumption per capita per year kWh/year

If we look at the density of nuclear power plants, mostly built in the 70s and 80s of the last century, we see that there was the highest density in Sweden, there were 12 nuclear reactors for a population of 8 million. In the United States [8], 112 power plants were built, when they had a population of 225 million, or 1 nuclear reactor per 2 million inhabitants, the same in Slovenia. In France [9], 56 reactors have been built for a population of 56million.

If we take the French density, that is one reactor per one million inhabitants and extrapolate this to India, we should have 1500 nuclear power plants in India today for a billion and a half inhabitants. China would need1400 reactors,Indonesia 300, Brazil 250 reactors, Africa 1800 reactors, and the world 8200 reactors. For such a scale of nuclear energy, we have neither the money, nor the people to build and operate them safely, nor the uranium nor the steel. We quickly realize that a Western European or American (energy) standard will be very difficult to enforce worldwide because it is unsustainable. Does this mean that poor countries will continue to be poor and have low GDP? Does this mean that developed countries need to do much more to make significantly more efficient use of energy and reduce consumption?

Worldwide, there are nuclear power plants in 33 countries[10] and there are no nuclear power plants in 160 countries.
If Slovenia starts building one new nuclear power plant today, it is as if the United States, according to the number of inhabitants, started building 165 units, France 35 or China 700. We may wonder why they don’t.

Myth 2. “According to COP-28, we will triple the share of nuclear energy by 2050.”

This was pledged, on December 1, 2023, in the framework of COP-28, by representatives of 25 countries, led by the United States, in the Declaration on the Tripling of Nuclear Power [11]. In doing so, they followed the results of the 2022 OECD NEA analysis [12] that limiting atmospheric warming to 1.5°C would require tripling nuclear power from the current 370 GWe to 1160 GWe by 2050. Slovenia is one of the signatories of the declaration. But the countries that build or supply by far the most new nuclear power plants are missing: China, Russia and India.

Europe is very unlikely to triple its nuclear energy by 2050. There are currently 100 reactors in operation in Europe, the vast majority of which are old and 90 of them will be shut down by 2050. So we will need 90 new reactors just to keep nuclear energy at its current level. A threefold increase in Europe alone would mean a total of 300 new reactors or the connection of 15 new large reactors in Europe each year from 2030 to 2050, which would require a total of 300 reactor vessels of 300 tons, 900 to 1200 steam generators of 400 tons and 900 to 1200 primary pumps of 100 tons, 600 transformers of 300 tons each, 300 turbines and electric generators of 1000 MW and more and 1200 large diesel generators… There are no such supply chains in Europe and the West. The investments, however, would amount to 4500 billion Euro plus interests costs, which for 30-year loans are comparable to the initial investment – so a total of about 9000 billion Euro investments. And that’s only in Europe.

Let’s look at the situation in the world. In 2004, electricity produced by nuclear power plants [13] accounted for 16% of all electricity generated in the world and today [14] only 9%. After the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, 52 preordered nuclear power plants were canceled in the United States [15], and those that were at a higher stage of construction mostly continued to be build. The golden age of nuclear power plant construction was in 1982 and 1983, when 32 reactors per year were connected to the grid around the world. In recent years, the total number of nuclear reactors in power plants in the world has hovered around 410. In 2023 five reactors were connected and five were turned off [16], and in the last ten years (2014 to 2023), 66 reactors were connected to the electric grid in the world, and 63 reactors were turned off. At this rate, it would take 300 years to triple the number of nuclear reactors in the world from 410 today to 1230.

IAEA PRIS data [17] show a harsh reality: that the increase of power of all nuclear power plants in the world over the past twenty years, from 2004 to 2023, has been a total of 7 GW (Figure 7). Over the same period, the capacity of solar power plants in the world grew by 1643 GW, from 3 GW to 1650 GW (Figure 8).

Figure 7 Total power in GWe (dark blue) and number of nuclear reactors in the last 20 years

Figure 8: Increase in the power of solar power plants in the last 20 years [18]

By 2050, of the world’s current 410 operating reactors, 300 will be shut down. To triple the nuclear energy in the world, 1200 new large reactors would need to be built by 2050, which would mean investments of about 18 thousand billion Euros plus interest. Political slogans and paper can endure a lot, but reality paints a harsh picture.

OECD NEA study “Achieving Climate Change Goals: The Role of Nuclear Power” [19] from 2022 and the “NEA Small Modular Reactors Dashboard – Second Edition” [20] from 2024 predict a different distribution of nuclear capacity in the world in 2050: existing nuclear power plants would retain 370 GWe (extending at least half of them to 80 years???), new large nuclear power plants would yield 300 GWe, and new small modular reactors- SMRs would yield 375 GWe (Figure 9). This last figure is at the level of science fiction, as it would require the construction and operation of 3,000 small modular reactors of 125 MWe or 4,870 NuScale US600 [21] small modular reactors of 77 MWe each (which already has an approved safety report from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission) by 2050. It seems that paper and studies endure a lot.

Figure 9: Full potential of nuclear energy towards zero emissions

Myth 3. “Uranium is plentiful.”

In recent years, 50 to 60 thousand tons of natural uranium – yellow cake [22] – have been yearly extracted in the world, by far the most in Kazakhstan, followed by Canada, Namibia, Australia, Uzbekistan, Russia, Niger, China, India and South Africa. According to the recently published IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency) report “Geopolitics of Energy Transition – Energy Security” [23] , the share of newly acquired uranium in the world by country is as follows (Figure 10):

Figure 10: World uranium production – share by country (%)

There is no longer an operating uranium mine in Europe. From 50 to 60 thousand tons of yellow cake, 5 to 6 thousand tons of enriched uranium to 3 to 5% in U-235 is produced, which is needed to power existing nuclear power plants. TENEX from Russia has by far the largest uranium enrichment capacity, followed by Urenco in Germany, the Netherlands and the United-Kingdom, then Orano (ex-Areva) in France and the USA, and CNNC in China (Figure11). Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan and Iran also have commercially uninteresting capacities.

In addition to the declared threefold increase in nuclear power by 2050 with 1200 operating reactors, uranium uranium mining – yellow cake production – should also be tripled, the capacity for conversion from yellow cake U₃O₈ to uranium hexafluoride UF₆ should be tripled, the fuel enrichment capacity should be tripled and the capacity for the conversion of UF₆ to UO₂ should be tripled, the production of zirconium and zirconium tubes should be tripled, and fuel production would have to be tripled. There is an unanswered question of how much, when, by whom, and where will invest in these new facilities.

Figure 11: Global reactor conversion, enrichment and sales capacity – share by country (%)

Myth 4. “Supply chains can be quickly restored for the goals of tripling nuclear power by 2050.“

Functioning supply chains have been maintained or created mainly in Russia, China, South Korea and partly Japan.
But what about when, in the current geopolitical reality, it is not appropriate to import from a non-democratic or authoritarian environment. The IRENA report gives country-by-country shares in the world for uranium conversion capacities (from yellow cake U₃O₈ to uranium hexafluoride UF₆), for uranium enrichment, and for nuclear reactor sales. Currently, the share of the Western world is very weak (Figure 11). In the US, France, Canada, Germany, Japan, Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, nuclear supply chains have largely stalled or were abandoned in the last 30 years, both in personnel, technological and industrial terms. New supply chains cannot be established quickly, as they require a lot of coordination, multidisciplinary staff, education for science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), applied research, achieving high industry standards, the strictest quality assurance with traceability of all materials, processes and equipment, finances, the interest of industry – including heavy steel, long-term contracts, state incentives and the like, and above all, it is a long-term activity.
We cannot count on the established supply chains of the 70s and 80s of the last century, because they are no longer there. Unfortunately, the supply chains that have been used or are being used in the construction of the last power plants in Finland, France, the USA and the United Kingdom have not performed well. Above all, there is a problem with the high-quality production of large components such as reactor vessels, steam generators, main coolant pumps… The statements of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Slovenia that the Slovenian industry could supply 40% of the equipment for NEK-2 have no real basis and I prefer not to comment on them.

Myth 5. “The taxonomy [24] classifies nuclear energy as an environmentally sustainable resource—a low-carbon resource.”

The taxonomy sets the conditions for both gas-fired and nuclear power plants. In addition to the requirements for nuclear safety in accordance with the European Directives for Nuclear Safety and for the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel, and the requirements to establish a fund for the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel and a fund for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants, the taxonomy requires that a country that classifies nuclear energy as an environmentally sustainable source has, inter alia, an already operational repository for low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW) and a functioning repository by 2050 for high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel [25]. We do not yet have a repository for LILW, but we are already building the first silo, and we will finally build it within three years and dispose of the Slovenian half of the LILW in it. In the meantime, Croatia will find its way around. But in the meantime, and until then, half of Croatia’s waste will be with us on the NPP site. We have a fund for the decommissioning of the NPP, but we collect significantly too little funds in it, and certainly not for the disposal of the spent nuclear fuel.

Myth 6. “We’re going to build the nuclear power plant in 6 to 8 years.”

Yes, indeed, in the past, some nuclear power plants were built in six years, or even faster, if there were several reactors on the same site and they were built one after the other. Even today, China and Russia have been building nuclear power plants for about six years. But unfortunately, this does not happen in the West. The EPR reactor of the French company Areva in Finland, Olkiluoto 3, has been under construction for 18 years [26], the same reactor at Flamanville in France has been under construction for 17 years [27] and was only put into trial operation at the end of last year. For the AP 1100 plant in Vogtle USA, a contract was signed in 2008 for two reactors with Westinghouse, which was then owned by Japanese Toshiba. Construction of the first reactor officially started in 2013 and reactor was built in 10 years, while the second achieved its first criticality and synchronization to the grid this year, after 11 years of construction or 16 years after the contract was signed. In 2010, the UK government made the decision to build a new nuclear power plant, Hinkley Point C. In 2016, the UK government decided on two French EPR units of 1600 MWe each. Construction began in 2017 and was expected to be completed by 2025 [28], then 2027 and then 2029. The latest announcements indicate the completion of construction in 2031, which means 21 years from the government’s decision and 14 years from the start of construction. It would be difficult to argue a priori that Finnish, French, American and British engineers, industry and builders are so much worse than Slovenian ones. A more efficient construction was carried out in the United Arab Emirates; Four Korean units were built at Barakah, each lasting 8 years [29].

Myth 7. “The price of a nuclear power plant is known and is not high.”

The published investment prices for the Finnish nuclear power plant Olkiluoto 3 were 3 billion Euros for the 1600 MW EPR reactor under a fixed-price contract, while the losses of supplier Areva and Siemens go to the amount close to 10 billion Euros, which means that the investment price was 13 billion Euros or at least 11 billion Euros [30]^,[31]. For the French nuclear power plant Flamanville 3, the same EPR reactor that began trial operation at the end of last year; the contract price was 3 billion Euros and the estimate of completed is 13.2 billion Euros [32]^,[33]. The record holders are two 1600 MWe EPR reactors in the UK at Hinkley Point C, which will cost £36 billion (€43.4 billion) at 2015 prices [34], or €57.7 billion at today’s prices, according to figures updated last year. The NPP Seizwell C, on the other hand, will jump from a planned £20 billion to £44 billion (or even £47.9 billion (55.8 billion Eur) [35] for two units. For the two Westinghouse AP1100 units at Vogtl in Georgia, USA, the final investment amount of USD 35 billion is indicated [36]^,[37]. Even sadder was the fate of the two AP1100 V.C. Summer units, which began construction in 2013 and abandoned in 2017 after having already invested/lost $9 billion [38]. A good price is expected to be achieved in the United Arab Emirates with a Korean supplier for four 1400 MW units (based on Combustion Engineering System 80 technology) for a contract price of USD 20.4 billion [39], which rose to a total price of USD 32 billion or USD 8 billion per unit during construction [40]. In addition, in the UAE, the scrotum was loosened widely for a large number of foreign experts for their regulatory body and for the domestic industry. However, we can in no way compare to the investment capacity of oil-lying Emirates. The latest news from the Tennessee Valley Authority -TVA states that the price of GE-Hitachi’s new 300 MWe SMR BWRX-300 will reach $5,4 billion plus interests when it is built in 2033 [41].

Myth 8. “Nuclear energy is cheap.”

Back in 1954, the then chairman of the U.S. Atomic Commission declared that nuclear energy would be “too cheap to be metered” [42]. Well, we haven’t achieved that yet, and we won’t for a long time. However, it is true that electricity from the 43-year-old Krško NPP is cheap, because the investment has paid off a long time ago. The domestic price at the plant was 34 Eur/MWh in 2022, and last year, due to an extraordinary overhaul after the leakage of a smaller pipe of the primary circuit and remediation, it was 43 Eur/MWh, plus 12 Eur/MWh for the decommissioning fund, LIL waste and spent nuclear fuel, in total 55 Eur/MWh. Electricity prices for households and industry are, of course, much higher. And this will be the case for a new nuclear power plant. French electricity is supposed to be cheap, but in 2022 alone, the French Électricité de France – EDF had a loss of 17.9 billion Euros, and the total debt of the company was 64.5 billion Euros [43] (losses and debt it can have because it is a state-owned company and its loses are borne by the state or by all taxpayers). In 2023, EDF had a profit of €10 billion and debt of €54.4 billion [44].

The published electricity price of the NPP Hinkley Point C is £92.5/MWh at 2012 prices [45]. At today’s prices, this is £136.9/MWh or 159.55 Eur/MWh. This price will be much higher by 2030 or 1931, when the plant is expected to be connected to the grid. If we make a very simple projection of the own price of electricity from NEK 2: capacity 1.2 GW, annual production 10 TWh, investment 15 billion EUR, and credit for 30 years at 5% interest rate, means that we have to repay in total 30 billion Eur or 1 billion EUR/year in 30 years, which gives electric price of 100 EUR/MWh only on account of investment and interest. To this must be added the cost of fuel of about 100 M Eur, maintenance of the power plant, insurance for break of equipment, fire insurance and liability for nuclear damage, contribution for the municipality, contribution for decommissioning, radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, training and salaries of staff, thus the price at the plant for the new Krško NPP – NEK2 is above 150 Eur/MWh. However, neither households nor industry will see this price, but much higher (at least for VAT and network fees). Also, Draghi’s report “The Future of European Competitiveness” from September last year [46] states that electricity from new nuclear power plants has risen in price by 46% from $123/MWh in 2009 to $180/MWh in 2023, above most other clean sources.

Myth 9. “Nuclear power is clean and environmentally friendly.”

There are no more operating uranium mines in the EU. The largest uranium mines in the EU were in the former East Germany district of Wismut, which were exploited by the former Soviet Union until 1990. The United Germany spent more than €7 billion on the environmental remediation of the area, which took 25 years [47]. The uranium mines in the former Czechoslovakia, mainly in the territory of today’s Czech Republic, were also very large, produced in total 110,000 tons of uranium, most of them for the former Soviet Union. Most of the mines were closed by 1995, with the last one closed in 2017. The surroundings of the underground mines have already been rehabilitated for EUR 45 million, and a larger uranium deposit, where underground leaching was used, will be rehabilitated by 2042 for an estimated EUR 2 billion [48]. Our RUŽV mine was a dwarf compared to Wismut, and the remediation of landfills is still causing us problems today and has not yet been completed, but of course it comes from taxpayers’ money. We also did not conduct an epidemiological study of the impact on employees of the mining and processing plant for the production of yellow cake, despite the fact that most miners and workers in the processing plant did not wear dust masks at their workplaces. Rarely has a country had the will and money to undertake the rehabilitation of former and current uranium mines. Uranium mines are or have had problems in the U.S. in New Mexico [49], in Ukraine in Zholta Woda[50], in Kyrgyzstan[51], Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Niger and Namibia. Also in Canada and Australia, uranium mines are not without environmental challenges.

Then there’s another obscure area that doesn’t get into the media and to the general public. These are huge amounts of depleted uranium, in the form of chemically toxic UF₆ in steel cylinders, which remain in uranium enrichment plants [52]. For one kilogram of enriched uranium at 3 to 5 % U-235, 9 kg of depleted uranium-238 (DU) remains. There are not many uses for DU, but it can be converted into uranium metal for ammunition, which pierces tanks and armored vehicles with kinetic energy. Otherwise, it waits and waits in cylinders in the form of UF₆ gas. Recently, the conversion of depleted UF₆ into the less (chemically) dangerous U₃O₈ has begun in France, Great Britain, the USA and Russia.

Myth 10: “Nuclear power is not import-dependent.”

This is a bad joke. Nuclear fuel, from yellow cake U₃O₈, conversion to uranium hexafluoride UF₆, enrichment of uranium 235, conversion of UF₆ to uranium oxide UO₂ powder, sintering of UO₂ pellets, zirconium tubes for fuel rods, fuel elements and all spare parts for the primary loop and secondary loop, lubricants, ion exchange resins and parts for regular maintenance of the primary loop, turbine and control systems are all imported [53]. Largest availability of yellow cake U₃O₈ is in Kazakhstan, followed by Canada, Namibia, Australia, most of conversions from U₃O₈ to UF₆is in Russia, followed by Canada,China; uranium enrichment in U235 is most abundant in Russia, followed by Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The countries that sell by far the most nuclear power reactors are Russia and China, followed by India, South Korea, and France(Figure11). What can be delivered at home? Maybe just power transformers, cement and sand. It is true, however, that we could have nuclear fuel in stock at the power plant for the next refueling, but so far in 43 years of operation, we have never made such a decision.

I am not saying that nuclear power can’t be part of energy mix of some countries. But before making big and costly decisions, it is a good idea to get a broad understanding of it and of the alternatives. I’ve saved a few myths for another time.

M.Sc.MiroslavGregorič,mech.eng.
Member of the National Assembly,
Former Director of the Nuclear Safety Administration of the Republic of Slovenia 1989-2002
Former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1998/1999

[1] https://www.energetika-portal.si/dokumenti/strateski-razvojni-dokumenti/nacionalni-energetski-in-podnebni-nacrt-2024/

[2] https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy

[3] https://worldsteel.org/data/world-steel-in-figures-2024/

[4] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1087115/global-cement-production-volume/

[5] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1290786/global-fertilizer-production-by-nutrient/

[6] https://www.statista.com/statistics/282732/global-production-of-plastics-since-1950/

[7] https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/per-capita-energy-use

[8] https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/nuclear/us-nuclear-industry.php

[9] https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx

[10] https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/RDS-2-43_web.pdf

[11] https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-countries-launch-declaration-triple-nuclear-energy-capacity-2050-recognizing-key

[12] https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_90816/the-nea-small-modular-reactor-dashboard-second-edition

[13] https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/2004MSC-WorldNuclearReport-EN.pdf

[14] https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/nuclear-power-in-the-world-today

[15] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident

[16] https://pris.iaea.org/pris/home.aspx

[17] https://pris.iaea.org/pris/worldstatistics/worldtrendnuclearpowercapacity.aspx

[18]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/386393976_The_Advancement_of_Silicon_as_A_Photovoltaic_Material_Historical_Accomplishments_Present_Efficiency_and_Future_Development

[19] https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_69396

[20] https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_90816/the-nea-small-modular-reactor-dashboard-second-edition

[21] https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/smr/licensing-activities/nuscale.html

[22] https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/uranium-production-figures.aspx

[23] https://www.irena.org/Publications/2024/Apr/Geopolitics-of-the-energy-transition-Energy-security

[24] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1214 of 9 March 2022 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2139 as regards economic activities in certain energy sectors and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 as regards specific public disclosures for those economic activities – https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2022/1214/oj/eng

[25] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R1214

[26] https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=860

[27] https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=873

[28] https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/EDF-announces-Hinkley-Point-C-delay-and-big-rise-i

[29] https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ReactorDetails.aspx?current=1050

[30] https://www.dw.com/en/finlands-much-delayed-nuclear-plant-launches/a-61108015

[31] https://apnews.com/article/finland-energy-nuclear-power-reactor-741341cfdf79e655a2a680e1b1130917

[32] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/edf-eyes-flamanville-epr-nuclear-reactor-fuel-loading-march-2023-12-21/#:~:text=The%20cost%20of%20the%20project,go%20into%20service%20in%202012

[33] https://www.nucnet.org/news/edf-announces-further-delay-and-eur500-million-cost-overrun-12-2-2022

[34] https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/EDF-announces-Hinkley-Point-C-delay-and-big-rise-i

[35] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/feb/19/citizens-advice-says-sizewell-c-costs-should-not-be-paid-with-energy-bill-hikes

[36] https://www.ans.org/news/article-3949/vogtle-project-update-cost-likely-to-top-30-billion/%22%22/

[37] https://apnews.com/article/georgia-nuclear-power-plant-vogtle-rates-costs-75c7a413cda3935dd551be9115e88a64

[38] https://apnews.com/article/57a95fce520e4804941f585d7eca97d6

[39] https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/workshops/wpne/presentations/docs/4_2_KIM_%20Barakah%20presentation.pdf

[40] https://www.agbi.com/analysis/energy/2023/07/uaes-nuclear-finance-deal-sets-standard-for-gulf/

[41] https://lnkd.in/g7FgXxjK tva-azr-eastus-cdn-ep-tvawcm-prd.azureedge.net – https://eu.knoxnews.com/story/money/business/2024/09/27/tennessee-valley-authority-small-nuclear-reactors-could-cost-billions/74894512007/

[42] https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/students/history-101/too-cheap-to-meter.html

[43] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/02/17/france-s-edf-posts-record-annual-loss-debt-swells_6016197_7.html#:~:text=While%202022%20revenue%20rose%2070,%E2%82%AC5.1%20billion%20in%202021

[44] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2024/02/16/edf-bounces-back-from-historic-losses-with-10-billion-profit-in-2023_6529830_19.html

[45] https://energyfutureslab.blog/2020/11/23/new-nuclear-in-the-uk-at-what-price-does-it-make-sense/

[46] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness-looking-ahead_en

[47] https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/wismut-brochure.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1

[48] Remediation of the Uranium industry in the Czech Republic: Regulation aspects and main technologies Miloslav Nemec et al 2021 J. Radiol. Prot. in press https://doi.org/10.1088/1361-6498/ac0d40

[49] https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-08/documents/uranium-mine-brochure.pdf

[50] Experience of Ukraine in implementing of rehabilitation programs for uranium legacy sites the IAEA Technical Meeting of the Uranium Mining and Remediation Exchange Group, 7 – 9 October 2019, Chemnitz, Germany

[51] https://www.pureearth.org/project/mailuu-suu-legacy-uranium-dumps-2/#:~:text=From%201946%2D1968%20the%20plant,meters%20of%20radioactive%20mining%20waste

[52] NUCLEAR WASTE CLEANUP DOE’s Efforts to Manage Depleted Uranium Would Benefit from Clearer Legal Authorities, GAO-22-105471, July 2022, United States Government Accountability Office, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105471.pdf

Click to access gao-22-105471.pdf

[53] GEOPOLITICS OF THE ENERGY TRANSITION, ENERGY SECURITY, https://www.irena.org/Publications/2024/Apr/Geopolitics-of-the-energy-transition-Energy-security

Heated fusion of the nuclear energy governance model in France

25 October 2024

Some background

In 🗓 February 2023, the French government announced its intention to merge IRSN, the nuclear expert body 🔬☢️ with ASN, the regulator authority, foreseeing with this the end of the dual model for the nuclear energy safety governance in France 🇫🇷.

This came as a shock since this model was praised internationally, especially after the Fukushima disaster 🗾🌊☢️, as a better model to be followed. Even more surprising for the barely 3000 employees concerned, this decision came without any previous notice or concertation of the institutional bodies constituting the very core of the safety governance model in France 🇫🇷.

Despite no impact assessment and a trans-partisan opposition coming from many elected official and nuclear experts 👩🏽‍🔬☢️, warning about the possible risks linked to such a disruption, the text was put to the vote at the French National Assembly 🇫🇷. Anyhow, after being ❌rejected a first time in 2023, the proposal, included in the nuclear acceleration law 📄☢️, was then ✅approved when presented a second time on 🗓 Tuesday 19 March 2024, with only 260 votes in favor and 259 votes against…

Enacted the following month in May 2024, this law led to the creation of a new entity called ASNR meant to start operating for 🗓 the 1st of January 2025 leaving only 7 months⏱ for both ASN and IRSN to organize themselves.

Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) involvement

In this context, NTW reacted immediately after the decision was made public, raising concerns on the outcomes for the safety of such a decision in an open letter to the then French Minister of Energy Transition co-signed by 11 other NGOs and 22 Members of the European Parliament 🇪🇺.

NTW was also invited to be heard by the for a consultation of the OPECST in June 2023, and by French Deputies, in 2023, and French Senators, in 2024, to give its opinion on the consequences of the foreseen fusion of ASN and IRSN. Its position on this issue revolved around the following four points that underlined the importance of preserving the qualities of the current French system 🇫🇷:

The exemplary nature of the French control system, recognized as a model at European level and the importance of strictly independent expert assessment institutions,
The ability of the French control and expertise system to maintain a link between and expertise, as well as a pluralism of expertise that guarantees the quality of quality,
Maintaining a high level of commitment to exchanges and research conducted at European level on the various technical and socio-technical issues related the nuclear sector,
Maintaining the development of a shared safety culture and openness to civil society in the spirit of the Aarhus Convention.

Also, the first open letter being left without response, NTW sent another open letter in March 2024 to the new Minister in charge who answered in 🗓 June 2024 with a letter (part 1 and part 2) ensuring that the new entity would be as transparent, as safe and as open to the civil society as what was functioning in the previous dual system.

However, even before the operation of the new ASNR, a major conflict of interest risk is pointed out by several NGOs ⚠️🧐 as the current Director General of the French National Agency for the Management of Radioactive Waste (ANDRA)🛢☢️ is foreseen by Emmanuel Macron to lead the future nuclear safety authority where he will have to give its opinion on the industrial geological repository for high-level and intermediate-level long-lived waste (Cigéo) he developed over ten years…

Transboundary participation and safety concerns

30 September 2024

In the frame of the Consultation on the 4th periodic review of France’s 1300 MWe nuclear reactors, NTW provided the following statement:

Insufficient transboundary participation and the risk of French Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) for European countries.

Note: ANCCLI being a founder member of NTW and a member of the HCTISN it didn’t associate to this statement for obvious deontological reasons.

Insufficient transboundary participation and the risk of French Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) for European countries

The safety objectives for the continued operation of 1300 MWe reactors is to move towards the safety levels of the latest reactors (EPR). To date, 1300 MWe reactors have not achieved the highest levels of safety, and concerns persist about corium and the ability to dissipate heat in the event of core meltdown, as well as the safety of fuel pools.

The ASN guidelines regulating protection against flooding are outdated for a possible extension[1]. There are remaining doubts whether the Hardened Safety Core’s design against flooding events considered adequately the effects of climate change. In fact, regarding impacts of climate change in general, Patrick Lejuste (IRSN) said during the consultation that he was “very pessimistic” adding that “there are a lot of unknowns”[2]. Also, design basis earthquakes need to be defined not only on deterministic methods as this is no longer state-of-the-art^[3].

Nuclear risk resulting from the French NPP fleet should not be underestimated and could probably impact other country in Europe. Calculations from the project flexRISK show a contamination risk in consequence of a severe accident in the old French NPP fleet for all over Europe.

The extension of reactor operation and, more generally, the arrival of new reactors (EPR) cannot be achieved without a thorough review of waste and fuel management, some links of which are under strain.

The risk to humans and environment resulting from severe accidents and from nuclear waste management has to be assessed and presented to the public, also from other European countries in a transboundary Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). The lifetime extension program constitutes a prominent part of the French energy policy and therefore falls in the scope of SEA Directive 2001/42/EC; moreover, as the French Multi-Annual Energy Plan also was not subjected to a transboundary SEA but only to a voluntary consultation.

If transboundary comments are appreciated, an English version of the consultation website and of all documents should be offered, too. Furthermore, NTW is concerned by the absence of consultation guarantors reported several times in order to ensure a real participatory process agreed on[4].

To preserve the trust and fruitful consultations of the participatory process, much greater access to resources must be possible for members of civil society such as local residents, NGO volunteers or young people.

We demand a transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for every lifetime extension of an old NPP beyond the originally foreseen lifetime of 40 years, especially in the lights of the new developments in the framework of the Espoo and Aarhus Convention which clarified the EIA obligation for NPP life-time extensions.

[1] https://www.umweltbundesamt.at/fileadmin/site/publikationen/rep0915.pdf 4.4.3, p.39.

[2] https://concertation.suretenucleaire.fr/media/default/0001/01/89713121a30d81cd976bcbca2ed8f218b79cd88f.pdf

^[3] Results from the expert statement of the Austrian Government to the consultation.

[4] https://concertation.suretenucleaire.fr/media/default/0001/01/89713121a30d81cd976bcbca2ed8f218b79cd88f.pdf

United-Kingdom: pressure over land at Moorside for SMRs

3 September 2024

“A letter signed by more than 100 political, business and union leaders is calling for urgent action to resolve land issues at Moorside so that new nuclear power stations can be built.

Whitehaven and Workington MP Josh MacAlister wrote the letter, which has been signed by fellow Cumbrian MPs Julie Minns and Markus Campbell-Savours, local members of the House of Lords, Cumberland Council leader Mark Fryer, trade union leaders in the nuclear industry and dozens of local business leaders.”

Here is the News & Star journal introduced the letter below (source):

“In my first few weeks as an MP I’ve met with ministers, the NDA, Great British Nuclear and leading nuclear industry figures. It’s become clear that there’s been a conspiracy of silence for years over plans for new nuclear in our area. The last government told our community to wait in line and trust the process. But having looked in detail at the process, we’ve been set up to fail because of competing claims on land at Moorside.

The NDA want to use a large chunk of the land at Moorside for potential future decommissioning activity. If all of the land they want is taken out then there’s not enough land left to build the number of small modular reactors Great British Nuclear wants.

Today, over 100 local leaders are ringing the alarm on this. Our ask is simple – this is land designated for new nuclear use and it should be prioritised for new nuclear use. The NDA should develop contingency plans for their future land needs and buy alternative land for future decommissioning activity if and when the need arises.

West Cumbria has the land ready to go, the strong community consent, the skills and the nuclear infrastructure which make our area the perfect location for new nuclear. We do not want to miss out on another opportunity.”

In reaction to this letter, Colin Wales, Chair of Cumbria Trust and member of Nuclear Transparency Watch, wrote the published letter below:

“Your article on the Battle for New Nuclear was an interesting read, particularly the part about the “conspiracy of silence” as Mr. Mac Alister described it. Surely part of the truth is that if the Mid Copeland GDF Community Partnership progresses to borehole investigations, then all the “Moorside” land mentioned will be “needed” for GDF access and decommissioning work. That is the NDA’s priority and given the encouraging subsea geology results a Sellafield area the GDF looks the most likely outcome.

Another thing counting against the siting of Small Modular Reactors in that area are the International Atomic Energy Agency guidelines. While not specific, common sense raises some significant safety issues i.e., Would it be wise to site any operational nuclear power plant next door to what Europe’s largest stockpile of nuclear waste for the reason that an accident at one facility might well render the other inoperable. Do either the Office of Nuclear Regulation or CoRWM have a view on this?

A less risky, less expensive, more productive, and safer alternative might be to spend such huge amounts of money on a Morecambe Bay/Duddon Estuary 3GW transport and power generation barrage. For comparison, this would :-

*Connect the 3 nuclear communities of Copeland, Barrow and Heysham.

*Provide easy access for West Cumbrians to the M6 southbound and increase tourism to the Western Lake District.

*Provide a flood defense for local communities against predicted rising sea levels.

*Provide 2 x the power output than 3 SMR’s

*As part of a deal to host the GDF it could provide us with cheaper power, an attraction to business investors and provide west Cumbrian households with discounted electricity bills for decades to come.

*Be built using a local workforce.

* Have a lifetime of 120 years as opposed to 60 years for nuclear power plants.

It is also important to note that Electricite de France (EDF) have abandoned their SMR programme and Rolls Royce are trying to sell their SMR business.

Given the new Chancellor’s ideas on using the Canadian approach to Pension Fund investment for major infrastructure projects, what is proposed above would work well since there would be guaranteed long term returns on investment. Other countries do strategic infrastructure programs, why can’t we?

Colin Wales – Cumbria Trust and Nuclear Transparency Watch”

Evaluation of Euratom Research and Training Programme 2021-2025

22 May 2024

The contribution of Nuclear Transparency Watch for the Evaluation of Euratom Research and Training Programme 2021-2025 is available here: https://t.co/1jSf4zGPx2

As an NGO involved in the Joint Programme on RWM EURAD, NTW has benefited from funding to represent civil society in the programme, in accordance with the first 2 pillars of the Aarhus Convention (access to information, access to participation) to help ensure the development of transparency and safety.

Results were obtained (e.g., production of deliverables on Transparency & Public Participation (T&PP) or Interaction with the Civil Society (ICS)) that envision better ways to interact with different stakeholders involved in decision making procedures and research. Progress (e.g., Double wing model of interaction and involvement in strategic studies) was made in understanding how to approach uncertainties through a common shared culture of safety and what this could mean in the perspective of intra- and intergenerational stewardship.

However, there is still insufficient structural and material support to develop sustainable, trustworthy (from industry’s interests) independent citizen engagement. Therefore, referring to the obligations under the Aarhus Convention art. 3(2), 3(3) and 3(4), it is necessary to include funds to develop civil society engagement structures to enhance civil society participation from a wider perspective and also in future research and training concerning the development of nuclear technology, including management of radioactive waste.

This is key to develop and implement processes, tools, knowledge, and relations that were previously established in the EURAD programme. If this is not continued, engagement towards transparency, public participation but also safety will suffer, as recognized by all stakeholders, who emphasized that participation of civil society in these research programmes is indeed indispensable in ensuring safety.

This contribution was developed by the European Environmental Bureau, Jan Haverkamp, Kobor Joseph, Colin Wales and other members of NTW Management Board.

Article on Rosatom-show in COP28 and other issues

30 January 2024

January 6, 2024

Source:Rosatom News

József Kóbor dr.

Pécs City Council, Hungary, European Committee of the Regions, NTW

Undoubtedly, it borders on the absurd that at the largest world environmental congress in 2023, COP28, the biggest appearance was presented by the Russian state nuclear giant ROSATOM. It is even more absurd when you consider that this company is theoretically being boycotted by the so-called “democratic world” due to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Or maybe not .

The Small Modular Reactors (SMR) have become so important for both Rosatom and the entire world that the Russian state-owned company recently dedicated a day to them at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai – an SMR day. In addition, Rosatom conducts negotiations, concludes agreements, develops projects and prepares documentation related to the construction of small power reactors. Nuclear experts from other countries will also be familiarized with small power plants and their operating characteristics.

SMR Day was one of the most important events in Rosatom’s COP28 program. The event began with a vivid multimedia presentation covering the construction of a small, powerful onshore nuclear power plant in Yakutia that will be “carefully” integrated into the Arctic ecosystem.

Guests were able to virtually explore the Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant, which supplies electrical energy and heat to the town of Pevek on the Chukchi Peninsula, Russia’s northernmost city. “I am sure that Rosatom’s small powerful nuclear power plants represent an efficient and environmentally friendly choice for countries that, for various reasons, have not previously thought about their own nuclear energy production,” said Alexey Likhachev, the general director of Rosatom, in his video message to the Participants of the SMR day. The Russian small, powerful nuclear power plants are also interesting for other countries.”

The parties will examine the possibilities and study the location of the mainland SMR, the configuration of the power plant and the infrastructure required for construction and operation, and select the optimal implementation model for the project.

Hearing all this, an expert who has worked in the nuclear industry for decades remembers the old joke: For a newborn, every joke is new. Because what ROSATOM has presented here on the subject of SMR is a story from over 60 years ago that could only have been something new for the “newborn” and laypeople. The IAEA had been trying to “sell” this to the public since 1960. It is the civilian application of these small nuclear reactors developed by the nuclear powers to power their strategic nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. (Also for icebreaking ships of the Soviet Union or Russia, this can be described as civilian use).

In reality, every previous project that has attempted to use SMRs for civilian economic purposes – where profitability, economy and the promised low operating costs mattered – has failed. The nuclear reactor was dismantled from the USA’s only nuclear-powered cargo ship 50 years ago and converted to diesel. Canadian nuclear heating plants were converted to gas and oil. Nothing came of the planned nuclear-powered locomotives, trucks, heavy commercial vehicles, seawater desalination plants, electrolysis plants and industrial heat generation units. Although a nuclear company came forward with such plans at least once every 10 years, they were never accepted by the business community.

So there is currently the lavishly presented Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant, whose towing through the Baltic Sea has sparked international protests – the others only belong to the category of visions, as was the case with the earlier ones.

IAEA also dreams – and unfortunately, EU plays with it

The IAEA published a report ahead of the COP28 conference entitled “Nuclear Technology Review – 2023”, which presents the main events and trends of 2022 and is considered by the agency’s experts as a pathfinder for the future development of the global nuclear industry.

We focus on the most significant and interesting ones.

Increase in nuclear capacity

The IAEA has increased its forecast for the development of the global nuclear industry in the last two years. According to the optimistic forecast, the installed capacity of nuclear power plants worldwide could reach 873 GW by 2050. This would be 10 percent higher than last year’s forecast. This could increase the share of nuclear energy in the global energy basket from the current 9.8 percent to 14 percent. (This was roughly the case before the Chernobyl meltdown .) Realizing this forecast will require a major shift to long-term operation, which means extending the life of existing reactors and building about 600 GW of new nuclear production capacity over the next 30 years.

It is quite shocking that the UN organization, whose main task should be the protection of nuclear safety, supports the systematic extension of the operational life of old, expired nuclear reactors, which obviously means an increase in risk and, incidentally, contradicts the previous principles of the IAEA!

And of course, Rosatom contributes significantly to achieving this goal. The state-owned company is building 22 power plant blocks in seven countries. The project portfolio includes a total of 33 units in 10 countries. The state-owned company has built 18 high-performance units in 18 years, nine of which were outside Russia. This year, fuel was delivered to the Akkuyu nuclear power plant under construction in Turkey and the Ruppur nuclear power plant in Bangladesh.

It is interesting that the IAEA does not say a word about the Belarusian Astravets nuclear power plant, which is also in operation – perhaps not by chance, as there are serious technical problems with the new VVER-2000 reactors. These reactors are also to be taken over by the Hungarian Paks2 project.

Difficulties in financing nuclear projects are hindering the construction of new nuclear capacity, study finds. However, there are “positive” developments, with nuclear energy being included in the sustainable finance taxonomy of the European Union and other countries in 2022.

What is taxonomy? Taxonomy is a tax system, which in this case means that nuclear energy and natural gas are considered “green” to enable the complete phase-out of coal and oil while meeting carbon emissions reduction targets. This would be the basis for the EU program to develop a green economy, the Green Deal. Behind this was a formal nuclear coalition: France under Macron, Hungary under Orbán, the Czech Republic, Poland – but above all Russia under Putin, for which both nuclear energy and gas would have been huge business.

Of course many people protested against it. Greens, professional associations. I – as a Hungarian city council member, member of the European Committee of the Regions and member of Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) – presented the case for plenary debate in December 2021. The European Parliament rejected the taxonomy. Nevertheless, the European Commission pushed through the taxonomy on December 31, 2021, on New Year’s Eve (!!). At this point, Russian tanks were already massing on the Ukrainian border. Everyone knows what happened next.

Small nuclear power plants

A current trend identified by the IAEA is interest in small-scale nuclear energy production. “Small nuclear power plants, along with high-performance water-cooled reactors, are expected to account for the majority of capacity additions over the next three decades,” the report says. of course in cooperation with the promotion of Rosatom projects..

Rosatom has commissioned the world’s first floating nuclear power plant, the Lomonosov Academic Floating Power Plant, and has begun implementing three more small floating nuclear power plant projects. The first four floating nuclear power plants provide power to the Baimsky Mining and Processing Complex. The second will be a small mainland nuclear power plant in Yakutia.

In addition, Rosatom is working on the construction of a small-scale nuclear power plant based on the Shelf-M reactor to supply energy to the Sovetskaya Gavan and neighboring areas. In total, Rosatom has about a dozen plans for the development of small nuclear power plants at various stages of development. Rosatom is actively negotiating with various governments, particularly Mongolia and Myanmar, to build small nuclear power plants.

The report states that modernized versions of water-cooled reactors are increasingly being considered, studied and built to gradually become modern, more efficient, semi-closed or “closed” ! Introduce fuel cycles. (A closed fuel cycle without waste production does not exist!)

“In the Russian Federation, conceptual research is underway on innovative water-moderated reactors with supercritical coolant parameters, including fast neutronic applications. The latest developments focus on small modular variants with an emphasis on improved nuclear safety, nuclear protective equipment, economic efficiency and sustainability parameters.” In addition, the development of Rosatom’s spectrally controlled VVER-S reactor is at an advanced stage. Among the promising technologies are also called salt bath reactors.”

Rosatom is also developing in this area, but not for energy purposes. The aim of the research is to test the transmutation of minor actinides in order to produce lower-activity fissile substances. This salt bath reactor is scheduled to be commissioned in 2030.

Note: not lower-activity, but perhaps shorter-lived isotopes (and not fissile material, but waste) can be produced with transmutation, but only with very poor efficiency.

“The report devotes a separate chapter to fast neutronic reactors.”

There are five fast neutron-cooled sodium reactors worldwide. One in China, one in India and three in Russia. Rosatom also plans to build the BN-1200 fast neutron reactor with 1200 MW of electrical power. According to plans, the first concrete for the BN-1200 will be poured into the block body in 2027.

“Technologies that use liquid metal coolants are receiving increasing attention. Rosatom is a leader here and is the first in the world to build the BREST OD-300 experimental demonstration reactor with 300 MW of electrical power.”

The characteristic feature of fast neutron technology is that the reactors operate at high temperatures in the strained operating mode with a high risk. Cooling with liquid metals. Most importantly, they produce plutonium, suitable for both nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel. Precisely for this reason they were not encouraged and even banned from spreading. Previous attempts in Germany, France, Sweden and even Czechoslovakia and Romania (!!) failed. It is truly shocking that this technology, which is extremely dangerous from a safety perspective, is now being promoted again.

The other applications of atomic energy

As mentioned in the report, the greatest interest in the non-electricity applications of reactor technologies is heat generation – alone or in conjunction with electricity (district heating and heat supply for industrial enterprises), seawater desalination and hydrogen production. Rosatom also deals with these areas and carries out developments. The Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant in Chukotka also supplies heat to the town of Pevek.

“A desalination plant designed and installed by Rosatom will be installed at the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant to serve the reactors and to meet the needs of drinking and fire-fighting water.”

The commissioning of an experimental plant for hydrogen production through electrolysis is planned at the Kola nuclear power plant. In addition, Rosatom is developing a project for a plant with an annual hydrogen production capacity of about 110,000 tons, using a 200 MW high-temperature gas-cooled reactor and chemical technology. The first unit is expected to be operational in 2032.

Natural uranium

NAÜ experts – citing global forecasts – estimate that demand for uranium will rise from about 160 million pounds of uranium oxide annually to about 190 million pounds over the next five years. “Due to the expected further increase in spot prices for the uranium market, the procurement departments of nuclear power plants are expected to give preference to the early acquisition of uranium ore concentrate and again enter into long-term contracts with uranium suppliers. This could lead to a further increase in the immediate price of uranium, which is forecast to rise to $65/ton by 2027, compared to the previous price of $52/ton – the report said. Reality is already exceeding expectations: on December 4, 2023, the spot price for uranium was $81.45/pound.

“New uranium mines are expected to open in the next five to 10 years, including in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mauritania and Namibia. “

And not just there. In Europe we know of at least ten new uranium mining projects. In southwest Hungary, uranium mining near the city of Pécs is to be reopened; in Germany there is the former Wismut project in the Elbe valley.

However, the planned production capacity of these new facilities will not be sufficient to meet the current shortage of supply, which is currently being met from secondary sources. In this regard, uranium exploration is expected to increase in the coming years, including both conventional and non-conventional sites,” state NAÜ experts.

“Rosatom is also developing sites and conducting exploration work in Russia and Kazakhstan and launching projects in Tanzania and Namibia.” (And in Hungary!)

Source:Rosatom News

József Kóbor dr.

Pécs City Council, Hungary, European Committee of the Regions, NTW

Link to the article in other languages: https://www.donauregion-atomkraftfrei.at/beitraege-ungarn/

EP&R: Is Bulgaria ready to react in a nuclear crisis?

12 December 2023

Analysis by Dr. Petar Kardzhilov on the answer of the Ministry of the Interior to his application according to the Access to Public Information Act.

There is a delegation of responsibilities from the minister of interior to the Main Directorate Fire Safety and Protection of the Population (FSPP), which are not legally justified because, according to the regulations, they are expressly prescribed for the Мinister. On the other hand, there are serious gaps in the regulatory framework, which are a factor in an unnecessary and dangerous division between the structures of FSPP at the Ministry of Interior around the country and the regional and local authorities.

After the strong interest of 46,000 readings on the “Aktualno” website to the publication with questions in my application according to the Access to Public Information Act (APIA) to the Ministry of the Interior (MI), regarding the prevention and preparation in Bulgaria for a crisis with high radioactivity in the environment, I offer a comment and analysis of the answers in the access decision of the ministry , signed not by the minister but by director of the Legal and Normative Activity Directorate, Mr. Hristo Stefanov.

Regarding the first question, concerning the need for citizens to have prior knowledge of how to react in situations with high radioactivity, the MI answers that the preventive activity is carried out by the bodies of FSPP under the MI, although in the Disaster Protection Act (DPA) and in the Ordinance for Emergency Planning and Emergency Preparedness in the Event of a Nuclear and Radiation Accident (OEPEPENRA) there are duties and responsibilities assigned specifically to the Minister of the Interior. Neither in the act nor in the ordinance is written that the minister can delegate his duties and responsibilities to FSPP. In particular, no answer is given, for example, whether the Minister agreed together with the Мinister of Education on the requirements for training in disaster protection in the system of preschool and school education, which the latter is obliged to approve, according to Art. 16, par. 3 of the DPA. In the answer, there is also no information that the minister has coordinated educational activities in the system of higher education according to the following par. 4 and 5 of Art. 16. There is no answer to the question of whether the Minister has approved programs for training the population on behavior and actions in an emergency situation and for specialized training of the executive authorities on the implementation of the external emergency plan, for which he is obliged according to Art. 21, para. 7, points 5 and 7 of OEPEPENRA. No information is provided as to whether and how the FSPP fulfilled these duties that the Мinister illegally delegated to them.

Attention deserves the answer from the Ministry of the Interior to the first part of the first question: “In what ways, in which settlements, in what locations and how often do the specialized state bodies work with citizens to create, as well as refresh the necessary prior knowledge with the aim of strict implementation by the citizens of protective measures to limit the harmful consequences for them in case of emergency situations with increased radioactivity in the environment?” The answer is: “In MI-FSPP, systematized information is not processed and stored according to the criteria set in the application for the frequency and number of trainings conducted by FSPP authorities in populated areas specifically on the subject of nuclear and radiation accidents.”; The lack of such information and archive means that the citizens have no way to find out whether and how the statutory duties of the Minister directly delegated to FSPP are fulfilled, both to date and in previous years decades ago. From the overall answer to the first question in the application, according to APIA, it is clear that the MI does not implement the DPA and OEPEPENRA, which necessitates the need for legislative changes, both essentially in the regulatory framework for preparation and radiation protection, as well as for control over the fulfillment of the duties of the institutions liable according to the law.

From the answer to the second cluster of questions: “Are there external emergency plans developed for all regions, coordinated by the Minister of the interior and approved by orders from the regional governors according to Art. 9 of OEPEPENRA? For which regions and municipalities in the country do such plans exist, according to the provision of Art. 16, par.2 of OEPEPENRA and Art. 9 of the DPA? Please indicate where these emergency plans are available to the public? ”, after one page of general information, it is clear that the MI does not know at all whether and which districts and municipalities in Bulgaria have emergency plans. This means that the current or former ministers of the interior have not fulfilled the provisions of Art. 9, par. 17 of DPA (effective from 07.05.2016) – to conclude agreements with regional governors and mayors regarding the implementation of these plans: “(17) In connection with ensuring the implementation of disaster protection plans under para. 4, 8 and 10, agreements are concluded between the Minister of Interior, the regional governor or the mayor of a municipality and the persons under chapter four, section II.” In the answer to the question, there is no information that the Minister has coordinated the development of emergency plans for populated areas, which is his responsibility according to Art. 9, par. 3 and Art. 16 from OEPEPENRA.

From the answer to the third cluster of questions about siren systems for early warning, we understand that for 39.33% of the citizens of Bulgaria, alarming is provided with modern systems. That is, the people living in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas, Ruse, Pleven, Pazardzhik, Montana, Smolyan, Kardzhali, Vratsa, Stara Zagora, Galabovo, Tsarevo, Ahtopol, the village of Lozenets and all settlements in the 30 kilometer zone around Kozloduy NPP may hear various siren signals, accompanied by a message of what type and with what threats the emergency situation is. In other settlements in the country, air raid sirens are used, without a voice message. Regarding the latest
ones, the Ministry of the Interior says that they are checked once every two years, but they do not say when they were checked for the last time and whether they are all in working order. It is also clear from the answer to this question that no serious tests and studies have been conducted, and there are no written reports on the audibility of sirens by all citizens in a given settlement, as well as on the audibility and intelligibility of voice messages and commands. We also understand that for this important part of radiation protection there is no documentation and no archive has been created.

From the answer to the fourth cluster of questions about prophylaxis with potassium iodide tablets, we learn that suitable tablets are available almost all over the country. I write almost all of it because of the expression “(…) as well as partially for the regions of Veliko Tarnovo, Lovech and Pleven”. Although according to the law they are obliged to buy and deliver them to the municipalities, the MI doesn’t answer the exact amount of tablets in municipalities, but they write that there are enough, including for foreign citizens and guests of the country. There is also no answer to the question of where the tablets delivered to the municipalities are physically located and how they are stored.

After another half page of general info, we indirectly get an answer to the most important question in this cluster – there is no centralized and uniform protocol for the time, places and ways of distributing the tablets to citizens: “According to the Ordinance on the Order of Creation, Storage, Renewal , Maintaining, Providing and Accounting for the Stocks of Personal Protective Equipment, the mayors of the municipalities prepare logistical schemes for the provision of individual protective equipment to the population if necessary, which are updated annually. Logistic schemes should be available in the respective municipal administrations.” Since each mayor decides for themselves how to distribute tablets, and the MI has no idea and control over who decided to do what, the result in the event of a crisis will certainly be panic actions and severe consequences in places. This leads us to the conclusion of a very serious gap in the Bulgarian legislation.

The answer to the fifth group of questions concerning evacuation procedures also speaks of a serious gap in the legislation. The MI admits: “The legislation in the Republic of Bulgaria does not contain norms obliging MI to collect and store data on the settlements in the country that have evacuation plans. Calculations for evacuation and dispersion in the event of a disaster/accident are part of the respective regional or municipal disaster protection plans, which are published on the website of the relevant administration.” It is grossly inadequate that the MI, which is responsible for the public order and the security of citizens in the country, does not know who, where and how should evacuate in case of a crisis. This gap is a condition for chaos, incidents, accidents, looting, exposure of citizens to high doses of radiation and other damaging events in a nuclear accident crisis or attack. The ministry doesn’t even know how many and which settlements have evacuation plans.

Even more unacceptable, absurd and in complete contradiction to the law is the answer to the biggest sixth cluster of questions from the application under the APIA, concerning the availability of individual means of protection for citizens in a crisis with high radioactivity. The MI writes: “The Minister of the Interior, respectively the MI, is not obliged by law or by-law to collect statistical data on the individual means of protection available in the country. Because of this, they are not obliged entities within the meaning of Art. 3, par. 1 of the APIA for providing the requests in point 6.2 of the application for public information.” How then, if they think that they are not obliged to collect data, do they fulfill the obligations of the minister, arranged in Art. 21, par. 7, point 13 of the OEPEPENRA: “The Minister of the Interior supervises the maintenance of the readiness of the individual and collective means for the protection of the population” ?! There is no answer to the question of how Bulgarian citizens can get life-saving protective equipment, written in a leaflet by “Kozloduy” NPP, uploaded to the website of the MI – FSPP: civilian gas mask, children's gas mask, respirator, child safety camera. The answer to this group of questions also ends with the admission that the MI don’t store information and don’t have control: “At the Main Directorate FSPP to the MI no information is stored according to the criteria specified in the application – what exactly, how many individual means of protection, where they are located, how many of them are suitable and how they will be distributed in the event of a nuclear accident.” Thus, when a crisis with dangerously high radiation level occurs no one, including the MI, will know how, with what means to protect themselves and, contrary to the more correct decision to stay in the buildings, many people will run in panic, which will most likely lead to far more severe consequences.

The answer to the last seventh cluster of questions about information and communication doesn’t offer other options for activation, except for the siren system, national television and radio, the websites of the municipalities, the FSPP and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. With the highly developed modern telecommunication and online network capabilities, a much more secure and qualitative structure for information and communication can be developed, but, as can be seen from the response, the MI is not working in such a direction. Even the crisis call center, which is mandatory for every large-scale disaster/accident/attack, is not provided as an opportunity for information, communication and control over the situation by the structures of the FSPP in the country.

In conclusion, from the whole answer of MI it is clear the statement that there are several legal and by-law requirements in the DPA and OEPEPENRA, which are not complied with by the MI, because the institution does not accept them as their obligations. There is a delegation of responsibilities from the Minister to MD FSPP, which are not legally justified because, according to the regulations, they are expressly prescribed for the Minister. On the other hand, there are serious gaps in the regulatory framework, which are a factor in an unnecessary and dangerous division between the structures of MD FSPP in the country and the regional and local authorities. There is a lack of data on a sufficient number of quality activities for the preparation and prevention of crisis with high radioactivity levels, working together with the structures of the MI, local authorities, educational services, private organizations and citizens.

Petar Kardzhilov is a Doctor of Public Communications and Information Sciences at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, a specialist in risk and crisis communications, a member of the Union of Scientists in Bulgaria, a qualified expert at the international NGO for transparency in nuclear energy “Nuclear Transparency Watch”.

Abbreviations:
MI – Ministry of Interior
FSPP/MD FSPP – Main Directorate Fire Safety and Protection of Population
DPA – Disaster Protection Act
APIA – Access to Public Information Act
OEPEPENRA – Ordinance for Emergency Planning and Emergency Preparedness in the Event of a Nuclear and Radiation Accident

Audition of NTW by the French Assembly regarding absorption of IRSN by ASN

14 June 2023

The French National Assembly heard Julien Dewoghélaëre for Nuclear Transparency Watch, Tuesday 6 June 2023 at 5.30pm on the consequences of a possible re-organisation of the ASN and IRSN on scientific and technological plans nuclear safety and radiation protection.

The transcription of this hearing by Jean-Luc Fugit, Deputy and Stéphane Piednoir, Senator for the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technical Choices (OPECST) can be found here after: Parlementary Audition

On this topic, you can also find out NTW’s press release after that a coalition of NGOs and Members of the European Parliament have sent out an open letter with concerns for nuclear safety system in France:
https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/media/open-letter-to-the-french-minister-of-energy-transition-on-nuclear-safety.html

Furthermore, you can find ANCCLI’s Director, Yves Lheureux, views given to NTW, Monday 13 March:
https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/media/update-on-the-irsn-dismantling-project-by-the-french-government.html

WEBINAR – ANCCLI’s position regarding IRSN dismantling project by the French government

13 March 2023

Today, Monday 13 March is an important date in the evolution of the IRSN dismantling project decided by the French government early February, in fact IRSN more united than ever is demonstrating again today against this decision considered rushed and unjustified.

… [Read More]