Prevent and anticipate through transparency and participation
Indeed, the day after the invasion, on 25 February 2022, the armies of the Russian Federation attacked the Chornobyl power station and a few days later the largest power station in Europe: Zaporizhzhia
👉 find here ENSREG statement
“The French government has announced plans to transfer the competences of the Institute for Radiation Protection & Nuclear Safety (IRSN – Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire) to other institutions. The aim is to strengthen synergies at a time when France is seeking to expand its nuclear programme.”[1] … [Read More]
Initiation of a constitutional amendment procedure in the European Union seems increasingly likely due to the positions on treaty reform of the European Parliament, the European Commission, France and Germany as well as other EU member states. The aim of the webinar is to discuss the need of reform or abolishment of the Euratom Treaty and how EU’s constitutional framework could look like if it included mechanisms for an efficient and timely green energy transition.
Time: February 20th, 3-4 PM, CET.
Here is below an article reporting the outcomes of NTW organisation Laka’s actions towards more compliance to criteria of the Aarhus Convention namely “access to information” and “access to justice”. It also relates directly to the BEPPER report and the “access to funding”.
Faisabilité Technique et Financière du Démantèlement des Infrastructures Nucléaires
The issue of decommissioning costs is a key challenge in the nucear sector. Perhaps surprisingly, a recently published French Governmental report on Faisabilité technique et financière du démantèlement des infrastructures nucléaires, from Le Commission du Développement Durable et de l’Aménagement du Territoire, Assemblée Nationale, has just blown a significant hole in the French decommissioning strategy.
http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/documents/notice/14/rap-info/i4428/%28index%29/depots
In late January this year, on the last day of the Commissions work, the Committee took evidence from the EDF head of decommissioning and me. Given the Commission had been working on this for months, and had listened to mounds of complex data, I decided to cut to the chase and make as clear an argument as I could. What follows is that evidence.
How much has France, Germany and UK set aside for decommissioning ?
Whereas Germany has set aside €38 billion to decommission 17 nuclear reactors, and the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) estimates that clean-up of UK’s 17 nuclear sites will cost between €109 – €250 billion over the next 120 years – France has set aside only €23 billion for the decommissioning of its 58 reactors. To put this in context, according to the European Commission, France estimates it will cost €300 million per gigawatt (GW) of generating capacity to decommission a nuclear reactor – far below Germany’s assumption at €1.4 billion per GW and the UK of €2.7 billion per GW.
How can EDF decommission at such low cost?
EDF maintain that because of standardisation of some of the reactors and because there are multiple reactors located on single sites, they can decommissioning at a low cost. Does this claim stack up ? Well, probably not. Reactors are complex pieces of kit, and each has a differing operational and safety history. In other words, nuclear reactor decommissioning is essentially a
‘bespoke’ process.
Why has EDF underestimated the costs of decommissioning
and waste storage ?
Even EDFs €23 billion limited provision for decommissioning and waste storage is a large sum of money for a company that has huge borrowings and enormous debt, which is currently running at €37 billion, Standard and Poor and Moodys (the two biggest international credit rating agencies) have already downgraded EDFs credit-worthiness over the corporations potentially ill-advised decision to go ahead with attempting to construct two more of the failing Areva reactor design (the EPR) at Hinkley Point, UK. And any significant change in the cost of decommissioning would have an immediate and disastrous impact on EDFs credit rating – something that the debt-ridden corporation can simply not afford.
Spent nuclear fuel build-up
Then there’s EDF’s existential problems at France’s high-level waste storage and reprocessing facility at La Hague, where spent nuclear fuel stores are reaching current cooling capacity limits. This means La Hague may now have to turn away spent fuel shipments from Frances reactor fleet. In any case, since ASN have identified safety problems with some spent fuel transport flasks, spent fuel transport to La Hague has substantially slowed. All this means the build-up of spent fuel at nuclear sites across France, with the associated problem of cooling the spent fuel at nuclear sites during dry summer periods, with all that means for further escalation of rad-waste management costs.
French National Assembly Commission Findings
Happily, and perhaps unexpectedly, when the Commission publishes it’s final key findings, they come down on the side of those who voiced concerns about EDFs provisioning for reactor decommissioning and waste management does not include “obvious under-provisioning” regarding “certain heavy expenses”, such as taxes and insurance, remediation of contaminated soil, the reprocessing of used fuel and the social impact of decommissioning. The Commission found that the clean-up of French reactors will take longer, be more challenging and cost much more than EDF anticipates.
The Commission reports that EDF showed “excessive optimism” in the decommissioning of its nuclear power plants. “Other countries have embarked on the dismantling of their power plants, and the feedback we have generally contradicts EDF’s optimism about both the financial and technical aspects of decommissioning… “The cost of decommissioning is likely to be greater than the provisions”, the technical feasibility is “not fully assured” and the dismantling work will take “presumably more time than expected”.
Critically, the Commissions report says that EDF arrived at its cost estimate by extrapolating to all sites the estimated costs for decommissioning a generic plant comprising four 900 MWe reactors, such as Dampierre, noting that: “The initial assumption according to which the dismantling of the whole fleet will be homogeneous is questioned by some specialists who argue that each reactor has a particular history with different incidents that have occurred during its history”.
So what now?
Soon EDF will have to start the biggest, most complex and costliest nuclear decommissioning and radioactive waste management programme on earth. It seems very likely that (for various reasons not unassociated with it’s current bank balance) EDF may have seriously underestimated the real challenges and costs, with serious consequences for its already unhealthy balance sheet. This will have profound consequences for the French State, who underwrite EDF.
Taken up in the Press:
Opinion column of Philip Kearney
Together with three otherNuclear Transparency Watch colleagues I attended the European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) conference in Bratislava on October 3-4. This opinion piece is anevaluation of the the merits of the on-going NGO involvement in ENEF activities. Some years previously NGO delegates from a number of organisations had decided to withdraw from ENEF due to frustration at the failure to include their perspectives in the proceedings and the outcomes of the meetings. NGOs are now responding invitations from the European Commission and the Forum to re-engage in its deliberations.
The context in Bratislava was welcoming, the conference competently organised and the setting and logistics well matched with similar events elsewhere. The question to be considered was whether the approach and format facilitated inclusion, multiple perspectives and a sense of equality between stakeholders.
I would argue that in spite of genuine attempts to be inclusive, the use of a traditional conference format militates against achieving those outcomes either at the process level or in terms of generating engagement and innovation.
It was noteworthy that in the opening speech on the first evening by Commissioner Šefčovič and in the remarks by the prime ministers, the key EC officials and others on the second day, there were multiple references to the importance of civil society participation and the fact of the web-streaming was continually mentioned as an indication of ENEF commitment to transparency. These added dimensions do constitute improvements and are acknowledged. Unfortunately, they do not constitute a sufficient breakthrough in terms of qualitative enhancement of public participation.
The format of the event was unimaginative, too conventional and traditional. Panels of speakers giving formal presentations with minimal audience involvement simply results in reiterating much that is already known, does not stimulate engagement or participation and basically keeps things the same.
The moderator, Ms Melinda Crane, was excellent and skilful and did a great job within the significant constraints of the format. However, a World Café (or similar) model, using small groups with a much larger civil society participation, would re-energise the format and make the event much more engaging, innovative and relevant.
The inclusion of a few civil society representatives is tokenistic and at too small a scale to have any significant impact. To be fair there were at least four speakers from the CSO sector which constitutes quite a significant proportion, but the traditional format can absorb a high degree of ‘counter-views’ without any significant moderating effect on the over-riding concerns and pre-occupations of the main players in the Forum whose perspectives continue to dominate the narrative.
It will require a significant redesign of the format to make wider participation relevant and meaningful. There were relatively few of ‘us NGOs’ in the audience but my point is that even if we were many more it would not have made a substantive difference if the format remains linear and non-interactive.
It is clear from the conclusions of the 10th Forum Plenary meeting in Prague in 2015 that the ‘crucial involvement of civil society’ is fully recognised and that the ‘general public acceptance deficit is a central issue to be addressed’. It is also clear from the 2016 Plenary that this has not translated yet into substantive engagement and involvement to achieve the ‘strong and effective participation of civil society’ spoken of in those same conclusions. There is quite some way to go.
In its recent communication “Nuclear Illustrative Programme ” (PINC) of April 2016, the European Commission states that “the EU legal framework requires increased transparency and public participation in nuclear issues, as well as improving cooperation between all stakeholders. The directives on nuclear safety, radioactive waste and radiation protection referred to above all lay down requirements on availability of information and public participation. (…) In addition, the Commission will continue to promote the dialogue between stakeholders in the European Nuclear Energy Forum”.
There is an openness to NGO engagement on behalf of the wider society. This has been demonstrated in the response to our various proposed changes and additions including:
These changes should now be built upon to include some of the points mentioned above but most particularly a fundamental redesign of the format to be genuinely participative and interactive. Specialist expertise in running more interactive, multi-stakeholder events should be engaged. Civil society representatives should be included at every level of the Forum’s work and in the planning and implementation of the conferences. To allow this, specific resources have to be dedicated to NGO resourcing, both in preparations and for participation.
Anything less, although well-intentioned, is merely tinkering with a tired formula and will not change it.
In summary:
My impression is that ENEF realises that the prospects for the nuclear industry are tied increasingly to its capacity to engage meaningfully with civil society. It has very limited expertise in effecting this shift and almost no imagination. NTW should urge ENEF to open up, democratise and modernise its processes and procedures and our continued participation should be contingent on them agreeing to such changes.
Philip Kearney,
Management Board,
Nuclear Transparency Watch
November 2016
An opinion column of Bender Javor, Member of the European Parliament and member of NTW
Last week the European Commission made a decision on one of its investigations related to the new Nuclear Power Plant, Paks II of Hungary. An infringement procedure was opened because of the lack of compliance with EU public procurement rules after the Hungarian Government directly awarded the nuclear project to Rosatom. In its decision the European Commission approved the reasoning of the Hungarian Government and allowed the project to proceed without competition and without transparent public procurement based on technical exclusivity, stating that only the Russian reactor fits the Hungarian legal requirements. The details of the Commission’s justifications are not published yet, however, without going into details we can draw a clear conclusion: the Paks II agreement is again one of the ad hoc, shady deals of the Commission which follows along the history of the nuclear sector from the very birth of EURATOM.
The idea at the founding of the EU was the creation of a common European market and granting equal access by Member States to scarce resources. The aim was “to make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (Schuman Declaration).
Although, the idea of the declaration is still valid, since the early 1950s the world is slowly moving from coal, oil and nuclear to renewable energy sources. Tackling climate change and the need to shift our economy towards sustainability have become core issues of cooperation in Europe and beyond, as for example the Paris Agreement shows. To meet these challenges, the EU amongst others created an ambitious plan of establishing a European Energy Union, further strengthening the EU’s single energy market to ensure that Europe has secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy and to further the original aim of a peaceful Europe.
While European policymaking must react to the challenges of the 21st century, it still has to fit to an outdated legal framework which dates back to the nineteen fifties and which doesn’t treat the different sources of energy equally. This is just absurd. It is as if the information and telecommunication technology market was regulated by unchanged rules since the 1950s. It seems unimaginable. And that’s exactly the case with nuclear energy.
As a primary law, EURATOM and the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU provide different rules and conditions for nuclear energy compared to other sources of energy. In theory, according to Article 194 of the TFEU, renewable energy sources should be prioritised, but in practice nuclear is in a more favourable position because EURATOM seems to be exempted from the market rules. Although Member States are free to choose their energy mix, when it comes to investment in the field of nuclear, any form of support is considered as “facilitation of investment and supporting the EURATOM objectives” (according to Art 2c of the EURATOM) and as such, state aid is lately almost automatically accepted. The European Commission madeits position clear in its decision on Hinkley Point “C”. The news about the possible outcome of the pending Hungarian Paks II state aid case also strengthens such an understanding.
When it comes to new capacity in Europe the Member States should be offering tendering procedures under Article 8 of the Electricity directive: based on technology neutrality so they could choose objectively, under market conditions, to assess which source of energy is cheapest and the most competitive for the future. Unfortunately, the Commission does not consider it applicable to nuclear energy.
In the Brittany case, France chose gas turbines to fulfil the need for new capacity. The Commission opened a case against France under Article 8 as they believed that alternative sources were not considered. But the same rules does not apply to Paks II due to EURATOM.
As I mentioned already public procurement directives are not equally applicable for nuclear and renewables and rules can be easily circumvented. In fact, the Commission is willing to accept that Member States can refer to their own technical specification when discriminating against other suppliers in the nuclear market. In any other sector of the internal market, it would be unacceptable for the Commission and of course for the European Court of Justice.
Under such circumstances, it seems that we have a biased legal environment. It allows discrimination against certain sources of energy, renewables in particular, and there are no equal opportunities on the energy market.
Since the adoption of the Rome Treaty, the treaties have been regularly updated to meet the challenges of the day. EURATOM is unchanged since 1957. The situation could be somewhat improved if there was a coherent and up to date secondary legislation in the field of nuclear on the internal market. But there isn’t. In fact the situation is comparable to a city court basing its legal arguments on a day to day direct interpretation of the Constitution Indeed, here the interpretation depends on the Commission.
The EU definitely needs a predictable strong common energy market, where investors and all Member States can feel certain about their investments and their long-term profit perspectives. But conferring special status on nuclear with exemptions from the European competition and public procurement laws cannot represent common European objectives and a free energy market cannot be built on this foundation in the future.
If the Commission really want a competitive and united energy market, they should interpret and apply the existing rules according to the needs and the conditions of the 21st century and not according to the outdated and short-sighted needs of some Member States or on the ancient traditional views of technocrats. I have no doubt that the European Court of Justice would support a position which takes into consideration the technological and political developments if the final word was theirs.
10th EUROPEAN NUCLEAR ENERGY FORUM, PRAGUE – MINUTES FROM OUR CHAIR
NTW is concerned about the reduction of ENEF to a single-interest group of industry experts
On 26-27 May 2015, the 10th European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) meeting took place in Prague. ENEF was created in November 2007. It was initiated by the March 2007 European Council, when Member States suggested “that broad discussion should take place among all relevant stakeholders on the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy.” But difficulty was encountered in bringing all the key actors together. Indeed, civil society wasn’t always consulted as required. Since the beginning of ENEF, over 50% of the participants are from the industry and only two NGOs were initially invited. The rest of the participants are European Commission and national government representatives.
During the last five years, this restriction has affected the quality of debate and the credibility of ENEF as a place for discussion among all stakeholders. ENEF is facing challenges to be taken seriously and to shed its image as a pro-nuclear industry forum. ENEF is promoting nuclear energy while there are many related issues to consider: transparency, emergency preparedness and response, radioactive waste, ageing reactors, etc. At the 5th plenary session of ENEF, all NGOs and nuclear-critical members of the European Parliament decided to leave the Forum. This was due to the lack of taking into consideration of civil society’s views in the Forum. Although NGOs got a lot of interesting information and networking opportunities, and got their voices heard by people who normally are not confronted in this way, inputs from NGOs were structurally marginalised. NGOs inputs were not reflected on their merits in papers produced by ENEF working groups, in conclusions from ENEF meetings and in the media coverage.
The conditions for participation of civil society
This year, Michèle Rivasi, President of NTW, was invited as a speaker for the 10th plenary of ENEF. This invitation shows a willingness to open dialogue with civil society and to debate the future of nuclear energy without taboos. For this, it is necessary to allow a broad participation of civil society: elected officials, academics, NGOs and citizens. NTW, alone, cannot fully represent all these fundamental actors. It is NTW’s strong view that it is essential that more actors from civil society are involved at all levels in ENEF operations and that for NTW to continue to participate a restructuring on this basis is required:
1) It is essential to clarify the objectives of ENEF.
There is a lack of transparency and clarity about the Forum’s objectives: What are the objectives? Is it about promoting nuclear or about creating the conditions for a proper application of EU legislation to the nuclear sector? NTW is not established to promote or eject nuclear energy, but rather to promote quality and transparency of EU decision-making processes and thereby increase safety in nuclear matters.
2) Furthermore, it is necessary to clarify the rules concerning the governance of ENEF.
The Forum is still very opaque: How are agendas fixed? Who chooses the stakeholders and ensures plurality? Who appoints the moderators of ENEF meetings and working groups? How are the conclusions and decisions of the meetings made, and communicated? For NTW, a fair balance of power for communication with the media is essential. It is necessary to introduce transparency and to include civil society representatives in the Forum’s governance bodies, which need to be pluralistic. Civil society representatives should be included – on the same terms as all the other stakeholders – at all levels of the ENEF structure and be entitled to participate in the organization, agenda-setting, conclusions and communications of ENEF.
3) Finally, it is necessary to create conditions for effective participation of civil society.
It isn’t right that representatives of civil society must fund their travel and do not have access to translations. It is necessary to release resources to finance participatory and equitable governance.
These conditions are necessary to ensure that ENEF stays within its original mandate: to be a platform for discussion on the future of nuclear power, without taboos and open to ALL players. It is the only way for ENEF to play a credible role in shaping EU energy policy towards more sustainability.
Numerous examples demonstrate that such participation is possible
The approach adopted by NTW to organize round tables in the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) field is one example. It helps to mobilize civil society and the authorities together and to put on the agenda an update of EP&R arrangements. For example in Ukraine, organizing a roundtable on post-accident emergency has gathered scientists, representatives of Energoatom, the Minister of Health and NGOs around the same table.
Another example of the effectiveness of public participation is France where participation is based on local information committees (CLIs). The CLIs guarantee access to information and participation of stakeholders such as elected officials, NGOs and trade unions in discussions with operators and regulators. During the stress test process, the public via the CLIs could speak before the release of the French nuclear safety authority report (2012). Proposals and recommendations were supported by civil society. This participation has led to an investment of 10 billion euro in safety.
Moreover, these same CLIs are launching working groups on decommissioning and are themselves very pleasantly surprised by the interest of the public on this issue. Concerns vary from one territory to another. Some local actors are interested in safety, environment, waste, issues related to decommissioning, others are focusing on economic and social transition, what decommissioning generates. The local character of these issues has to be taken into account and could be easily supported by civil society.
Whatever the field, better debates and decision-making require broad participation. This participation is highly essential today for the European institutions given the growing distrust of the people toward Europe. On the issues of nuclear safety, civil society and local representatives have a fundamental legitimacy and right to participate in the debate.
As demonstrated during all nuclear accidents with consequences outside of the fence, ordinary citizens take in the end a large part of the burden of the consequences of safety flaws. “Civil society is indispensable to prevent political and economical reasons and short term industrial interests overshadowing the priority of safety.”
Michèle Rivasi, Chair of Nuclear transparency Watch
by Benedek Jávor
A new nuclear power plant with two blocks from Rosatom (VVER1200) is planned as an addition to the existing four-block nuclear power plant, Paks-1 that currently generates some 40% of the Hungarian energy production. According to the contract, Hungary signed with Russian Federation, the two reactors of the new plant will be operational by 2025 and will cost 12,5 billion EUR. 80% of the foreseeable capital cost is financed by an intergovernmental loan from Russia.
Although the Hungarian government states that everything is perfectly planned, the project is fiercely contested by experts, political stakeholders and the public both on the Hungarian and the European level. Some are infuriated by the lack of preliminary investigations, impact assessments, public consultation, lack of transparency and alternative scenarios and the centralization of the decision and the energy systems. From Europe, there are concerned voices due to lack of tendering, the obstacle the plant poses to restructure the Hungarian energy mix and to add renewables and also due to risk of corruption and illegal state aid. I organized a hearing together with Energiaklub and NTW on the issue in late March. You can find the summary here.
Since, I have been working on several issues related to the new nuclear power plant and I would like to share the latest developments:
STATE AID CASE
The NGO Energiaklub of Hungary submitted a complaint to the European Commission to start a non-notified state aid procedure in 2014. Recently Commissioner Vestager replied to our joint letter with Energiaklub and she states that the HU government formally notified the Paks 2 project to the Commission on 22/05/2015.The Hungarian government claims that financing Paks-2 is not a state aid, as they think the return of investment is more than favourable. The EC is currently waiting for further explanation from the Hungarian government and after receiving all the relevant data, the EC have 2 months to come up with its position.
Energiaklub has recently made an analysis, which claims exactly the opposite.
LEAKED PRELIMINARY DOCUMENTS FOR FEASIBILITY STUDY
Despite the fact that the District Court of Budapest ruled in a decision that Energiaklub could not have been given access to the preliminary and background docs for the new NPP as they did not exist according to the Hungarian government, I published a series of short documents that were given to me from the electricity management company MVM and from academia that indirectly prove the existence of the above mentioned documents and give also some insight to the weak points that have been raised by many people, some of whom are specifically connected to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The opinion from MVM states that there are elementary mistakes and out-dated data in the modelling and no appropriate modelling of the system integration. The grid integration is not modelled as needed. The work is not budgeted and planned, as would be needed at this stage of implementation. The documents affirm our hypothesis that the promoters do not actually know costs, they just have estimates. The costs are underestimated and exclude a series of additional investments needed for the operation of the NPP. External factors like the EU competition law are totally ignored in the analysis.
The first document from academia says that when Paks2 will operate with both blocks, it will be necessary to cut operation time for Paks 1. The document actually estimates that block 4 will be able to run for only 1000h/year, in other words 30-35% less production. It also states that a pumped storage facility will be needed for the grid system regulation and this has not been budgeted for.
The second is specifically about cooling water and highlights mistakes committed for the cold-water channel of Paks1. It states that the new NPP will cause serious nature protection problems and that excess heat will call for (partial) capacity reduction which will in itself hinder the 95% planned use of the new NPP and the financial prospective won’t be achieved. Furthermore, it is likely that nature protection standards are likely to rise in the coming 60 years and might lead to new situations like the one in the Rhône where drought threatens the cooling of nuclear plants.
The authenticity of the documents has been confirmed by both MVM and the Hungarian Academy of sciences.
PUBLIC HEARINGS ALL OVER EUROPE
Over the summer the international phase of the Environmental Impact assessment for Paks-2 is running and we expect public hearing in the concerned countries in the early autumn. So far dates for Germany (16/09), Ukraine (17/10) and Autria (23/09) have been fixed.
Benedek Jávor is a member of NTW and member of the European Parliament for Together – Dialogue for Hungary Alliance. He is first vice-chair of the Committee for Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and is a substitute member of the Committee of Industry, Research and Energy. Furthermore, Benedek is a founding member of the environmental NGO Védegylet (Protect the Future!) and holds a PhD. in biology.
OR HOW TO UNDERMINE NUCLEAR TRANSPARENCY
When Belgium decided in 2003 that it wanted to change direction towards a clean energy future and phase out its nuclear fleet after 40 years of operation, it probably had not expected the mess it is currently facing. Or maybe it did. Politics in the kingdom can be messy.
Belgium followed France in building nuclear capacity when it noticed its coal mines could not be operated economically in the late 1960s. The oil crisis in the early 1970 further paved the way for a nuclear option. Seven reactors were built on two sites. Four of them in Doel, on the doorstep of the port town of Antwerp. The other three in Tihange on the Meuse river bank between Namur and Liège. But when the date of the first shut-downs was nearing, Belgium’s nuclear operators Electrabel / ENGIE and EdF together with their political fan-club indicated the government that switching off the oldest three reactors, Tihange 1, and Doel 1 and 2 in one year might lead to shortages on extreme winter days. Despite the existence of alternatives strategies, the Belgian government decided in 2013 to give Tihange 1 a life-time extension of another 10 years, while confirming the limited lifetime of 40 years for the others.
In the summer of 2012, two of the “newer” reactors, Tihange 2 and Doel 3, were found to have thousands of cracks in the form of hydrogen flakes in their reactor vessel. There was no documentation to explain this phenomenon and several tests remain inconclusive about the question whether these cracks have been there from the start or could have grown over time. As a result, both reactors are off-line and kept off-line until further investigations give more clarity.
Doel 1 and 2 were slated for closure in February 2015 and December 2015 respectively and Engie/Electrabel and the new pro-nuclear Belgian energy Minister Marie-Christine Marghem saw their chances. They saw non-availability of Tihange 2 and Doel 3 as a good excuse to grant also Doel 1 and 2 an extra life of 10 more years. Official reason was again a potential shortage in unprecedented cold periods in the coming winter.
For Tihange 1, a secret agreement was made in which Engie/Electrabel and EdF will have to give the state 70% of their windfall profits from this move. In return, the state guarantees that whatever happens politically, Engie/Electrabel and EdF will be able to run those reactors up to the final date in October 2025. If not, the state will pay them all lost profits. Of course, technical malperformance or radioactive risks can lead to a shutdown without payments. But whenever there is an accident elsewhere in the world and the Belgian government would like to follow Germany’s wise lead and shut down all reactors older than 32 years, this agreement could become very costly indeed. This political guarantee is the same trick that EdF also smuggled into its agreement with the British government for the construction of the Hinkley Point C power station. The people carry the financial risks for politicians that make choices involving nuclear risks. The Belgian government declared the whole agreement as confidential and thus opposed its publication. Even against the ruling of Belgium’s independent Commission on Access to Information, and against valid Belgian and European laws and the Aarhus Convention on access to environmental information, which give the public interest prevalence over limited commercial ones – apart from the fact that there is no real commercial information in this agreement anyway. A few courageous parliamentarians from the Greens then decided to quote the entire agreement in a resolution, and thus we were able to have a look at it.
One important thing that the government forgot is the fact that for a life-time extension also an environmental impact assessment (EIA) needs to be made under the same Aarhus Convention and the Espoo Convention on transboundary EIAs as well as European and Belgian law. If the Belgian minister would take into account this obligation, that could mean that Tihange 1 would not be able to operate until such an EIA would have been carried out – with Belgian and transboundary public participation, that can easily take a year. In this case, according to the terms of the agreement, the Belgian state has to pay the missed profits to Engie/Electrabel and EdF.
It explains why the Belgian government is fighting the legal obligation of an EIA with all means available, despite the legal opinions from the country’s highest legal institution, the Council of State. The legal advice that the Belgian government quotes comes from Engie/Electrabel and the Dutch nuclear lawyers office Stibbe. Those acknowledge the obligations, but give tips to the Belgian government to help it to escape its obligations.
In the Energy Union discussions, Belgium supports the European aim of having the safest nuclear fleet in the world. Everywhere it states that nuclear safety always will be priority number one. However, the recent developments give us serious concern that financial objectives may have predominance over safety objectives.
Tihange 1 and Doel 1 and 2 are already 40 years old, while their design lifetime was only 30 years. A recent study commissioned by Greenpeace [1] shows that they faced many issues in the EU stress tests and many others were conveniently moved under the carpet. Another [2] shows that they are situated next to large populations and their emergency preparedness and response provisions in case of large accidents are fully inadequate
Instead of continuing to flog these old horses to work, it is essential to respect transparency laws and to focus on nuclear safety. Belgium is not a Banana Kingdom.
[1] Critical Review of the Updated National Action Plans (NAcP) of the EU Stress Tests on Nuclear Power Plants, June 2015, Greenpeace
[2] David Boley’s study of the Belgian emergency and response situation , Janvier 2015, ACRO
OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AROUND BELGIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS
Ir. Jan Haverkamp (1959) is board member of Nuclear Transparency Watch and expert consultant on nuclear energy and energy strategy for Greenpeace Central and Eastern Europe and the World Information Service on Energy (WISE).
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